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Reading beneath the Grain
CLOV: (anguished, scratching himself ):
I have a lea!
HAMM: A lea! Are there still leas?
CLOV: On me there’s one. (Scratching.)
Unless it’s a crab louse.
HAMM. (Very perturbed.)
But humanity might start from there all over again!
— Samuel Beckett, Endgame
In the last three decades, animal studies has inluenced every discipline in 
the humanities, including literary studies, encouraging scholars to acknowl-
edge the anthropocentrism of the stories we have been telling about our-
selves and the natural world. Nuanced analyses of what Aristotle called the 
“more perfect creatures” have introduced new life forms into traditional liter-
ary and cultural history, so that once- overlooked references to horses, dogs, 
apes, bears, cats, wolves, and other beasts in early modern texts now shim-
mer again with complex meaning.1 Imperfect Creatures: Vermin, Literature, 
and the Sciences of Life recovers a category of creatures— vermin— whose 
philosophical and literary signiicance in the period between 1600 and 1740 
has been underestimated, if not erased. Historically, “vermin” is a slippery 
term because it refers neither to a particular biological classiication nor to a 
group of genetically related animals; instead, it names a category of creatures 
deined according to an often unstable nexus of traits: usually small, always 
vile, and, in large numbers, noxious and even dangerous to agricultural and 
sociopolitical orders. he characteristic feature of vermin is they reproduce 
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so rapidly and in such numbers they threaten to overwhelm their biological, 
environmental and— from a human perspective— sociolegal contexts.
he irst full- length study of vermin in the early modern period, Im-
perfect Creatures is not a straightforward cultural history but an interdis-
ciplinary analysis of how and why these reproducing animal populations, 
perceived as threats to a fragile food supply, make their way into seven-
teenth- and early eighteenth- century literature and philosophy. Vermin play 
an important role in Shakespeare’s Macbeth; they are natural antagonists in 
the plague poetry of Abraham Cowley; and they enable homas Shadwell’s 
satire of science, along with his critique of a parasitical social order. As the 
constitutionally simple beings against which the complexity of the human 
brain and body are deined, imperfect creatures anchor experiments in early 
modern neuroanatomy. And disappearing magically from Crusoe’s wrecked 
ship, they serve as the absent center of an island economy that has grounded 
discussions of modern subjectivity and political economy. By bringing schol-
arship from agricultural history, environmental history, and medical history 
to bear on these and other works of literature, I argue rats, frogs, lies, and 
other animals located at the limits of our now- suburban zoography have 
shaped humanist practices, writings, and systems of thought. My historical 
focus is on the period 1600 to 1740, when religion, art, and science, in difer-
ent ways, cast vermin as agents in studies of, and debates about, the socio-
natural world. hroughout this period, leas, worms, wasps, maggots, and 
other swarming things carried considerable metaphysical and ethical weight, 
continually reshaping fundamental categories of analysis and perception.
By far, the most sustained body of scholarship on vermin during the ear-
ly modern period has been written by medical and agricultural historians: 
the former focus on microscopy and plague treatises, and the latter focus 
on farming and extermination manuals. Medical historians trace a line of 
thought linking vermin and disease that runs through the works of Athana-
sius Kircher (1601– 80), William Harvey (1578– 1657), Robert Hooke (1605– 
1703), Antony van Leeuwenhoek (1632– 1723), Francesco Redi (1626– 97), 
Marcello Malpighi (1628– 94), Jan Swammerdam (1637– 80), and Sir Wil-
liam Ramsay, author of the irst full- length treatise on worms in English.2 
he root of vermin is vermis, from the Latin word for worm, and the origin 
of worms was a subject of ongoing debates about the origin and nature of 
the universe and, in microcosm, of the human body.3 Kircher describes the 
blood of those infected with plague as “so crowded with worms” that he is 
dumbfounded: “I have even been persuaded forthwith that man both alive 
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and dead swarms with numberless but yet invisible little worms.”4 In his Hel-
minthologia (1668), Ramsay, one of two physicians to Charles II, claims the 
body’s “innumerable” vermin are “the most material enemy” of the physician, 
responsible for diseases from lux to melancholy.5 Parasitology and medical 
history have generated their own subgenre of literary criticism, with critics 
such as Jonathan Gil Harris demonstrating how English writers imagined 
internal others— Jews, Catholics, and witches— as pathogens within the 
body politic.6
he work of agricultural and legal historians ofers a glimpse of how hu-
mans struggled to protect an often- fragile food supply from vermin— crows, 
rats, locusts, and other pests. Animal trials, in particular, provide a window 
to assess the status of vermin as local and national threats.7 In he Criminal 
Prosecution and Capital Punishment of Animals (1906), E.P. Evans describes at-
tempts on the part of ecclesiastical and civil courts to punish, rehabilitate, or 
excommunicate insects, rooks, roosters, caterpillars, pigs, and other animals 
between 1266, the irst recorded instance of an animal prosecution, and the 
eighteenth century. Nicholas Humphrey singles out a 1478 Swiss prosecution 
against insects called the Inger: “hou irrational and imperfect creature[s],” 
the proclamation begins, are “called imperfect because there was none of thy 
species in Noah’s ark”; they are charged with destroying or devouring “food 
for men and animals” and are ordered to “depart” or else present themselves 
for trial on the sixth day.8 heir advocate used the usual defense that God had 
directed all creatures to “go forth and multiply”; the court, however, countered 
that because the Inger, like other insects, had not been placed on the ark 
but were products of spontaneous generation, they had no rights, and their 
defense did not hold. While animal trials were less frequent in England than 
on the Continent, English rats and other creatures were subject to ongoing 
extermination campaigns, and vermin- killing treatises described a wide range 
of technologies.9 Leonard Mascall’s 1590 Book of Engines, subtitled Sundrie 
Engines and Trapps to take Polecats, Buzards, Rattes, Mice and all other Kinded 
of Vermin and Beasts Whatsoever attests to the battles humans waged against 
creatures that threatened crops and grain supplies.10
By grounding my analysis in medical, agricultural, and environmental 
history, I explore the relationships between scientiic accounts of vermin and 
literary and philosophical representations. Focused, as they are, on the pre-
history of germ theory, medical historians often overlook the role of vermin 
in the everyday attempts of people in the seventeenth century to put food 
on their tables. Agricultural historians reverse the problem; concentrating 
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almost exclusively on the food supply, they focus, understandably, on ex-
termination campaigns, farming technology, and wetlands drainage, always 
with an eye to economic rather than epidemiological consequences. Liter-
ary critics have inherited and even reinforced this division, recognizing the 
importance of vermin to literature but rarely attempting to think outside of 
traditional disciplinary divides, seldom investigating relationships among a 
fragile food system, dearth, disease, and social order. Part of the problem is 
humanists have tended to base their analyses on culturally individuated ver-
min or, more precisely, on verminized individuals, such as Reynard the Fox 
or the other trickster igures who populate Aesop’s fables. As a composite of 
characteristics packaged for human consumption, these speaking rats, fox, 
and ravens necessarily relect to readers their own fears and desires, much 
as John Donne’s lea becomes the emissary of the speaker’s erotic ambi-
tions or Anna Letitia Barbauld’s eloquent “free born” mouse ventriloquizes 
Barbauld’s revolutionary views. Signiicantly, Aesop’s rat, Donne’s lea, and 
Barbauld’s mouse, unlike their real- life counterparts, travel alone. If we are 
to understand vermin as a category and as genuinely agential creatures in 
the early modern world, it is necessary to resist subjectivizing tendencies 
to treat dangerous and annoying animals as allegorized, isolated, domesti-
cated, personiied  or even eroticized beings. In order to appreciate— indeed, 
even to recognize— the speciic role of vermin in early modern literature, we 
must supplement an emphasis on individual animals or anthropomorphic 
representations by focusing on how writers and their readers perceived the 
creaturely populations who were their fellow travelers and constant, if un-
wanted, companions.
Imperfect Creatures, accordingly, argues what made vermin dangerous 
was less their breed- speciic cleverness or greed than their prodigious pow-
ers of reproduction through which individual appetites took on new, collec-
tive power, especially in relation to uncertain food supplies.11 Bitterly cold 
winters during the Little Ice Age brought with them not only skating par-
ties on the hames, the irst in 1607, but widespread dearth, if not famine.12 
Temperatures in northwestern Europe dropped an average of two degrees 
during the period 1350– 1850. During these centuries of comparatively cold 
winters and wet, cool summers, national policies on vermin control began 
to be developed; Henry VIII’s 1533 policy mandating villages collect dead 
pests was renewed and amended under Elizabeth in 1566.13 It required citi-
zens to make and maintain nets and snares for trapping crows, rooks, and 
choughs— birds that devoured seeds before they could take root and sprout 
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and grain before it could be harvested. Mascall estimates crows and other 
birds in England consumed or spoiled eight bushels of grain per parish; 
this amounted to 13,000 tons a year across the kingdom.14 On the Conti-
nent, where grain prices were even higher, vermin— and especially rats and 
mice— began to be prosecuted vigorously during this same period. Walter 
Hyde’s 1916 count suggests a direct correlation between climate change and 
the increased number of animal trials: in the fourteenth century, only twelve 
animals were tried; that number nearly doubled in the early days of the Lit-
tle Ice Age, and then in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it rose to 
ifty- seven and ifty- six, respectively.15 While it is easy to dismiss the animal 
trials as superstitious or archaic practices supplanted by advances in phi-
losophy and science, we should not underestimate the panic they expressed 
or the extent to which populations of rats, moles, rooks, choughs, and mice 
were perceived as eating into the health of the body politic.
To view vermin in their stark collectivity during the early modern 
period— as “infestations,” “crowds,” “hordes,” and “swarms”— is to acknowl-
edge their agency, including their role in disease. Francis Bacon observes 
in Sylva Sylvarum (1627) that during the plagues of 1624 and 1625, “many 
toads” with tails appeared in the ditches and “low grounds” of London, 
“which argueth,” he writes, “a great disposition to putrefaction in the soil 
and the air.”16 Even in the absence of germ theory, early modern writers 
were attuned to the relationship between “swarms” of imperfect creatures 
and threats to the human body. According to Paul Reiter, Shakespeare, De-
foe, Pepys, and others commented on changing weather patterns and what 
we now recognize as malaria, the physician homas Sydenham (1624– 89) 
even noting relationships between fevers and rapidly reproducing insects. 
“When insects swarm extraordinarily,” Sydenham writes, “and when . . . au-
gues . . . appear early about mid- summer, then autumn proves very sickly.”17 
Late seventeenth- century travel writers such as John Ovington (1653– 1731) 
similarly remark, with horror, that “the prodigious growth of Vermin, and 
of venomous Creatures” during India’s monsoons are seemingly both cause 
and efect of the “malignant Corruption of the Air,” which has “direful Ef-
fects upon the Europeans”:
For Spiders [in India] increase their Bulk to the largeness of a Man’s 
humb, and Toads are not of a much less size than a small Duck; where-
by ‘tis easily seen by these venomous creatures, what encouragements 
these infectious and pestilential Qualities meet with in this place, and 
6 imperfect creatures
under what a contagious Inluence all the Inhabitants must consequent-
ly be seated. his induc’d a Gentleman one time in the Governours and 
my Company, and some other person of Note, to airm, that he believ’d 
it rain’d Frogs; because he espied upon his Hat small Frogs, about the 
bigness of the end of one’s Finger, when he was at a great distance from 
any House or Covering, from whence they might drop.18
Like Sydenham and Bacon, Ovington links vermin infestations to life- 
threatening efects on human health: “All Wounds and Contusions in the 
Flesh,” he continues, “are likewise very rarely healed here” (145). If vermin are 
not quite disease vectors in such accounts, they are harbingers and agents of 
malignant forces.
On transoceanic ships, the malevolent triad of illness, eluvia, and ver-
min was intensiied. Writing from Commodore George Anson’s lagship, 
the Centurion, in the 1740s, Richard Walter describes eforts to eliminate the 
“noisome stench” below decks and destroy “vermin” by cleaning, smoking the 
deck, and then washing the whole ship with vinegar. Both stink and vermin 
had “increased upon us to a loathsome degree,” he reports, “and besides being 
most intolerably ofensive, they were doubtless in some sort productive of 
the sickness we had labored under for considerable time.”19 Walter’s phrase 
“doubtless in some sort” is extraordinarily suggestive. hree quarters of An-
son’s crew died of scurvy and other diseases during the four years that the 
Centurion spent circumnavigating the globe.20 While the speciic role of ani-
mals in shipboard illness was subject to debate, Walter joins other writers of 
the period in assuming that “infection” and “infestation” are related, perhaps 
diferent aspects of environmentally induced disease, one endoparasitic, the 
other exoparasitic.
Imperfect Creatures explores the associative linkage noted by Sydenham, 
Ovington, and Walter through several literary genres and across a range 
of disciplines that were once folded into the broader rubrics of “natural 
philosophy” or “physico- theology.” In contrast to the dominant trends in 
scholarship on early modern animals, represented by the groundbreaking 
work of Erica Fudge, Bruce Boehrer, Karen Raber, Laurie Shannon, Donna 
Landry, Richard Nash, Tobias Menely, Nathaniel Wolloch, Laura Brown, 
and Jonathan Lamb, I turn away from so- called “charismatic megafauna”— 
including companion species with whom humans afectively identify— in 
order to analyze animals as part of dangerous or noxious collectives.21 Im-
perfect Creatures also lies outside the tendency of animal studies to align 
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itself with animal welfare movements; I do not, admittedly, have an over-
riding interest in the welfare of weevils. But, as Cary Wolfe argues, it is not 
necessary to “like” animals in order to confront speciesism or to craft a post-
humanist theory of the human subject.22 Indeed, critical animal studies, to 
which I am deeply committed, can only beneit by sustained critical atten-
tion to zoological outcasts, those “imperfect creatures” traditionally excluded 
from Noah’s Ark. As the onto- historical “others” of dogs, horses, apes, and 
humans, vermin ofer a new, post- Cartesian way to understand the mate-
rial and ethical systems underwriting early modern literature: the “perfect” 
creatures of Renaissance humanism are, in a very real sense, dialogically de-
pendent on “imperfect” ones. Whether depicted as frogs raining from the 
Indian sky, as plagues of lice swarming over bodies in Egypt, or as packs of 
dogs roaming the streets of London, populations of vermin move through 
history like locusts through a ield. hey contribute materially to dearth, 
famines, and disease— and discursively to ethical and political systems that 
expose or exploit human corruption, competition, violence, and vice. Wil-
liam Shakespeare, Abraham Cowley, George Wither, homas Willis, Ber-
nard Mandeville, homas Shadwell, John Wilmot, Daniel Defoe, and their 
contemporaries write vermin into history and, in so doing, gesture toward 
the larger systems that deine early modern culture.
Actant Fleas, Nesting Systems
“Mark but this lea,” writes Donne, drawing attention to a parasite that, 
in biting him and his lover, has “mingled” their blood.23 In order for Don-
ne’s poem to work as a mode of playful seduction, it must igure the lea 
as an individuated agent, an accidental (or contingent) opportunity for the 
poet’s sportive, metaphysical speculation. In its solitude, Donne’s lea is 
decontextualized— not party to bodily pain, not a harbinger of a parasitical 
infestation that might remind us of the couple’s proximity to disease and 
death. His lea, singled out by the speaker, allows the poem to bypass or even 
eclipse a larger biopolitical system in order to focus on a singularly speciic 
and explicitly erotic situation. Metaphysical wit depends on such decontex-
tualizing: “this lea” that joins the lovers— not “these leas” that collectively 
bite and torment their hosts.
Donne’s “Mark but this lea” evokes a prior tradition of already- eroticized 
parasites celebrated in the genre known as La Puce, or “Flea Searcher” paint-
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ings. In these often- puzzling and much- debated treatments of women 
grooming themselves, the (always invisible) lea symbolizes, for the viewer, 
the potential of vermin to deine and cross boundaries between inside and 
outside, self and other, innocence and corruption.24 Georges de la Tours’ he 
Flea Catcher (1630– 34), the most famous painting in this tradition, features 
a (possibly pregnant) young woman in a stage of partial undress, sitting be-
fore a candle in an austere room, crushing between her ingers an invisible 
parasite. In its apparent religiosity, de la Tours’ painting often is contrasted 
to secular versions of the genre, such as he Flea Hunt (1628) by Gerrit van 
Honthorst, one of several lea- searcher paintings set in a richly decorated 
brothel, where a bare- breasted woman, usually with the help of one or more 
servants, investigates her naked body while two or more men look on. With-
in the erotic tradition, the lea serves as a point of (impossible) identiication 
for heterosexual men, fantasizing (in the words of the seventeenth- century 
poet Peter Woodhouse) about being transformed into a parasite who has 
“free scope him selfe to sport” in the “soft bosomes” of women, even to “low-
er stray” at his “best pleasure.”25 For Woodhouse and the painters like van 
Honthorst, the lea is the inferred agent of a forbidden intimacy that, two 
centuries later, still inds expression in the semi- pornographic novel, Auto-
biography of a Flea.26 he women in the lea searcher paintings and litera-
ture are always the objects of a scopophilic gaze. Having said that, the very 
possibility of scopophilia depends, to some extent, on the lea as an agent. 
Without the lea, the woman is not searching, her breasts are not uncovered, 
the voyeurs in the painting see only the interior of a room, and the viewer’s 
gaze is not directed to the actions that precede the imperative, “Mark but 
this lea.” he actions and identities of the men and women in the room are 
bound up in the set of relations that includes, but is not limited to, the leas 
being purpled under women’s ingernails.
By insisting on the agency of invisible leas, I am invoking the post- 
Kantian tradition of analysis associated with, among others, the work of 
Michel Serres and Bruno Latour.27 For Serres and Latour, there are no a 
priori distinctions between humans and nonhumans, subjects and objects, 
because these distinctions depend on complex relational networks of actors, 
forces, objects, and so on. he actor-network theory (ANT) with which 
their work is allied promotes a relational materiality that presupposes all 
entities in a system can be identiied and analyzed only in relation to a larger 
system. Within this context, nonhumans are more than Cartesian objects 
or mere vehicles of our thoughts and intention; instead, they do things in 
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speciic sociohistorical, ecological, institutional, and psychological environ-
ments. hey are, like humans, actants in the world. Latour coined the term 
actant to distance himself from anthropocentric accounts of intentionality; 
it is only through a series of networked associations that actants are pro-
vided with substance and action. Actants, he writes, “modify other actors”; 
they are not subjects, but “interveners.”28 In this respect, for Donne or de la 
Tours, leas are actants because they compel changes in those around them: 
women search, men watch.
Latour’s work has been useful to scholars in Animal Studies because, 
in the words of Erica Fudge, it allows “us a way of rethinking not only how 
we conceptualize the arrangements of culture and the structures of thought 
that organize human’s perceptions of animals and themselves in the past— it 
might also allow us to rethink how it is that we understand the history of 
being human, and from that gain a better understanding of what it means 
to be human now.”29 In treating distinctions between agents and structures, 
in perceiving humans, animals, and objects as equally signiicant actors in 
dynamic and interlocking systems, historical animal studies and ANT share 
post- Cartesian assumptions about the socionatural world. Latour’s theory 
of actants shifts fundamental questions from the identity of actors to their 
functions; the “who am I?” of western philosophy is superseded by another 
question: “what is my place in the system”? Moreover, the idea of system 
itself is destabilized: systems are not regarded as hierarchical or unidirec-
tional arrangements of actants and forces but as what some historical ecolo-
gists call “heterarchies.” Rather than emphasizing stability in ecosystems and 
holistic and deterministic notions of “system,” many historical ecologists 
base their analyses on models in “which elements are unranked . . . or ranked 
in a variety of ways depending on conditions,” or on “scalar hierarchies” in 
which any level of organization can afect or control temporarily others.30 
Imperfect Creatures ofers a heterarchical reading of key texts in early modern 
literature in order to explore how sociohistorical, biopolitical, and ecological 
conditions reconigure seventeenth- century perceptions of leas, curs, rats, 
worms, and other vermin. If these are the despised and wretched creatures 
at the lowest rungs of the Great Chain of Being, they are also, paradoxically, 
crucial constituents of early modern eco- culture.
A brief look at Guiseppi Maria Crespi’s lea searcher painting reveals 
how the concept of heterarchies can be useful as an interpretive strategy. 
he so- called Italian Hogarth, Crespi produced seven paintings in this 
genre between 1715 and 1740; most of them feature a woman delousing 
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herself as her lapdog, a King Charles spaniel, looks on.31 While its focus 
is on the woman disrobing, Crespi’s painting (ig. 1) difers from works in 
both the earlier religious tradition, associated with de la Tours, and the 
overtly ribald one of the Merry Flea Hunt. Crespi depicts what many crit-
ics have regarded as a more realistic, ostensibly less emblematic, depiction 
of everyday life, possibly the irst plate in a lost series about an opera singer 
from the lower ranks who arrives through youth, beauty, and talent to a 
life of luxury. Commenting on the painting’s “fully detailed ambience and 
situation,” Mira Pajes Merriman inds:
A slightly dissolute air pervades the scene, perhaps through the sugges-
tion made by the baby in the care of people who seem to be too old to 
be its parents. he ingénue— in charming disarray— takes center stage, 
absorbedly looking within her bodice.  .  .  . Her profession is indicated 
by the announcements on the wall and primarily by the presence of the 
musical instrument, wholly out of place in the otherwise unrelievedly 
lower- class scene of hanging garlic and clay pots.32
his interpretation divides the painting into humans and the objects around 
them— garlic, pots, the spinet, papers on the wall— an “ambience” that ac-
cords with critical perceptions of seventeenth- century realism. he only ac-
tion in the painting is described as a form of seeing: the woman is “looking 
within her bodice,” oblivious to the stares of those around her. She is the 
only real agent in the room.
Yet from a heterarchical perspective, the painting depicts multiple 
actants— the young woman, the old man, the woman at the door, the baby, 
the dog, and the invisible lea. While all of them look at something, the orga-
nization of the painting, its kinetic energy, hinges on what we cannot see— 
the biting lea or louse. As in Donne’s poem, then, the lea draws the viewer 
into a quasi- intimacy with the young woman. An irritant in a seemingly 
anthropocentric system, the lea provokes the action and is the source of the 
painting’s humor. he obvious and lewd joke of most lea searcher paintings 
is that the female breast, which should nurse a human child, is instead the 
dinner table for vermin; in this painting, the lea feeds on a woman’s breast, 
the old man feeds the child, and the dog waits to be fed. Part of a network 
of relations, the lea and its actions are not necessarily subordinated to an 
anthropocentric social order. Indeed, the more sophisticated, second order 
joke of Crespi’s painting is all the actants are in some sense parasites, feeding 
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of others. he baby is parasitical in an obvious sense, living on the body of 
the young mother. he young mother, in turn, depends on the gifts of her 
admirers (the spinet and the lapdog). If the old couple can be seen as the 
woman’s parents, then they too may be living of her singing or sex work, 
but the lapdog may be the most overtly parasitical of the portrait’s actants. 
Having replaced both the baby and the lover in the woman’s bed, stripped of 
the ability to feed itself, the small dog stares at the viewers, drawing us into 
the system of parasitical relations.
As Latour and Serres suggest, parasitical relations need to be viewed 
as temporary alliances— as elements of a system that come together, dis-
rupt previous arrangements, and then are disrupted. Nested within Crespi’s 
painting, in this regard, is a gendered network of relations that turn on the 
historical association between the lower creatures and women, between 
vermin and female “imperfections.” In Aristotelian taxonomies, modiied 
throughout the seventeenth century, women were identiied by a compara-
tive lack of physiological development, regarded as cold and therefore im-
perfectly formed versions of men. As Aristotle writes in On the Generation 
of Animals:
For females are naturally more imbecile and cold; and it is necessary to 
conceive the female sex as if it were a physical mutilation. Within the 
womb therefore the female acquires a perfect organization slowly; for 
the separation and distinction of the parts [by which a perfect organi-
zation is efected] is a concoction; but heat concocts, and that which is 
hotter is more easily concocted. Out of the womb, however, the female 
quickly arrives at perfection and old age. For whatever is less, more swift-
ly arrives at the end, as in the works of art, so likewise in the productions 
of nature.33
Morally, an “imperfect” constitution implied an “imperfect” moral nature, 
one lacking a masculine, guiding rationality.34 Despite objections by Cor-
nelius Agrippa (1486– 1535) and other less orthodox thinkers, so established 
was this historical connection among women, insects, and constitutional 
inferiority that it was only in 1701 that the parasitologist Nicolas Andry de 
Bois- Regard congratulates his readers for having overcome the mistaken 
Aristotelian assumption that insects and women are intrinsically defective.35 
Writing after microscopy revealed complex nervous systems in leas and 
women alike, he asserts,
12 imperfect creatures
hat it is not at all to be wondered at, that some Philosophers have 
looked upon Insects as imperfect Animals, since some of them have so 
far been mistaken as to advance, that the Body of a Woman is an imper-
fect Work, a rough Draught formed contrary to the design of Nature, 
as if a Body perfectly proportioned, in which no irregularity can be ob-
served, which wants no necessary part, and has none that’s Superluous 
[can be imperfect].36
Microscopy, the two- sex model, and the argument from design potentially 
freed women from the traditional association with imperfect creatures like 
lies, spiders, reptiles, and shrews.
At more or less the same time, however, women were assigned, in their 
roles as housewives and mothers, the function of policing the parasites in 
the household. “he whole Preservation of Men’s Health and Strength,” 
writes the author of a 1750 book on parasites, “chiely resides in the Wis-
dom and Temperance of Women.”37 While the author of this treatise (an 
“Eminent Poulterer, Lately Deceased”) is not the irst to enjoin women to 
lea patrol— a famous Dutch Proverb is “Lazy mother, lousy heads”— he 
describes how “cleanliness,” deined simultaneously as a moral and spiritual 
category, turns on new intimacies between women and vermin. he “great-
est Slut in the World,” he asserts, “does hardly smell her own House or Bed 
stink; For in Man is contained the true Nature and Property of all things, 
both of Good and Evil; therefore he is both liable, and also apt, to receive all 
Impressions, and to be wrought on by all things he shall either communicate 
with, or joyn himself to, whether it be Cleanness, or the contrary” (22). Her 
sense perceptions dulled by long habituation to ilth, the “slut” becomes im-
mune to the vermin around her; the good woman, in contrast, is “wrought 
on” by their presence and exercises “Wisdom and Temperance” in combating 
their ilth.
In the context of this discourse of parasites and medical hygiene, some 
of the “realistic” elements of Crespi’s painting, his highly textured “ambi-
ance,” become particularly meaningful. Herbal nosegays, including elder, 
fern, penny- royal, rue, mint, wormwood, and hops, were employed to ward 
of leas and vermin. In the painting, herbs around the bed, intertwined 
garlic on the wall, the pot of water for drowning leas, the woman’s aired 
clothes, the open windows— all these may indicate that the poor lea- 
searcher (or perhaps her mother) is aware of verminous forces of corrup-
tion and is trying to combat them. Working against such eforts, however, 
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is the presence of the dog on the bed. By the time Crespi painted, theories 
of spontaneous generation used to explain the rapid proliferation of insects 
had largely been replaced— thanks to Van Helmont, Harvey, Redi, and 
others— by notions of biogenesis, or reproduction from eggs. Although 
Robert Hooke was uncertain about the process of spontaneous generation, 
later microscopy placed domestic animals unambiguously in the chain of 
relations that lead to infestations:
Fleas are produced of Eggs, which the Females stick fast by a kind of 
glutinous Moisture to the Roots of the Hairs of Cats, Dogs, and other 
Animals, and also to the Wool Blankets, Ruggs, and other such- like Fur-
niture. Of these Eggs, a female lays ten or twelve a Day, for several Days 
successively, and they hatch in the same Order, about four or ive days 




after their being laid. From the Eggs come forth not perfect Fleas, but 
little whitish Worms or Maggots, whose Bodies have annular divisions, 
and are thinly covered with long Hairs. hey adhere closely to the Body 
of the Animal, on whose Juices they feed; or they may be kept in a Box, 
and brought up with dead Flies, which they eat with Greediness.38
his popular description makes lapdogs parasitical in an originary sense; 
they sustain the maggots that will later metamorphose into “perfect leas” 
that then begin to feed on humans. he staring dog in the young woman’s 
bed— whatever else it says about her sexual liaisons or class relations— is 
already a sign of potential corruption, notice of her inadequate hygiene dur-
ing a time when the policing of vermin was widely regarded as the cultural 
function of women.39
Nested within this gendered set of relations, moreover, is yet another 
heterarchical set of elements linking sex, species, medicine and theology. 
hat vermin played a role in the very act of breast- feeding is always the sub-
text of all lea- searcher paintings. Londa Schiebinger has demonstrated the 
importance of work on the maternal breast to Linnaeus’ (somewhat arbi-
trary) introduction of the term Mammalia to distinguish hairy animals with 
a four- chambered heart from others.40 Vermin helped create the conditions 
for the taxonomic system she describes and to which humans are consigned. 
Working in the 1720s (more or less at the same time as Crespi’s paintings), 
the Italian physician Antonio Vallisneri, much of whose empirical research 
was based on dissected insects, wrote a treatise on why even some new-
born infants can be infected with worms. His argument is reported in the 
contemporary English redaction “by M. M.,” A Short Historical Account of 
the Several Kinds of Worms Breeding in Human Bodies.41 Vallisneri had ar-
gued that chyle is produced in the mother’s stomach and iltered through 
the intestines, which “are the general Seat of Worms”; since milk is simply 
chyle “conveyed from the Bowels to the Breast,” a nursing child will “receive 
this Verminous Progeny” should the mother (or a wet nurse) be infected 
(56– 57). he medical issue converts into a theological one: whether these 
“colonies” of worms were created with humans (“originally implanted in 
the Body of the irst Man, or Woman”) or whether they emerged after the 
Fall as a scourge for sinful humans. Such debates similarly ilter through 
Crespi’s lea- searcher painting. Like all those in the genre, it depicts a more- 
than- human world in which vermin act in systems of nourishment, gender, 
cleanliness, the domestication of animals, and species identity. Invisible leas 
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disrupt interlocked systems, provoke action, forge interspecies intimacies, 
occasion gendered performances, and raise questions about the nature of 
creation, infestation, disease, and death. Vermin, in short, compel us to ex-
amine the distinctions between “inside” and “outside,” self and other, nature 
and culture— but also “perfect” and “imperfect” creatures— that have gov-
erned centuries of liberal humanist thought.
Reading beneath the Grain
To read for vermin is not to read “against the grain,” as Terry Eagleton termed 
his Marxian notion of critique, but “beneath the grain”— beneath the social, 
political, and anthropocentric modes of humanist analysis to the life- forms 
and energies that enable it.42 While Eagleton focuses on the complex rela-
tions between literature and economic hierarchies of modern civilization, 
Michel Serres is more useful to my analysis. Serres deploys the notion of the 
parasite to yoke biological, information, and communication systems.43 In 
French, le parasite (the static on a radio broadcast) signiies noise, and Serres 
plays on the double meaning of the term to explore irritants or interruptions 
within multiple systems.44 Serres’ he Parasite, written partly through an 
analysis of Aesop’s fables, is notoriously di cult to adapt to familiar modes 
of literary criticism. On the one hand, as Latour points out, Serres is not a 
“critique” philosopher who “sees his task as that of establishing a distinction 
between beliefs on the one hand and knowledge on the other, or between 
ideologies and science.”45 Latour calls him “provisionally” an “anthropologist 
of science” who treats the sciences “as local achievements extracted from the 
world”: “they do not replace it, and cannot be substituted for it, no more than 
any other metalanguage” (95). Yet because Serres refuses to follow the proto-
cols of a single discipline, his insights have led to signiicant reconsiderations 
of the early modern period, including an important essay by Karen Raber. 
“here is no system without parasites,” she argues, and “there is no theory of 
the human without them.”46 As Raber suggests, he Parasite opens up liter-
ary and scientiic history to whole categories of creatures essential to our 
ecologies, creatures that have neither an obvious relation to (economic) pro-
duction nor an obvious role to play in aesthetic- theological readings of the 
natural world. An interdisciplinary book about vermin, consequently, must 
be willing to be verminous— that is, to read beneath, across, and through 
the grain.
16 imperfect creatures
A broader category than parasites, although no more stable, “imperfect 
creatures” means diferent things to diferent early modern writers, some-
times referring ostensibly to creatures of putrefaction and, at other times, 
to beings regarded as anatomically or morally less complex than humans 
and their mammalian kin. But in the ive chapters that follow, I maintain 
that the Aristotelian division between “perfect” and “imperfect” creatures is 
as historically important, in its own way, as the Cartesian distinction that 
has shaped our philosophical analyses of subjectivity and identity. While 
“imperfect creatures” are not necessarily verminous and verminous creatures 
not always “imperfect,” the fact that these categories overlap so frequently in 
the early modern period is itself signiicant. Early modern writers, as Laurie 
Shannon has argued, upheld an interspecies sense of community; they “rou-
tinely understood a condition of membership and mutual participation to 
hold across species,” rather than stressing a human- animal divide.47 When 
imperfect creatures turn vermin, however, they test the limits of interspecies 
“cosmopolity”; a (real or imagined) ability to reproduce rapidly and in large 
numbers become a marker of (perceived) constitutional inferiority. What 
worms, rats, mice, frogs, insects, and reptiles have in common, then, and 
what distinguishes them from horses, elephants, domesticated canines, and 
even hedgehogs, is not simply a matter of intelligence or domestication, but 
a deeply disputed place within theological and scientiic histories and their 
correspondent social visions.
At bottom, early modern writers had to contend with the question of 
how a perfect God could create imperfect creatures, those seemingly absent 
from the Garden of Eden. Alexander Ross’s (1591– 1654) exposition on Gen-
esis puts the question this way: “Did God create in the beginning, imperfect 
creatures, as Bees, Waspes, and such like?”48 To justify the ways of God to 
man, Ross depends on some Aristotelian casuistry: “He did not create them 
actually, as he did the perfect creatures, but hee created them in their causes, 
as hee gave that faculty to the lesh of an horse, to beget Waspes being dead” 
(19). In other words, although imperfect creatures were not part of the origi-
nal zoography, God made it possible for them to breed through the process 
of putrefaction. Similarly, both John Wilkins in his Essays Toward a Real 
Character and a Philosophical Language (1668) and Athanasius Kircher in his 
Arca Noe (1675) discuss the architectures and animal populations of Noah’s 
ark, yet neither allocates any space for caterpillars, insects, or others crea-
tures thought to spring from dust and mud.49 his absence symptomizes an-
other set of theological problems: were Adam and Eve born with lice, or did 
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those emerge after the Fall?50 As I suggested in the previous discussion of 
breast- feeding women, worms and other noxious creatures cannot easily be 
assimilated to arguments from providential design. In fact, given their end-
less reproducibility and the unpredictable nature of their swarming motion, 
imperfect creatures may actually threaten the ideas of an orderly universe 
and the regeneration of Nature symbolized by Noah’s Ark. When schol-
ars ignore “imperfect creatures,” they help gloss over the urgency of these 
seventeenth- century theological problems and downplay the ways in which 
so- called pests were conceived as material and ideational agents.
To be an agent, though, does not require what we now think of as on-
tological or taxonomic stability. Indeed, a pathologized instability is typi-
cal of most vermin and imperfect creatures. Seventeenth- century writers 
rarely distinguished between lice and leas, or between rats and mice. he 
“ancients,” writes Michael McCormick, “did not have use of the Linnaean 
conceptual apparatus to name and describe their animals.”51 In classical Lat-
in, mus, and in Greek, mys, may refer to either a rat or a mouse; seventeenth- 
century writers tended to follow their predecessors in using both “rat” and 
“mouse” to signify common rodents. Frogs and toads, similarly, may have 
been distinguished in Edward Topsell’s Historie of Foure- Footed Beastes 
(1607) or other texts of natural history, but poets, painters, and novelists 
rarely exercised such precision. his taxonomic vacillation frustrates eforts 
to impose a representational coherence on a particular animal in order to tell 
the “story” of a singular species: the ape, the horse, the rhino.52 Vermin sim-
ply thwart such representational schema. Writing the story of the “worm,” 
as Janelle A. Schwartz asserts, requires being attentive to representations of 
“everything from an earthworm to a larva to a maggot, to a lying insect, and 
the unknown.”53 But while vermin spoil nominalist schemes— and this is 
an important point— in their categorical instability they often constitute the 
temporary stability of any system in the irst place. Serres claims, “We para-
site each other and live amidst parasites. Which is more or less a way of say-
ing that they constitute our environment” (10). Although it was not always 
apparent to early moderns who the “they” were or how “they” originated, 
writers from Shakespeare to Defoe similarly acknowledged the fundamental 
role of vermin. Reading beneath the grain allows us a more comprehensive 
(if shifting and squirming) appreciation of biopolitics in the period.
In the irst chapter, “Rats, Witches, Miasma, and Early Modern he-
ories of Contagion,” I confront the problem of how sixteenth- and early 
seventeenth- century thinkers understood the role of rats in the transmis-
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sion of disease. he transmission of bubonic plague by rats was established 
only in 1894 when the bacteriologist Alexandre Yersin located the Pasteu-
rella pestis (later, Yersinia pestis) bacterium in the blood of infected hosts 
and isolated the role of the lea as a disease vector; as the host- animal died 
of plague, the lea, feeding on its blood, leapt of onto another host, human 
or animal. Although the Chinese in the late Ming and early Qing era may 
have had a nascent understanding of the role of rats in the transmission of 
plague and although the English sometimes mentioned the role of animals 
as disease vectors, rats rarely make early modern lists of plague animals. Yet 
rats and other small animals nonetheless played an important role in link-
ing environmental and supernatural accounts of disease. On the one hand, 
because they were still widely regarded as creatures of putrefaction, born of 
rot and corruption, rats signiied, by their very presence, an unhealthy envi-
ronment from which illness may emerge. On the other hand, it was widely 
believed that demons and witches could assume the shapes of “some small 
creatures” such as toads, salamanders, and rats by virtue of what is called “in-
spissated” air, that is, air that “partakes of some of the properties of earth.”54 
Within theories of miasma, or polluted air, rodents bear an analogous (or 
even, for some, homologous) relationship to witches, and witches, in turn, 
are held responsible for physical and spiritual disease. As King James puts 
it in his Daemonologie, witches are “like the Pest.”55 I trace this constellation 
of witches, vermin, and “inspissated” air in contemporary treatises on witch-
craft and plague in a series of engravings by the Dutch artist Jacob de Gheyn 
and in Shakespeare’s Macbeth, written and performed during the London 
plague years of 1605– 7.
In diferent ways, de Gheyn and Shakespeare suggest how theories of 
contagion developed within and were responsive to a world wracked by cli-
matic instability and repeated local dearth, if not outright famine. Disease, 
plague, and famine comprise three of the four aspects of “pestilence,” a term 
that had naturalistic and metaphysical connotations. As late as 1799, Noah 
Webster’s A Brief History of Epidemic and Pestilential Diseases attempts to 
reconcile descriptions of plague in ancient, scriptural, and medieval sources 
and confronts the question of causality. Webster traces plague, famine, and 
war to “one common cause”— weather— or what he calls “a pestilential state 
of the elements, as fatal to vegetables as to animal life.”56 In a study that 
includes an impressive series of tables detailing the weather patterns, comet 
sightings, murrains, and crop failures for every recorded account of pesti-
lence, Webster makes the case that “famine and pestilence are equally the 
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efects of . . . a temporary derangement of the regular operations of nature” 
(86). Such “derangements” include comets, volcanoes, droughts, rains, and 
overpopulated cities— any number of conditions that give rise to a corrupt 
state of air. At the same time, Webster’s seemingly empirical imperative is 
linked to his theological efort to authenticate biblical accounts of the great 
plagues of Egypt, a land whose climate, he argues, was especially conducive 
to pestilence. For Webster, as for his predecessors, plague and famine ap-
pear as part of the same complex of medical, historical, environmental, and 
theological discourses that are borne on the backs of frogs, lies, and the 
“swarming things” of Genesis.
I bring this understanding to the next chapter, “Swarming hings: 
Dearth and the Plagues of Egypt,” in order to focus on seventeenth- century 
adaptations of the Exodus story. At the heart of the ten plagues of Egypt 
is an age- old interpretive problem: are the lice, frogs, and swarming things 
to be read allegorically or literally? Is the story about political sovereignty 
or natural populations? Focusing on the former, Graham Hammill has ar-
gued convincingly that plague discourse exceeds its traditional function— to 
“imagine new forms of social and political control”— and instead may un-
dermine sovereignty, narrowly conceived.57 Like Hammill, I turn to Fou-
caultian ideas of biopower to examine plague discourse but reintroduce to 
biopolitical readings the question of the animal, demonstrating how natu-
ralistic and typological readings prove mutually constitutive. A woodcut by 
Jan Sadeler (1550– 1600?) depicting the plague of frogs raises critical ques-
tions about the apparent agency of vermin invading the dinner table of fash-
ionable Egyptians. Encouraging his viewers to read history and typology as 
complex overlays of natural phenomena, Sadeler underscores the interpre-
tive problems posed by vermin: if the plagues of Egypt can be read in terms 
of responses to political and moral crises— in terms, that is, of sovereign 
power— they can also, like Macbeth, be regarded as deeply entangled in con-
temporary epidemiological and ecological crises, especially food shortages. 
Focusing on discourses of dearth and famine in plague poems by George 
Wither (1588– 1667) and Abraham Cowley (1618– 67), I trace their eforts to 
stabilize the interpretive strategies— religious, political, and naturalistic— 
that could be brought to bear on the ten plagues. Cowley’s heavily footnoted 
poem relects the erudite author’s knowledge of contemporary science; and 
without surrendering an overarching providential narrative, Cowley brings 
the biblical infestation of vermin very close to naturalistic explanation.
In the plagues of Egypt poems, where hordes of loathsome toads and 
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armies of winged invaders darken the Egyptian skies and cover the tables of 
decadent slave owners, imperfect creatures constitute a kind of verminous 
sublime. hese poems exemplify in dramatic ways the collective agency of 
vermin, their ability to alter domestic, national, and natural economies. At 
the same time that Cowley was writing, Royal Society virtuosi were pressing 
vermin into a diferent kind of service; lice, insects, frogs, and other beings 
were used to prove the empirical reality of what Robert Boyle called “the 
argument from design,” the belief that providential wisdom could be read in 
the physiology of all God’s creations. Robert Hooke’s now- iconic descrip-
tion of the lea in Micrographia— a “small creature” praised for the “strength 
and beauty” of its limbs and parts, “adorn’d with a curiously polish’d suit of 
sable Armour”— brings to the fore late seventeenth- century attempts to ar-
gue that anatomical structures were, in their very complexity, evidence of 
providential design.58 he next two chapters examine questions raised by 
the argument from design in neuroanatomy, especially in the work of the 
physician homas Willis.
Like his predecessors William Harvey and Pierre Gassendi, homas 
Willis appeals to the Book of Nature in Cerebri Anatome (he Anatomy of 
the Brain) (1664) and De Anima Brutorum (Of the Soul of Brutes) (1672) to 
provide a theological justiication for comparative anatomy. Whereas Har-
vey had turned to “larger and more perfect animals” to demonstrate the “per-
fect and divine” harmonies of Nature,59 the wisdom of the Creator, claims 
Willis, is manifested “even in the smallest and most despicable Animals” who 
share, with humans, hearts, or “so many altars and hearths to perpetuate this 
vital lame” of life.60 And, like Harvey and Boyle, Willis uses resemblance 
to emphasize the diference between humans and animals; by “confronting 
these Brains,” he continues, “the vast diference of the Soul of a Brute and 
that of a Man may  .  .  . be shewn” (152). Yet the signiicance of Willis for 
animal studies, I argue, is not his critique of Descartes on some absolute 
diference between man and animal— the “more perfect” animals, Willis ad-
mits, are capable of judgment and even imagination— but his distinction 
between “perfect” and “imperfect” creatures. Willis reexamines this Aristo-
telian distinction through comparative neuroanatomy, identifying struc-
tural diferences in the brains of diferent species by exploring the central 
nervous systems of oysters as well as those of humans, apes, and domesti-
cated quadrupeds. While Willis is not the irst seventeenth- century natural 
philosopher to distinguish between “perfect” and “imperfect” creatures, he 
naturalizes a theologically motivated discourse that associates instinct with 
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a swarming, soulless form of behavior that both reason and imagination en-
join us to contain and control.
In chapter 3, “‘Observe the Frog’: Imperfect Creatures, Neuroanato-
my, and the Problem of the Human,” I suggest Willis’ theologically laden 
anatomical writing leads to a concept of “an amphibious human,” one who 
shares with other “perfect” creatures wit and intelligence. Comparative 
neuroanatomy, then, collapses the Cartesian diference between “human” 
and “animal”— a diference that Willis must reinstate theologically (rather 
than anatomically) by positing that humans alone possess an incorporeal 
soul, also located in the brain. A similar kind of category collapse under-
writes seventeenth- century satires of Royal Society experiments on vermin. 
homas Shadwell’s he Virtuoso mocks Sir Nicholas Gimcrack’s fascination 
with insects, spiders, and frogs at the expense of his discovering anything 
useful or reinforcing the civilized virtues of wit and good nature. To read 
Shadwell’s play within the context of Willis’ experimental philosophy is to 
appreciate in a profound and immediate way how insects, mollusks, worms, 
and frogs trouble Cartesian binaries. While Shadwell’s play manifests this 
discomfort at the level of farce, Willis’ scientiic work, I conclude, exhib-
its the two- fold process of translation/puriication typical of what Latour 
calls the “modern constitution”; in trying to draw a line between Nature and 
Culture, Willis proliferates hybrid beings, notably his “Amphibious” “double- 
soul’d man.”61 In an important sense, “imperfect creatures” emerge, in such 
works, from the mud of scholastic philosophy and reappear as the intro-
jected other of the early modern self.
In their rejection of Cartesian binaries, Willis and other comparative 
anatomists are important for animal studies because they promote the no-
tion the “more perfect creatures”— always mammals— share with human 
beings fundamental neuroanatomical structures, including structures of 
feeling intrinsic to a social world. Signiicantly, Willis refers to the more per-
fect beings as “twin species” with humans, created, according to Genesis— 
unlike crawling things— on the ifth day. In chapter 4, “Libertine Biopoli-
tics: Dogs, Bitches, and Parasites in Shadwell, Rochester, and Gay,” I focus 
on the complex biological and social status of one “perfect creature”: Canis 
lupus familiaris, or dogs. Donna Haraway has remarked about dogs that “the 
familiar is always where the uncanny lurks,” and in this chapter, I explore the 
role of dogs in the depiction of gendered madness and disease.62 hat early 
modern Europeans, during times of plague, feared and executed dogs is well 
documented. Defoe’s Journal of the Plague Year reports over 40,000 dogs and 
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perhaps 200,000 cats were destroyed during the plague of 1665 (along with, 
I might add, a “prodigious” number of rats and mice).63 he Restoration dog, 
similarly, brings together many of the thematic concerns I examine in the 
irst three chapters: scapegoating, mimetic contagion, and the logic of expul-
sion; relationships among infection and infestation; and the intimate rela-
tionships among women and verminous animals. Tracing those discourses 
through analyses of Shadwell’s Timon of Athens and Rochester’s “A Ramble 
in St. James’s Park,” I emphasize the porous boundaries separating domesti-
cated and verminous creatures.
“What Happened to the Rats? Hoarding, Hunger, and Storage on Cru-
soe’s Island,” circles back to rodents and explores the signiicant absence of 
rats on Robinson Crusoe’s island. In marked contrast to eighteenth- century 
accounts of island ecologies ruined by rodent infestations, Crusoe— unlike 
his real- life progenitor Alexander Selkirk— sufers no depredations by rats. 
he economy Crusoe constructs depends, I argue, not simply on the presence 
of European corn but on the absence of the rats that plagued Selkirk and the 
millions in Europe who tried desperately to protect grain supplies from ver-
min. In discussing both Robinson Crusoe (1719) and he Farther Adventures of 
Robinson Crusoe (1719), I focus on the ways in which food accumulation and 
storage are essential for social virtues like compassion and benevolence, and 
for the reassertion of an European, civilized identity on Crusoe’s island. Bees, 
particularly in the irst half of Farther Adventures, help Defoe to imagine a 
system that might be immune to the threat posed by rats, crows, and other 
vermin. While Defoe joins Bernard Mandeville and others in imagining the 
apid colony as an alternative to constant competition for food, the hive itself, 
I maintain, is based on a form of organized violence, what eighteenth- century 
naturalists saw as the periodic “sacriice” or expulsion of hungry drones. Gen-
eralizing from such examples, I conclude what we call “the animal” is bound 
not only— and maybe not even primarily— to “the human” but to fundamen-
tal questions of food and diet as well as disease.
In diferent ways, these chapters explore some of the implications of 
Serres’s observation that “We have made the louse in our image; let us see 
ourselves in his” (7). Given the vast range of early modern texts featuring 
vermin, I have had to make some strategic decisions, and these chapters 
should be taken as necessarily exploratory rather than comprehensive. What 
unites them is the paradoxical logic of the parasite: vermin must be banished 
from biological, economic, and theological systems, and yet they remain es-
sential to their constitution. Vermin become convenient scapegoats for 
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those qualities that must be repressed or controlled in post- Cartesian ideals 
of the human, even as they return, invariably, to plague our economies and 
haunt our constructions of human exceptionalism. Vermin— either early 
modern leas or twenty- irst century “trash animals”— always plunge hu-
mans back into complex ecologies.64 Swarming and multiplying, biting and 
eating, they threaten to overwhelm the orderly, theologically buttressed so-
ciopolitical economies we tend to identify with Enlightenment and modern 
thought. Snarling curs, voracious rats, and omnipresent leas mark the limits 
of Timon’s generosity, Cowley’s biblical commentary, and Defoe’s colonial 
endeavors. Ultimately, they encourage us to rethink the constitution of “the 
animal” as well as the human in the ongoing development of animal studies.
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Chapter 1
Rats, Witches, Miasma, and  
Early Modern heories of Contagion
Rats tenured in the academy of hunger,
Each worm an emperor of dissolution,
Every beetle a senator of the end.
— Mark Doty and Darren Waterston, A Swarm,  
A Flock, A Host: A Compendium of Creatures
In sixteenth- century England, outbreaks of the plague, the persecution of 
women for witchcraft, and several major rat infestations occurred during 
an extended period of climatological instability. he Little Ice Age, between 
1350 and 1850, was characterized by a general cooling, bringing about what 
Brian Fagan calls “a lethal mix of misfortunes”: famine, serial epidemics, 
bread riots, and chaos. “Witchcraft accusations soared,” he points out, with 
the greatest number of prosecutions in England and France occurring in the 
severe weather years of 1587 and 1588.1 Drawing, in part, on Fagan’s analysis, 
Emily Oster argues “in a time period when the reasons for changes in weath-
er were largely a mystery,” witches served as scapegoats for unseasonable 
weather that threatened harvests and outbreaks of disease; she, too, demon-
strates a correspondence between the rise of the European witchcraft trials 
and temperature luctuations during the Little Ice Age.2 he environmen-
tal and epidemiological factors that contributed to witchcraft persecutions 
sometimes are marginalized by historians focused on sociopolitical con-
cerns, but the roles played by climate and disease are crucial to understand-
ing how developing theories of contagion yoked witches, rats, and plague in 
the early modern imagination.3 Both witches and vermin are linked by mias-
mic theory to unnatural or uncanny modes of reproduction; these modes of 
reproduction, in turn, mimic the mysterious process of contagion, thereby 
reinforcing associations between rats and disease.4 Although association 
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does not imply causality, paying attention to how witches, rats, and plague 
work in concert helps us recognize the ways early modern writers and their 
readers understood, or misunderstood, the agency of imperfect creatures in 
the transmission of disease. Imperfect creatures, miasma, and witches are all 
parts of a generalized system of pestilence that generated breakdowns of the 
biopolitical order. What René Girard calls “the logic of expulsion” governed 
attitudes not only toward the infected victims of the plague but also, more 
generally, toward populations— human or otherwise— similarly perceived 
as threats to natural and cultural structures.5
Even in the twenty- irst century, as John Kelly points out, the transmis-
sion of the plague among humans can be puzzling. Its highly mediated chain 
of infection can take several, not always predictable, forms. In one of the 
more common, a rat community’s food supply is disrupted by an “ecologi-
cal disaster”; the rats search for food in human settlements and, as infected 
rodents succumb to the plague, the parasitical lea X. cheopis is driven to ind 
other hosts.6 Once infected, humans easily spread the disease. Surround-
ed by death, famine, and disease, but without the beneit of germ theory, 
learned and popular writers alike during the sixteenth and seventeenth cen-
turies recognized that plague was spread through contact, including contact 
between humans and animals, but cast about for etiological explanations.7 
George Wither claims the plague “much amazes/ he naturall man”; “he sel-
dome indes . . . he Causes and Efects agree together,” and, if he does, “there 
is much uncertainty in either.”8 Confounded, seventeenth- century writers 
struggled to reconcile classical and biblical authorities and metaphysical ex-
planations with empirical evidence and a nascent, contemporary tradition 
of naturalistic explanation. Anita Guerrini has argued that while physicians 
like homas Sydenham (1624– 89) did not go so far as to propose “a causal 
explanation of the environment on disease,” they did note “the concurrence 
of particular diseases and particular environmental circumstances.”9 Within 
what she calls the “pathological environment” of the early modern period, 
the theological notion that plague marked the corruption of a fallen, post-
lapsarian earth was compatible with both classical and naturalistic theories 
of contagion, especially that of pestilential or “bad air.”
In this luid and volatile intellectual environment, analyses of the plague 
frequently proceed by imagistic association. In many ways, early modern 
descriptions are indebted to Virgil’s Aeneid, a text Sheila Barker argues is 
largely Aristotelian: for classical writers, pestilence is but “one symptom,” she 
writes, “of nature’s universal degeneration and corruption, a cycle initiated in 
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the heavens and permeating all the lower spheres.”10 Seventeenth- century 
texts tend to resituate this metanarrative of “universal degeneration” with-
in the context of Judeo- Christian theology. In his poem Epiloimia Epe, or 
Anatomy of the Pestilence (1666), William Austin draws on a compendium 
of etiological theories (Lucretian, Aristotelian, and Galenic) to argue that 
while the plague irst appeared after the Flood as a sign of God’s “indigna-
tion,” subsequent visitations are endemic to a fallen world.11 he earth itself 
is imagined as a corrupted body:
Our Mother Earth some reckon such a lat,
As pudding makes, and never washes gut:
Eats carrion and digests not, then at last
Belches and blows us backward with the blast.12
his image of a belching, farting earth (possibly recalling the London earth-
quakes of 1649 and 1650) drives home Austin’s point that if “Mother Earth” 
can provide a “kinde embrace,” she can also, and unpredictably, prove nig-
gardly, giving food “onely it to choke us,” so that we are “starv’d at nurse.”13 
In his vision of an ailing world, humans share the fate of their mother: 
“we must languish and be sick as ill as she.”14 Plague is the expression of a 
gendered earth cursed with and by human sin. Insisting that woman irst 
“curst the earth,” Austin invokes a time- worn narrative that leads from Eve, 
through the daughters of Gaia and Uranus, to contemporary witches, the 
most recent incarnations of feminized and sexualized malevolence: “Furies 
are females,” he declares, “and who Furies made, / Gave them their whips 
to labor in their trade.”15 As the “King of Mischiefs agents,” witches spread 
contagion:
Records will tell you Plague’s an hellish itch.
hat irst attacks a sorcerer or witch.
No matter in what manner they receive it,
Whether in pain or pleasure, so they give it.16
If sorcerers and witches are not the only cause of plague, their sexualized 
alliances with the Devil make them among its irst victims and the sources, 
directly or indirectly, of subsequent contamination.
Within the theologically charged environment of early modern Europe, 
the terms “plague” and “pestilence” could refer to a variety of divine scourges: 
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disease, famine, bad air, crop failures, murrains, or infestations of animals, 
ranging from rats, to lice, to locusts. Because “pestilence” includes crop fail-
ure brought about by infestations, vermin serve as a kind of missing link 
or excluded middle in seventeenth- century theories of contagion. In his in-
luential treatise, On the Demon- Mania of Witches (1580), Jean Bodin dis-
cusses the case of four would- be witches in Constance accused of stirring 
up a storm that, in his words, “ruined the fruit for four leagues around.”17 
In Bodin’s providentialist view, Satan often tries to take credit for natural 
disasters, sometimes convincing his witches that “they bring, or drive away 
the plague and tempest and famine” when, instead, Satan simply has fore-
cast a divinely sent storm.18 Nonetheless, moral corruption, “blasphemies,” 
and “atheism,” claims Bodin, breed “evil spirits,” “plagues,” “wars,” and “famine” 
(145). his list of dire natural, metaphysical, and sociopolitical phenomena, 
suggests that, in plague discourse, categories are never really distinct. hen it 
is hardly surprising that, in a revealing simile, Bodin conlates witches with 
“vermin”:
Not that it is impossible to drive witches away completely without 
there always being some, who are just like toads and grass- snakes on 
the ground, spiders in houses, caterpillars, and lies in the air, who are 
engendered by corruption and who attract the poison from the earth, 
and the infection from the air. But well cultivated land, puriied air, and 
cleared trees are not so subject to this infection. And if one lets the ver-
min multiply, it engenders corruption and infects everything. (145– 46)
“Engendered by corruption,” witches, like toads, caterpillars, and lies, invite 
or impel plague- like conditions: they “attract the poison of the earth, and the 
infection from the air.” By superimposing the discourses of moral corruption 
on those of natural infestation, Bodin makes the referents of his phrase, “the 
vermin,” di cult to disentangle. Witches, toads, lies, spiders, and so on are 
all catalysts for ecological and epidemiological corruption. While verminous 
conditions can be rectiied, to some extent, by “purifying” the air through 
cultivation and reclaiming wastelands for productive uses, Bodin’s language 
of infection thwarts attempts to distinguish between vermin infestations 
and witches’ curses.
In conlating witches, plague, and vermin, Bodin blurs the lines between 
miasmic pollution (infection) and verminous corruption (infestation): “If 
one lets the vermin multiply,” he insists, “it engenders corruption and in-
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fects everything.” His fusion of infection and infestation may strike us, look-
ing back from the perspective of germ theory, as typical of a prescientiic 
worldview, but this linkage relects the fundamental precepts of miasmatic 
theory, which held that “contagion could not adequately explain widespread 
epidemics; rather, a tainting of the atmosphere as a whole was responsible.”19 
Understood as a compound of tiny particles, air was imagined as carrying 
mysterious motes that infected bodies, which then could infect the bodies 
of others. Drawing on contemporary humoral theory, the physician homas 
Lodge explains infection in such terms in his treatise on the plague, pub-
lished in 1603. “Contagion,” writes Lodge, “is an evil qualitie in a bodie, com-
municated unto an other by touch, engendring one and the same disposition 
in him to whom it communicated.”20 Plague, he continues, “proceedeth from 
the venomous corruption of the humors and spirits of the body, infected 
by the attraction of corrupted aire, or infection of evil vapours, which have 
the property to alter mans bodies, and poysons his spirits after a straunge 
and dangerous qualitie” (B2v). For Lodge, ecological disruption (“corrupted 
aire”) is internalized as communicable disease, “the venemous corruption” 
that infects and disseminates its deleterious efects. Like Bodin’s “infection 
from the air,” Lodge’s “infection of evil vapours” links disease to atmospheric 
disturbances. “Pestilent sicknesses,” Lodge claims, are heralded by regions 
“troubled with thicke, cloudy, moyst, and ill smelling vapors,” with the wind 
coming from the south.
heories of putrefaction are apparent in Bodin’s warnings about “poison 
from the earth” and Lodge’s concern with warm and “ill smelling vapors” and 
played a crucial role in early modern biotheological discourses. hey also en-
sured that imperfect creatures, the animals most closely associated with rot, 
became further enfolded in the contagious cluster of witches, plague, and bad 
air. Still widespread in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries was the 
ancient assumption that rats, mice, toads, and other denizens of the witches’ 
kitchens were generated spontaneously from putrefaction. his belief, found 
in Ovid’s Metamorphoses and many other classical texts, was reinforced in 
one of Europe’s most important sixteenth- century works of natural philoso-
phy, Giambattista Della Porta’s neo- Pythagorean Natural Magick (1584). 
Della Porta, citing Pliny, among others, claims “Mice are generated of Pu-
trefaction”; after the looding of the Nile, mice emerge with “their fore- parts 
living and their hinder parts being nothing but earth.”21 he early sixteenth- 
century philosopher and alchemist Henry Cornelius Agrippa (whose work 
was translated into English in the seventeenth century) described all ani-
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mals generated without “Manifest seed” as “Monstrous,” and claimed mice 
“sometimes are generated by Coition, and sometimes of the putrefaction of 
the Earth.”22 Unwilling to reject classical authorities outright, many other 
sixteenth and seventeenth- century natural philosophers equivocated, creat-
ing in their accounts of imperfect creatures a tension between sexual repro-
duction and spontaneous generation. Acknowledging there is “some dispute” 
among his sources, a somewhat skeptical Edward Topsell nevertheless cites 
Pliny and other ancient writers in his Historie of Foure- Footed Beastes (1607): 
“the generation or procreation of Myce, is not onely by copulation, but also 
nature worketh wonderfully in engendering them by earth and small show-
ers.”23 Rats, in Topsell’s view, “belongeth also to the rank of mice” and are 
similarly creatures of putrefaction; their long and “venomous” tail “seems to 
partake with the nature of Serpents” (519). Topsell’s strained morphologi-
cal analogy between rats’ tails and poisonous snakes exempliies the ways 
in which the category of “vermin”— useless or “Monstrous” animals— could 
expand (or contract) to accommodate any species linked metaphorically to 
disease, witches, slime, or even “small showers.” Rats and mice, then, shared 
with other imperfect creatures— frogs, toads, worms, and scorpions among 
them— a suspicious origin in putrefying matter and ambiguous modes of 
reproduction.
Early modern questions about the reproductive agency of rodents com-
plicated their role in sixteenth- and early seventeenth- century theories of 
contagion. Instead of looking for evidence that rats were (or were not) per-
ceived as disease vectors in a twentieth- or twenty- irst  century sense of 
the term— as hosts for the plague, bacillus— we should think of them as 
actants, as mediating agents within interanimating cycles of bad weather, 
environmental stress, corrupted air, moral degeneration, and communicable 
disease. What Edward Green argues about African theories of disease also 
might be applied to early modern understandings of contagion: “indigenous 
contagion beliefs express essentially the same process of infection as modern 
germ theory attempts to, but in an idiom to which we are unaccustomed.”24 
he writings of ifteenth- , sixteenth- , and seventeenth- century physicians 
and theologians are full of uncanny moments in which the etiology of dis-
ease is described in a rhetoric that seems familiar in its depiction of complex 
networks of relations and causation, but links (for us) what appear to be 
unlikely and even implausible elements. In his Discours des Sorciers (1610), 
Henri Boguet begins with a complaint that witches, with Satan’s help, “cause 
cankerworms, rats, and other vermin to waste the fruit, even as they de-
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plete the fertilization in the soil.” Rather than seeing these creatures as natu-
ralistic instruments of evil, he quickly conlates rats and witches: there is 
hardly a country, he asserts, “not infested with this miserable and damnable 
vermin.”25 his verbal slippage between destructive animals and metaphysi-
cal agents allows the rubric “damnable vermin” to suggest that both rodent 
infestations and witches’ satanic designs blight harvests.26 In such texts, rats 
and mice scurry through early modern theories of contagion by virtue of an 
ontological instability that makes them amenable, if not foundational, to 
both naturalistic and theocentric theories of disease.
It would be convenient to argue that some writers, under the empiri-
cal imperatives of seventeenth- century natural philosophy, grew skeptical of 
witchcraft and began to recognize a direct, causal relationship between rats 
and disease. Perhaps a few did. In her article on plague and Continental art, 
Baker suggests, as early as the fourteenth century, travelers in Europe had 
observed an association between shipboard rats and the spread of plague, 
a point she uses to examine rat infestations in paintings by Raphael and 
Poussin. Another work, Vincenzo Cartari’s 1556 Le imagini de I dei de gli 
antichi, she claims, ofers what appears to be a “scientiic explanation,” linking 
dead rats to pestilence.27 Yet proximity does not imply causation. In his re-
port on rodents in Spain, for example, Topsell links rats and plague without 
recognizing a modern understanding of zoonotic disease: “here are such a 
number of these mice in Spaine,” he writes, “that many times their destruc-
tion caused pestilent diseases, and this thing hapned amongst the Romaines 
when they were in Cantabria, for they were constrained to hier [sic] men 
by stipends to kill the mice, and those which did kill them, scarse escaped 
with life.”28 What Topsell probably means by his statement, “their destruc-
tion caused pestilent diseases,” is the sheer number of rodent corpses created 
a noxious breeding ground for all sorts of diseases. His account, in this man-
ner, links mice and disease through theories of bad air.
Even though early modern writers operated without the explanatory 
power of germ theory, they often suggested that rats and mice played a 
quasi- pathological role in the spread of the plague. Writers on witchcraft, 
in particular, often reinforced a complex chain of associations that linked 
rodents to miasma, miasma to witches, and witches to famine and disease. 
heir ontological instability allows rodents, like witches, to embody myste-
rious forms of contagion mimicked by their unnatural modes of generation. 
Ironically, in other words, it is by virtue of their slippery natures that rats 
can appear in early modern accounts of pestilence as something resembling a 
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disease vector. In their relationship to moisture and “bad air,” rodents herald 
disease; as instruments of God’s wrath, they are heaven’s gluttonous emis-
saries. hey move easily between the medical and religious imaginaries, yok-
ing what, for us, appear to be very diferent worlds.
Metamorphic Rats and Frogs:  
The Drawings of Jacques de Gheyn II
he intricate and mysterious associations among vermin, witches, and dis-
ease were a popular subject in the visual culture of the early modern period, 
particularly in the dramatic series of etchings by the Dutch artist Jacques 
de Gheyn II (c.1565– 1629). In traditional visual depictions of witchcraft 
from Breughel to de Gheyn, rodents are rendered alongside salamanders, 
serpents, scorpions, and other imperfect creatures in genre paintings of 
“the witches’ Sabbath” or the “witches’ kitchen” in which several (usually 
old) women mix potions and raise storms while their animal consorts look 
on.29 Verminous familiars in de Gheyn’s early seventeenth- century drawing 
Witches’ Kitchen link his work to Breugel’s St. James and the Magician Her-
mogenes in which demonic beings are raised from a miasmic cauldron. Its 
dank subterranean setting, as Claudia Swan notes, is “the diametric opposi-
tion of the polished Dutch domestic interior.” In this work, witches cajole, 
rather than combat, traditional household enemies, such as toads and rats, 
in ways that suggest de Gheyn’s understanding of the popular view that the 
“devil vexes and confounds by purposeful inversion; the force of evil is com-
pelled to invert.”30 Such typical examples of demonic “inversion” may make 
his depiction of witchcraft seem “largely conventional,”31 but several of de 
Gheyn’s other sketches or drawings jarringly juxtapose portrayals of witches 
with naturalistic images of imperfect creatures.
Take, for example, his Study of Hermit Crab and Witchcraft (ig. 2). Swan 
argues convincingly that the crab and the scenes of witchcraft are linked by 
the former’s emblematic nature as a igure (like the moon and woman) of in-
constancy and mutability.32 he crab’s association with witches is reinforced 
by its backward and sideways movement: “Witches,” writes Nicholas Remy 
in the Daemonolatreiae libri tres (1595) “love to do everything in a ridiculous 
and unseemly manner. For they turn their backs toward the Demons when 
they go to worship them, and approach them sideways like a crab.”33 At the 
same time, crabs, like rats, were often regarded in the popular imagination 
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as creatures of putrefaction. In describing “monstrous generations” not pro-
duced “according to the Laws of Nature,” Agrippa includes in this category 
the usual suspects (gnats generated from worms, wasps from a horse, bees 
from an ox), and “a Crab” whose “legs being taken of[f ], and .  .  . buried in 
the ground” will later (presumably) emerge as “a Scorpion.”34 De Gheyn’s 
creatures in this sketch, similarly, are both “zoomorphic” and markedly 
arthropod- like. Arthropods include crustaceans (such as shrimp, lobster, and 
crabs) and chelicerata (such as spiders and scorpions, along with insects). 
hese animals have in common an exoskeleton, jointed appendages, and a 
segmented body. Behind and to the right of the accurately rendered hermit 
crab, a group of creatures troubles species identities. One clearly sports an 
exoskeleton, a kind of shell, on which, strangely, a naked human form clings 
like a barnacle. he short, broad cockroach- like being in the middle of the 
demonic group exhibits qualities of humans and arthropods, as do the two 
beings with long, segmented proboscis. In another version of hybridity, the 
segmented bodies of arthropods are mimicked in the humanoid form of the 
skeletal man on the right of the drawing.
Fig. 2, Jacques de Gheyn II, Study of Hermit Crab and Witchcraft
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If de Gheyn’s Study of Hermit Crab and Witchcraft links witchcraft and 
crabs through an emblematic tradition, its metamorphic associations 
among witches, insects, and crabs stage the complexities and ambiguities of 
seventeenth- century theories about generation, putrefaction, and the role of 
imperfect creatures. In visually undoing traditional boundaries between the 
natural and the monstrous, the stable and the metamorphic, and the “real” 
and nightmarish renderings of hybridity, de Gheyn’s sketch deals not in 
questions of belief but in images of what Karen Barad calls entanglement— 
the irrevocable materiality and contingency of representation/reality.35
In a related sketch, Witches and Frogs (ig. 3), de Gheyn interrogates the 
problem of generation. hree amphibious chimera— frogs endowed with 
marked secondary sexual characteristics— surround a book of spells. In this 
instance, creatures that ambiguously might reproduce “outside” the laws of 
Nature through spontaneous generation have anthropomorphized female 
breasts and oversized male genitalia, as though they were reproducing mon-
strously through sexual intercourse.
An obvious interpretation of these igures would see the frogs (and the rats 
discussed in ig. 4 below) as witches in the process of transformation, their 
amphibious bodies beginning to assume the postures and disposition of hu-
mans. his reading is in keeping, again, with theories of bad air. Kramer and 
Sprenger argue demons and witches can assume a bodily form only with 
Fig. 3. Jacques de Gheyn II, Witches and Frogs
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the aid of “inspissated” air. Devils and disembodied spirits,” they contend, 
“can efect this condensation by means of gross vapours raised from the 
earth, and by collecting them together into shapes in which they abide, not 
as deilers of them, but only as their motive power which gives to that body 
the formal appearance of life.”36 Even under such circumstances, however, 
witches cannot assume “natural” shapes “except in the case of some small 
creatures” such as toads, salamanders, and rats.37 De Gheyn’s strange depic-
tion of demonic transformation similarly endows imperfect creatures with 
a kind of “motive power,” a “formal appearance of life.” Yet what make his 
amphibians seem especially “monstrous” are their breasts and genitalia, the 
secondary sexual characteristics tagging them as desiring creatures; if these 
metamorphic frogs are capable of human sexual desires, the drawing sug-
gests, they are also capable of other kinds of agency. De Gheyn’s imperfect 
creatures, in other words, are not, like those in the “witches’ kitchen,” silent 
witnesses to human manipulations of the natural world, but active agents of 
desire and disorder.
his sense of ambiguous agency marks de Gheyn’s Study of Two Rats and 
hree Frogs (1609) as well (ig. 4). he strangely humanoid layed rats and 
three frogs grasp sticks in ways that simultaneously suggest both aspiring ro-
Fig. 4. Jacques de Gheyn II, Study of Two Rats and hree Frogs
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dents, trying to walk, and disabled humans, struggling to avoid falling down. 
Given their extended bellies, the rats seem both pregnant and starved.
he frog to the right of the rats lounges languidly atop what appears to 
be a pile of coins. Most striking about this image is that de Gheyn’s natural-
istic technique— speciically, the ine and accurate articulation of muscles in 
rest and motion— is entangled with cultural representations of seemingly 
bestial or immoral aspiration and acquisitiveness. he efect, to say the least, 
is discomiting. While Swan admits “it is di cult to reconcile the epistemo-
logical underpinnings of de Gheyn’s naturalistic works with the tone, sub-
ject matter, and efect of his demonological pictures,” she tries to split the 
diference by arguing that de Gheyn, skeptical of witchcraft, portrays what 
he regards as efects of a diseased imagination.38 Following this assumption, 
one might regard the transformation of the animals in Study of Two Rats and 
hree Frogs as an example of a belief in demonological transformation from 
which the artist distances himself.
But questions about whether de Gheyn actually “believed” in witches 
do not, and should not, obscure the naturalistic theories of transformation, 
putrefaction, and inspissation on which he draws. His uncannily anthropo-
morphic vermin exist in a world, both historical and imaginative, alive with 
trans- species relationships. In de Gheyn’s “imperfect creatures” struggling to 
assume human postures, we ind iconic images of a socionatural world that 
has not yet been neatly divided, as ours has, into the “social” and the “real,” or 
into distinct realms of religion and science.39 he humanoid musculature of 
the rats and frogs implies the human and the verminous are always emergent 
qualities, transformative rather than static. In this sense, de Gheyn’s crea-
tures are not the beings with which we are familiar. Pre- Cartesian, animated 
by forces that humans share, their appetites, secondary sexual characteris-
tics, and even their tails are entangled in the epistemological and ontological 
questions of what it means to be “human.” On the one hand, the rats’ serpen-
tine appendages serve a tropological function in their phallic suggestiveness. 
Topsell writes that rats, “when they are in copulations, . . . embrace with their 
tailes, illing one another without al delay.”40 On the other hand, however, 
Topsell’s description is not “merely” symbolic: the tail of the rat is actually 
part of a complex vascular system used for cooling and heating that operates 
much like a penis, swelling and shrinking in accordance with the function 
it performs.41 De Gheyn’s rats inhabit both of these realms, the tropology 
of folk belief and the science of empirical observation. hey entangle, in 
Barad’s sense, humans, witches, and vermin in recursive hybridities.
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Vermin in Macbeth
In ways that play on the themes of de Gheyn’s drawings, Shakespeare’s Mac-
beth exploits the associations between natural and spiritual contagion, draw-
ing on seventeenth- century demonology and miasma theory to stage imag-
istically the relationship among vermin, plague, and witches. Shakespeare’s 
tragedy was written and irst performed sometime between 1605 and 1607 
during the height of one of London’s plague seasons.42 As F. P. Wilson notes, 
the language Ross uses to describe Macbeth’s Scotland very well could have 
been used to characterize plague- ridden London.43 Under Macbeth’s rule, 
“sighs and groans and shrieks that rend the air / Are made, not marked” and
. . . violent sorrow seems
A modern ecstasy. he dead mans knell
Is there scarce asked for who, and good men’s lives
Expire before the lower’s in their caps,
Dying or ere they sicken.
(4.3.169– 74)44
References to pestilence and the human devastation of a plague- ridden city 
or kingdom abound throughout the play. Storms, murrains, and crop fail-
ures are the calling cards of the three witches in act 1. A “feverous” earth and 
crop failures are alluded to in the second act and again in act 4. Indeed, Mac-
beth’s rise to power and subsequent rule are cast as a kind of epidemiological 
horror, the contagion in the body politic mirroring that of the natural world.
One of the most insistent patterns of imagery in Shakespeare’s tragedy 
links the moral and political state of Scotland to atmospheric disturbances 
and miasma. he play begins with the three witches crying, “Fair is foul and 
foul is fair, / Hover through the fog and ilthy air” (1.11.11– 12). Subsequent 
invocations of “ilthy air” similarly confuse or conlate the two realms. In 
the irst act, Banquo describes the witches emerging from the kind of mi-
asma associated with disease, bad air, and moral corruption: the “earth hath 
bubbles, as the water has / And these are of them” (1.3.79– 80). Later, in 
Shakespeare’s staging of a masque- like witches’ Sabbath, Hecate announces 
she will “raise  .  .  . artiicial sprites” out of a moondrop “distilled by magic 
slights” (3.5. 23, 26). Hecate’s “little spirit,” her imp, “sits in a foggy cloud” 
(3.5.34– 35). In its uneasy ambiguity, this language describes the “inversions” 
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and equivocations typical in early modern demonology (“Fair is foul and 
foul is fair”), and, at the same time, gestures toward the climatic instability 
of weather patterns during the Little Ice Age, when persistent storms of the 
North Sea battered the Scottish Lowlands and England.45 he cold, foggy, 
and rainy climate of Macbeth’s Scotland foreshadows and evokes miasmic 
associations that make atmospheric, moral, and political corruption seem 
mutually constitutive. “Infected be the air” the witches “ride” on, curses Mac-
beth, and “damned all those that trust them” (4.11.115).
In Macbeth’s generally theocentric view of multiplying “evil,” swarm-
ing vermin play analogous roles in the spiritual, agricultural, and ecologi-
cal economies. he traitor Macdonwald, for instance, is described as a kind 
of breeding ground for the carriers of pestilence, the lies and vermin that 
carry moral corruption as well as disease: “Worthy to be a rebel, for to that 
/ he multiplying villainies of nature / Do swarm upon him” (1.2.10– 12). 
his imagery recalls not only Bodin’s creatures of putrefaction, but also the 
language of James I’s Daemonologie (1597). In a dialogue between Epistemon 
and Philomathes, James, like many of his predecessors, describes witches 
as a kind of spiritual pestilence.46 Witches, Epistemon says, are especially 
harmful to those who are “of inirme and weake faith,” to which Philomathes 
responds, “hen they are like the Pest, which smites these sickarest [sic], that 
lies it farthest and apprehends deepliest the perrell thereof.”47 Philomathes 
invokes the idea that the very fear of contagion makes one vulnerable to it; 
and Macbeth, who allows his “vaulting ambition” to get the better of his loy-
alty, seems to invite the witches’ spiritual pestilence to corrupt his soul. After 
he murders Duncan, Macbeth becomes linked metaphorically to witches, 
vermin, and other creatures of putrefaction: “O, full of scorpions is my 
mind, dear wife!” (3.2.59). If scorpions breed spontaneously from putrefac-
tion, Macbeth is now the origin and incubator of his own putrefying sin. Al-
though, for Malcolm, Macbeth’s corruption assumes satanic proportions— 
“Not in the legions / Of horrid hell can come a devil more damned / In 
evils to top Macbeth” (4.3.57– 59)— Shakespeare keeps alive the notion that 
moral corruption and infection are mutually constitutive: the hero’s mind, 
like his wife’s, is “infected” by things “unnatural” (5.1.61– 63). As the Doctor 
says of Lady Macbeth, “Unnatural deeds / Do breed unnatural troubles; in-
fected minds / To their deaf pillows will discharge their secrets” (5.1.61– 63). 
he language of infection, then, is of a piece with the ilthy air, scorpions, 
and swarming evils that plague the kingdom.
To acknowledge vermin— spiders, frogs, rats, and other creatures pre-
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sumably born of rot and companionate with witches— as signs and symp-
toms of both spiritual and physical contagion in early modern literature does 
not mean that one can deinitively answer questions (long central to scholars 
of early modern witchcraft and to some critics of Macbeth) about whether 
Shakespeare and his audience actually “believed” in witches and their de-
monic familiars.48 Indeed, these presumed creatures of putrefaction may 
complicate our views about which animals can serve as familiars, and why. 
Diane Purkiss reads familiars as “collaborative construction[s]”— that is, as 
compromise formations between elite and popular versions of witchcraft— 
that render the “witch a perverse kind of mother.”49 he ilial relationship 
she describes perhaps explains the witch’s relationship with Graymalkin in 
Macbeth, but rats and other less perfect creatures bring with them discursive 
assumptions that undermine, rather than reinforce, ilial— indeed, intersub-
jective and afective— relations. Composites of ideological and natural ma-
terials, ailiated with disease, and characterized by their ability to refuse a 
stable shape at all, verminous familiars pose, rather than answer, questions 
of knowledge and belief. In Macbeth, Shakespeare exploits the epistemologi-
cal as well as ontological instability of rats and other imperfect creatures to 
explore the complex relationships among vermin, disease, and witchcraft. 
Refusing to provide answers, the play stages the many ways its audiences 
might imagine the relationship between spiritual corruption and pestilence.
Rodents are used to evoke the general context of pestilence very early in 
Macbeth. One of the witches, describing her revenge on a woman who had 
refused to share some food, envisions herself tracking the woman’s husband 
across the seas:
Her husband’s to Aleppo gone, master o’th’Tiger.
But in a sieve I’ll thither sail,
And like a rat without a tail,
I’ll do, I’ll do, and I’ll do.
(1.3.7– 10)
At least since the eighteenth century, this odd image has been treated as a 
curious example of Elizabethan folklore. Glossing this stanza in his 1773 edi-
tion of Shakespeare, George Steevens writes, “it was imagined” that “though 
a witch could assume the form of any animal she pleased,” she could not alter 
her sex: “the tail would still be wanting.”50 Yet given the emphasis on pesti-
lence elsewhere in the play, Shakespeare’s rat is a telling choice. What makes 
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the rat— rather than, say, a toad— an especially powerful vehicle for Mac-
beth’s witch is its suggestion not only of famine and “ilthy” air but also of a 
toxic sexuality. In addition to proliferating through putrefaction, rats were 
igured, when full grown, as among the most lustful of creatures. Topsell 
refers to the white mouse as a long- standing image of lust, but “all mice,” he 
asserts, are “most desirous of copulation.”51 Rats, in his mind, are even more 
sexually dangerous than mice, capable of going into something resembling 
elephant musth, excreting a toxic luid: “For if the urine do fall upon the bare 
place of a man, it maketh the lesh rot unto the bones.”52 he bodily luids of 
rats eat away at human lesh, and the danger posed by their “urine” is itself a 
refracted image of pestilential decay.
For Shakespeare’s audience, however, the greatest danger posed by rats’ 
“copulation” is their prodigious power of reproduction. Because they are 
able to reproduce quickly and in mind- boggling numbers, rats are a constant 
threat to human food supplies, a danger magniied during periods of bad 
weather and bad harvests. Topsell claims mice conceive every fourteen or 
sixteen days, exceeding “all other beasts” in the “number they bring forth”; a 
contemporary scholar estimates two black rats and their progeny, breeding 
continually for three years, can produce 329,000,000 ofspring.53 During a 
period in history when the cost of grain increased roughly in an inverse ratio 
to income, the productive capacity of rats and mice posed signiicant threats 
to life and livelihood: “the lower the income available to a household, the 
greater was the dependence on grain,”54 and, therefore, the greater the dan-
ger posed by rodent infestations.
Europeans of all social classes were familiar with stories about famines 
caused by rats and mice, notably the biblical account of the plagues in Egypt, 
but contemporary narratives were common as well, especially stories of rats 
on board ships. Garcilaso de la Vega, to take one prominent example, tells 
his readers about the “great Destructions and even Plagues” that struck Peru 
in the sixteenth century, “caused by the incredible multitudes of Rats and 
Mice” that stowed away on Spanish ships. “Swarming all over the Land,” 
these voracious rodents ate seeds and killed fruit trees, nearly forcing the 
colonists to “abandon their Dwellings,” had not “God in mercy caused that 
Plague to cease on a sudden” when it was at its extremity.55 In a similar vein, 
Samuel Clarke’s account of the irst English Bermuda plantation describes 
a “great Plague” visited on the English by “reason of a few Rats.” Having in-
fested a meal ship, they “multiplied so exceedingly” on the island that de-
spite eforts to eradicate them using cats, dogs, ratsbane, and traps, and then 
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even setting the woods on ire, the rats took over the island. By eating “all 
up,” they precipitated a devastating disease. Clarke ends his narrative with 
a strangely hybrid explanation— part theological, part empirical; eventually, 
supplies from England and “some rest and ease” helped the disease to abate 
and “suddenly it pleased God (by what means was not known)” to “take [the 
rats] away.”56
Read within the context of, and against, such narratives, Shake-
speare’s image of the would- be- demon rat simultaneously evokes and 
displaces a theocentric discourse of the plague, food shortages and infec-
tious disease. As Deborah Willis argues, Shakespeare invokes or stages 
scenes of feeding or deprivations of food throughout Macbeth, even as 
“the witches’ motives and the extent of their powers remain madden-
ingly opaque.”57 This ambiguity may be explained, in part, by recogniz-
ing within plague discourse, witches functioned as both carriers and 
symptoms of a mysterious and destructive mode of contact. They are, 
as Philomathes says in James I’s Daemonologie, “like the Pest,” and con-
tagion, as we have seen in Austin’s Anatomy of the Pestilence, was baf-
fling enough to elicit a variety of explanations, with most commentators 
agreeing its origins taxed the capacity of human understanding. In their 
mysterious origins and connection to pestilence, witches share the opac-
ity of vermin. The latter, at least, could be recuperated into a theological 
discourse as providential scourges of humankind’s sins. In his Curiosi-
ties: or, The Cabinet of Nature (1637), a popular commonplace book, Rob-
ert Basset poses the question of why “unnecessary frogs and Mice doe 
breed . . . of their owne accord, seeing other animals for Mans use breed 
not, but by propagation?” The answer, he asserts, lies in the power of 
God. Because plagues of mice are connected to other seemingly random 
natural disasters, such as floods and droughts, he reasons rodents must 
be instruments of divine power. “Even as the High Procurator of the 
great World, provides store of all manner of Viands for his little world 
(Man),” humankind remains prone to sin:
So also [God] chastiseth this neglecting Man, when he subtracts and 
withdrawes from him the fruits of water, earth, Ayre, and beasts for 
mans owne faults: Wherefore sometimes waters either abound by in-
undations, sometimes by Drought are extenuated, and scarce; some-
times the Ayre by contagion infects, sometimes ire rageth so, that from 
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whence these breed, it can no more be certainly arrived, than whence the 
swarmes of these Animals. And the innumberable diseases of man do 
also breed.58
In Basset’s theocentric view, the “innumerable diseases of man” are analogous 
to these “swarmes” of mice, inexplicable and dangerous, but permitted by 
God as scourges to humankind.
As Shakespeare’s witch suggests, the battle for human souls is waged 
in often explicitly sexual terms. Very early in learned witchcraft litera-
ture, such as in Heinrich Kramer and James Sprenger’s Malleus Malefi-
carum (1486), witches are represented as “enemies of the human race” 
not only because they “change the perceptions and befoul the emotions 
of man” (mental or psychological contagion) and “bring diseases” (epide-
miological contagion) but because, among their “thousand ways of do-
ing harm,” they have power over human sexual function and appetite.59 
Not surprisingly, sexualized rodents are part of the witches’ arsenal 
for tempting and bedeviling humankind. William Drage’s 1665 treatise 
Daimonomageia includes cases of witches sending their “Imps, or young 
Spirits, into . . . the form of Mice, sometimes of Flies,” who then bewitch 
cattle and men and blast “Plants and Fruits of the Earth.”60 John Bar-
row recounts the story of his son’s possession by demons who appear 
in the form of rats and tempt him with “Pasties” or sweet food. “Then 
they would demand his Soul,” writes Barrow, “bidding him give it to the 
Devil, but he refused to condescend to them.”61 Underscoring the char-
acteristic conflation of metaphysics and materiality in witchcraft litera-
ture, Barrow’s demon- rats cast their temptation in a diabolical image of 
food consumption: the demon- rats use a sweet to appeal to the young 
man’s appetite rather than an adult sexual desire. In this manner, they 
link forbidden desire, damnation, and the specter of demonic possession 
in the entwined terms of eating and sexuality.
For Shakespeare’s witch to imagine herself in the form of the rat, 
then, is in keeping with a long- established relationship among conta-
gion, consumption, and sexuality— specifically, with unnatural modes 
of reproduction— evident in her threat to “drain” the sailor “dry as hay” 
(1.3.18). Since demons were thought to materialize from inspissated air, 
without a natural bodily form, they were often imagined as collecting se-
men from humans— ideally, according to Kramer and Sprenger, to have 
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semen removed by a witch during the “carnal act.” Carnally gathering se-
men is better than semen produced through “nocturnal pollutions” since 
the latter, they write, “arises only from the superfluity of the humours.”62 
In imagining herself draining the sailor “dry as hay,” Shakespeare’s witch 
may therefore be announcing (albeit in a near- comic revenge fantasy) a 
sexual encounter that gives her the opportunity to collect his semen, if 
not his soul: “I’ll do, I’ll do, and I’ll do.” The copulating and childless 
other of the childless Lady Macbeth, the witch is poised, like both Mac-
beth and his wife, for a yet- to- be- named mode of evil. Her unnatural act 
of copulation must be cast in the form of a familiar, the rat whose form, 
thanks to the inspissated air, she is presumed (in popular imagination) 
to be able to assume. Rats, sexuality, and “filthy Aire” remain embedded 
in the mutually reinforcing languages of vermin infestations, plague, eco-
logical stress, and moral blight that characterize Scotland under Mac-
beth’s unquiet rule.
Scapegoats and Mousetraps
While Shakespeare’s randy witch only fantasizes about turning rodent, 
the persistent association between witches and rats provoked one late 
seventeenth- century physician, writing sixty years after Macbeth, to mount a 
defense not only of the humans accused of witchcraft but of their pet vermin 
as well. Referring to a 1645 case in which a woman was executed for keeping 
a frog in a box, homas Ady argues, “Oathes that have been usually taken 
against many person in that kinde, are not to be regarded”:
[If ] such a one hath been seen to have a Rat or Mouse creep upon her, or 
under her Coats, or was heard talking to her Imps, these are not mate-
rial testimonies, but are foolish and senseless arguments, not grounded 
in the Word of God . . . For it is as lawful to keep a Rat or Mouse, or 
Dormouse, or any Creature tame, as to keep a tame Rabbit, or Bird; and 
one may be an Imp as well as another.63
In deliberately blurring distinctions between “vermin” and domesticated 
creatures, Ady argues forcefully that keeping mice or rats does not prove 
“that the Devil is in it.” He warns judges and jurymen against reasoning from 
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the appearance of the usual cast of familiars— “Mice, Dormice, Grasshop-
pers, Caterpillars, Snakes”— to the assumption that these creatures are evi-
dence of demonic forces at work. Ady even claims he knew a “Gentleman” 
who, “to please his Phantasie in trying conclusions, did once keep in a Box a 
Maggot that came out of a Nut, till it grew to an incredible bigness.”64 he 
quasi- scientiic interest in “trying conclusions,” he argues, trumps allegations 
and superstition.
Ady’s “defense” of imperfect creatures as pets raises, from a diferent per-
spective, the crucial question of the extent to which early modern writers 
and readers could disentangle the empirical, theological, and folk attributes 
of vermin. In her foundational article on vermin in the early modern period, 
Mary Fissell demonstrates how fabular and popular depictions of vermin 
relect contemporary social problems. Early modern vermin, she argues, 
shared three characteristics: “they ate human food; they were cunning; and 
they understood symbols.” As a combination of “projections, fantasies, iden-
tiications” and real lesh and blood animals, vermin “threatened the always 
tenuous balance between ease and hardship, satiety and starvation, enough 
and not- enough.”65 Twenty- ive Norwegian or grey rats, according to one 
historian, “eat as much as one human being does, and they foul much more 
food than they eat.”66 Rats and other swarming creatures posed fundamen-
tal challenges because, in signiicant numbers, they assumed a collective 
identity and agency. his collective agency, in turn, paradoxically endowed 
vermin with legal and spiritual status. All across Europe in the ifteenth and 
sixteenth centuries, they were hauled into court— at least symbolically— 
and prosecuted.
Recorded early modern prosecutions against rats and mice include trials 
in Berne (1451); rats and moles at Nimes (1479); rats at Autumn (1500– 30); 
vermin at Lausanne (1509); rats at Langres (1512– 13); ield mice at Glurns 
(1519); rats at Lausanne (1522); and rats in Spain (throughout the sixteenth 
century).67 As late as 1651, the Catholic Church in Germany was publishing 
exorcisms, like the following:
I exorcise you, you pestiferous worms, mice, birds, or locusts and other 
animals through God the omnipotent Father and through Jesus Christ 
His Son and the Holy Spirit who proceeds from both, so that you de-
part without delay from these ields, or vineyards, or waters and no lon-
ger live in it but move to those places where you are unable to harm 
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anyone, and for the sake of the almighty God, and heavenly hosts, and 
God’s Holy Church you will be cursed wherever you go. You are ac-
cursed and made to decrease from day to day, and diminish until noth-
ing of you shall be found in any place unless it be necessary for the 
wealth and use of mankind.68
his exorcism, with its blanket condemnation of worms, mice, birds, and 
locusts, seeks to turn the logic of scapegoating or expulsion from a single 
sacriicial animal to entire populations of vermin. he unintentionally comic 
quality of this curse to “diminish” the ofending vermin highlights the help-
lessness of early modern communities confronted by infestations. he re-
course to exorcism reasserts the status of vermin as part of a divine creation 
precisely so they can be threatened with a kind of bestial excommunication. 
Unlike the sacriicial goats of the Old Testament, rodents (like all “imperfect 
creatures”) are di cult to expel precisely because they shape the very agri-
cultural ecologies— “ields,” “vineyards,” and “waters”— that deine the early 
modern world.
he logic of expulsion intended to protect the foodstores “necessary 
for the wealth and use of mankind” also took more material forms. Dur-
ing the early modern period, a number of widely distributed technologies— 
including traps, poisons, professional exterminators, and specially- designed 
barrier devices— constituted the arsenal directed against vermin. Mice and 
rats afected households of every rank, often in numbers referred to as “pro-
digious” and in swarms described as “armies.” Consequently, almost every 
castle and community employed not only a priest but a ratcatcher, some of 
whom became legendary in song and literature. Like the rats he hunted, the 
ratcatcher occupied a kind of double role: as both an abject, semimystical 
igure, a kind of “vermin- whisperer” capable, like the Pied Piper, of mov-
ing large populations through mysterious means, and a scientiic husbandry 
professional, part chemist, part engineer. During the sixteenth century, rat-
catchers developed an impressive number of methods for exterminating or 
otherwise controlling rodents and other pests. Leonard Mascall’s 1590 Booke 
of Engines (a compilation from previous sources) provides recipes for doz-
ens of poisons and thirty- four diferent traps, many of which make their 
way into the art and literature of the period. he most well- known of these 
“mousetraps” is on the right panel of the Merode Altar; one appears in the 
“mousetrap scene” in Hamlet, and another at the end of Christopher Mar-
lowe’s he Jew of Malta.69
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he Jew of Malta appeared shortly after Mascall’s Booke of Engines and 
is full of rodent- like poisonings, including those of Abigail and the nuns. 
After a career of murders and gloating about his prowess as a killer, Barabas 
inally dies when he falls into the trap he set for the Turks— a pot of boil-
ing water. As it is depicted onstage, Barabas has created a “mill trap” (also 
called a “fell- trap” or “pitfall- trap”), which, as David Drummond points out, 
is “apparently the earliest known example of an ever- set, multi- catch mouse-
trap.”70 his contraption is designed to control rodent infestations because it 
does not have to be reset after every kill. he author of he Compleat French 
and English Vermin Killer, commenting on this trap one hundred years after 
Mascall, claims it can promote the demise of “40, 50, nay 100” rats “in one 
Night.”71 His version (Figure 5), involves putting oatmeal and butter on one 
end of a plate suspended from two sticks and positioned over water; when 
the rat ventures out on the platform for the food, its own weight depresses 
the baited side of the platform and dumps it into water, which is sometimes 
laced with arsenic, and sometimes, as in the Jew of Malta, placed over ire.
he fact that the contemporaries of Marlowe, Shakespeare, and de Gheyn 
felt the need for a trap that kills in double and triple digits reinforces the 
magnitude of the problems faced by English farmers and citizens. Yet Mar-
lowe’s use of a fell- trap to inish of his Machiavellian hero suggests the ex-
tent to which the problem of vermin control could be reigured as a way to 
deal with threats posed, for instance, by Turks and Jews, to a body politic 
deined by the ostensible logic of Christian communion. Rats, worms, and 
other “pestiferous” creatures can (in theory) be exorcised, but conlating the 
racial or religious “other” with vermin produces a chilling rationale for con-
tainment or extermination that, as I argue in chapter 5, comes into play on 
Crusoe’s island.
Unlike the cats massacred during the French Revolution, rats cannot 
easily function as scapegoats for socioeconomic and political problems, in 
part because the threat they pose to food supplies and their possible role as 
disease carriers leave them outside a normative socioagricultural order.72 Yet 
as Macbeth and he Jew of Malta suggest, vermin mark the absent center of 
the ritual expulsions that deine Europe’s relationships with its own “alien” 
populations. In the modern world, René Girard argues, the simple act of 
scapegoating— choosing an animal to sacriice for a community’s sins— is 
replaced by “a spectacle of secret substitutions” in which one victim is sub-
stituted for another. Such scapegoating substitutions usually go unnoticed, 
he claims, remaining “only as a trace,” but occasionally, as in the destruction 
Fig. 5. he Fell Trap
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of European Jews by the Nazis, “they can reappear in forms more virulent 
than ever and on an enormous scale.”73 While the subject of genocide, then 
and now, lies beyond the scope of this book, the logic of what Girard calls 
“mimetic contagion” can displace a community’s sins onto another ethnic or 
national group. Vermin deine both the subject and processes of mimetic 
contagion, and, as we have seen in this chapter, Turks, Jews, devils, witches, 
and rats exist along a chain of substitutions that operates by this logic of 
always- imperfect expulsion. What has made modern forms of genocide 
thinkable, in an important sense, are the very technologies developed to ad-
dress rampant food insecurity: the threats posed by the vermin that popu-
late plague discourse and biopolitics during the early modern era.74 Girard 
notes plague “is never present alone” but is part of a “thematic cluster” that 
links venom, poison, moral corruption, dearth, and putrefaction in mutually 
reinforcing discourses.75
In the seventeenth century, George Wither’s Britain’s Rembrancer drops 
the rats from its account of the plague, but retains the witch, reimagined 
as a feminized basilisk, who turns “her poison” on individuals. Character-
izing the plague as a kind of airborne “venom,” a “Maladie” that manifests 
a “spreading Nature,” Wither imagines a feminized igure of Pestilence, 
armed with a “venom’d speare, which, where it toucheth, ills/ he veines 
with poison, and distracts, and kills.” he sorceress Pestilence is a master of 
poisons— “of the pois’ning Art [she] hath found the height”— because her 
acts are highly mediated: “she knows how to poison by conceit” (43). Poison-
ing “by conceit” suggests both a kind of agency and an unsettling obscurity 
about the connections among the disease, its sources, and its victims. Much 
like most of the so- called “imperfect creatures,” the plague “neither certaine 
forme, not habit wears.” Contagion deies epidemiology: “Pestilence,” Wither 
writes, “doth show her selfe inclin’d / So variously she cannot be dein’d” 
(116). his inability to locate a single cause for evil and infection character-
izes the “thematic clusters” that make vermin a critical component of the 
threats that troubled early modern society
In the next chapter, I revisit the relationship among imperfect crea-
tures, epidemiological crisis, and ecological uncertainty in examining what 
is perhaps the most verminous narrative in the Western world: the Genesis 
account of the ten plagues of Egypt. In seventeenth- century redactions of 
the biblical narrative by Wither and Abraham Cowley— two of the most 
popular writers of the period— famine, disease, and pestilence take the form 
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of rapidly reproducing frogs, locusts, lice, and other mysterious swarming 
creatures. Empirical and theological accounts of pestilence remain mutually 
constitutive, and Cowley’s eforts, in particular, to untangle the two open up 
a series of questions about the “rise” of seventeenth- century “science.” As I 
argue in chapters 2 and 3, vermin populate the discourses of natural philoso-




Dearth and the Plagues of Egypt  
in Wither and Cowley
Eate as it becommeth a man those things which
are set before thee; and devoure not, lest thou be hated.
— King James Bible 1611, Ecclesiasticus 31:16
In his 1616 treatise, he Fall of Man, or the Corruption of Nature, Godfrey 
Goodman exhorts his readers, “let not the plagues of Aegypt seem so in-
credible,” when, within living memory (1580), swarming mice infested Essex 
and made it “almost [un]inhabitable.”1 he corruption of nature, he asserts, 
has spread throughout the animal world: even domesticated creatures “who 
were made onely for mans vse and seruice” have “cast of their yoake, and are 
now become dangerous and obnoxious to man” (219). Goodman’s character-
ization of a deeply corrupted nature in the early seventeenth century turns 
on an extended analogy between the Egypt of Exodus and the England 
of James I: both are plagued (at least in Goodman’s imagination) by large 
beasts of prey and by vermin. “Wee stand not onely in feare of ierce Lions, 
cruell Tigers, rauening Wolues, deuouring Beares,” writes Goodman, “but 
Gats, Flies, and the least wormes doe serue to molest vs” (219). As his title 
suggests, the fall of man is bound inextricably to the corruption of a natural 
world, igured not only by traditional images of wild beasts (all but extinct 
in seventeenth- century Britain) but by small, noxious creatures, ubiquitous 
and familiar vermin.
During the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eighteenth centuries, bibli-
cal accounts of infestation by lice, lies, locusts, frogs, and other unidenti-
ied swarming things were deeply embedded in scientiic and political, as 
well as religious, culture. For religious writers, Europe was subject to real 
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plagues, pestilence, and famine that reinforced the experiential authenticity 
of Exodus and evoked, conceptually and typologically, the corresponding 
idea that England was being punished for its collective sins. Indeed, several 
seventeenth- century writers on the plagues of Egypt were thrown into jail, 
accused of comparing England’s leaders to the wicked Pharaoh.2 Invocations 
of and allusions to the Old Testament plague narrative always involved the 
danger of topical interpretations of Exodus as political allegory, even as writ-
ers registered contemporary concerns about the environment and natural 
world. Given their hermeneutic multiplicity, plagues of Egypt narratives, 
as Goodman’s text suggests, ofered tempting opportunities to explore bio-
politics throughout the seventeenth century. Focusing primarily on plague 
poems by George Wither (1588– 1667) and Abraham Cowley (1618– 67), 
this chapter traces conlicted and complex attitudes about the relationships 
among environmental, political, and religious narratives as they are igured 
through the swarms of verminous things.3 Republicans and royalists alike 
draw on typological uses of the plagues of Egypt narratives to reinforce, or 
subvert, diferent visions of God, King, and Nature.
Vermin— and especially plagues of vermin— were popular subjects for 
theological writers, like Goodman, partly because they functioned as mark-
ers for what now we would call anxieties about environmental degradation. 
During the Little Ice Age, populations of hungry animals or insects often 
meant the diference for individuals, families, villages, and cities between 
suiciency and hardship, even between life and death. Cold temperatures, 
rainfall shortages, and easterly winds brought with them crop shortages, 
relected in higher grain prices.4 Increases in grain prices created food in-
securities and nutritional deiciencies that, in turn, made already vulnerable 
populations more susceptible to disease.5 In 1533, Parliament passed an act 
requiring citizens to make and maintain nets and snares for trapping crows, 
rooks, and choughs, birds that fed on seeds before they could sprout and 
take root. In 1566, under Elizabeth, the earlier act was “revived,” but this time 
it was expanded to include a larger range of vermin, including foxes, weasels, 
otters, rats, mice, and moles.6 When James ascended to the English throne in 
1603, he drew up an elaborate plan (and corresponding taxation) for improv-
ing agricultural conditions in England, in part by controlling vermin his 
draining of the fens did not actually occur on a large scale until Charles I, 
and then drainage and enclosure may have worsened, rather than improved, 
the vermin problem. Michael McCormick argues land clearing and grain 
production increased food sources for rats, even as it deprived some of their 
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predators— primarily owls, foxes, and weasels— of their natural habitats.7 
Paradoxically, then, the clearing of wetlands may have contributed later in 
the century, particularly in 1665– 66, to the increase of vermin and the feroc-
ity of plague.
On the Continent, where grain prices were even higher, vermin— 
especially rats and mice— were prosecuted for their depredations. While 
pigs, dogs, and other mammals were, into the eighteenth century, some-
times charged and tried in ecclesiastical courts, vermin constituted a much 
bigger problem, evident by a greater number of prosecutions. Livestock 
and most stray mammals could be seized by humans and penned or 
chained, but “continuing infestations of insects and other vermin,” writes 
Dannenfeldt, seemed to require metaphysical aid, what C.P. Evans calls 
“sacerdotal conjuring and cursing.”8 Unlike hierstraten, the category of 
capital punishments brought against pigs, cows, and other domestic ani-
mals for homicide, hierprocesse were proceedings brought against rats, 
mice, locusts, weevils and other vermin “in order to prevent them from 
devouring the crops, and to expel them from orchards, vineyards, and cul-
tivated ields by means of exorcism and excommunication.”9 Once the in-
sects and vermin were warned against the destruction of crops, they were 
sometimes subjected to the “anathema maranatha” or cursed in the name 
of the Lord.10 his seemingly bizarre reaction to vermin infestations on 
the part of ecclesiastical authorities stemmed from uncertainties about the 
ultimate source of insects or rats, sent either by God or by Satan as a pun-
ishment for, or as a mark of, sin. Evans notes:
If the insects were instruments of the devil, they might be driven into 
the sea or banished to some arid region, where they would all miserably 
perish; if, on the other hand, they were recognized as the ministers of 
God, divinely delegated to scourge mankind for the promotion of piety, 
it would be suitable, after they had fulilled their mission, to cause them 
to withdraw from the cultivated ields and to assign them such a spot, 
where they might live in comfort without injury to the inhabitants. he 
records contain instances of both kinds of treatment.11
Such proceedings testify to conceptual struggles to incorporate vermin into 
theological and political systems so their power could be contained or de-
stroyed. In this sense, “sacerdotal conjuring and cursing” join nets, traps, en-
gines, and other devices as strategies to shore up humankind’s dominant 
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place in an already corrupted natural world. Biblical vermin provided writ-
ers and their readers ample precedent for interpreting “the corruption of na-
ture” in simultaneously theological and material terms.
Biopolitics and the Plagues of Egypt
he plagues of Egypt were a typological touchstone for depictions of a fallen 
world and a warning to the corrupt times. Intrinsically political, the Exo-
dus story became a popular subject during the politically and ecologically 
troubled sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, as writers and artists tried to 
warn frightened audiences about punishments that they, unlike their pagan 
predecessors, might still be able to avoid. In retrospect, early modern ac-
counts of the plague can be read through the context of what Foucault calls 
“bio- power,” one of the mechanisms through which “modern Western soci-
eties took on board the fundamental biological fact that humans are a spe-
cies.”12 he plagues of Egypt, individually and collectively, bring with them 
disruptions to the social order, biopolitical disruptions often igured, both 
Fig. 6. Jan Sadeler, he Plague of Frogs (1585)
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in art and literature, in terms of vermin and the threats they pose to food 
supplies. One of the more interpretively rich representations is Jan Sadeler’s 
1585 version of the plague of frogs, partly because it brings into clear relief 
the zoopolitics of Egypt’s degradation. Here imperfect creatures invade and 
overrun a sociopolitical body arranged for humans and normally populated 
by them and their domestic animals. Sadeler renders the frogs naturalisti-
cally, with attention to their anatomy and genuinely omnivorous diets. A 
dozen or so hungry amphibians assail an Egyptian dinner table laden with 
plates of ish. Although we tend to think of frogs as living on insects, they 
also readily consume small ish and sometimes even other frogs; because the 
Egyptians share with supposedly loathsome creatures similar appetites they 
are dragged down to the level of voracious, invading vermin. At the bottom 
right of the plate, one of the frogs seems to be staring down a dog for table 
scraps, a staged competition that suggests a larger economy of consump-
tion and scarcity. Such trans- species encounters raise the question of fun-
damental Aristotelian categories: who or what can be considered vermin? 
he frogs? he dog? he Egyptians? Distinctions among ostensibly distinct 
orders of being threaten to collapse. In the lower left corner, also at ground 
level, are an African, a monkey, and a frog engaged in what appears to be 
another scene of consumption. he monkey eats a piece of fruit with his 
left hand and reaches out to a frog with his right; compositionally and stra-
tegically, the monkey, the frogs, and dog— at a level below the African boy, 
who, in turn, is below the aristocratic Egyptians— are identiied as competi-
tors for food resources and perhaps as vermin, too. While this remarkable 
print doubtless stages familiar sociopolitical hierarchies, it also suggests that 
vermin are not particular animals, or a static category of creatures, but are 
determined by their position in shifting set of agricultural, theological, and 
political relations.
Sadeler also manages to incorporate the historical and narrative dimen-
sions of the Exodus story. Whereas most other artists render the ten plagues 
sequentially— one plague per plate— Sadeler depicts the second, frogs, in 
the foreground, while in the background, lice (the third plague) and lies 
(the fourth) attack horses beyond the gates of the city. Superimposing the 
diachronic on the synchronic, he encourages us to read typology and his-
tory simultaneously; by virtue of their progression in a series, Sadeler’s 
creatures appear as part of a telos, as punishments at the hands of an an-
gry God, who replaces excess with scarcity. he biopolitics of this woodcut, 
then, are bound to food shortages, or what Foucault calls “misfortune in its 
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pure state.” As Foucault argues in Security, Territory, and Population, politi-
cal thought traditionally has addressed scarcity in one of two ways. First, it 
can be seen as “cosmological- political”: “bad weather, drought, ice, excessive 
humidity, or anything that is outside one’s control” leads to scarcity, one of 
the “fundamental forms of bad fortune for a people and for a sovereign.”13 
Second, scarcity may appear as “juridical- moral,” as punishment for man’s 
sins: either God uses “nature” to punish humankind— scarcity itself is seen 
as a form of punishment— or
. . . man’s evil nature [inluences] scarcity by iguring as one of its sources, 
in as much as men’s greed— their need to earn, their desire to earn even 
more, their egoism— causes the phenomena of hoarding, monopoliza-
tion, and withholding merchandize, which intensify the phenomena of 
scarcity.14
If writing about the plagues of Egypt, from either perspective, is necessarily 
a political act in the seventeenth century, it is one capable of being inter-
preted in myriad ways. Interpretations of the ten plagues— “cosmological- 
political” and “juridical- moral”— were deeply entangled with contemporary 
epidemiological, political, and ecological crises. To read such crises from a 
narrow political perspective is to foreclose the semiotic possibilities pro-
voked by Sadeler’s vermin, to sacriice his disturbing vision of the place of 
the human polis within a less- than- predictable bioworld.
It is within this broader understanding of biopolitics that early mod-
ern commentaries on the plagues of Egypt can be read. In a very real sense, 
seventeenth- century English men and women were faced with the Egyp-
tian Pharaoh’s dilemma: how to interpret and respond to unpredictable 
infestations of vermin, dearth, and disease, a crawling and destructive 
creaturely landscape. James I, Charles I, Charles II— and Cromwell, the 
Lord Protector— could be perceived as standing in for the stony- hearted 
Pharaoh, bringing increasing destruction on a land and its people. Early 
modern writers were well aware that seventeenth- century England wit-
nessed four distinct and major outbreaks of plague— 1603, 1625, 1636, and 
1665— three of which coincided with signiicant political events: the death 
of Elizabeth, the death of James and coronation of Charles I, and the dec-
laration of war on the Dutch.15 As the sinful sovereigns of a corrupt na-
tion, monarchs could be accused of having caused scarcity by provoking 
God’s wrath. Even if plague and dearth were regarded as “cosmological- 
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political,” a matter of misfortune, queens and kings could be held respon-
sible for their failure (again like the Pharaoh) to respond to conditions of 
dearth and disease appropriately— to develop, for example, anti- hoarding 
policies during periods of grain shortage. By treating the plagues of Egypt 
as a theological text, poets like George Wither, writing in periods of civic 
unrest, could maintain the iction that exegesis transcends sectarianism 
and politics. In so doing, they could evade the legal consequences of being 
seen as critical of the political order.
So commonly did people read plague narratives as veiled commentary 
on the fate of sovereigns that Wither, who dedicated his Britain’s Remem-
brancer to Charles I, admits some readers may see his lines as dishonoring 
the monarch: “My Lines are loyall,” he insists, “though they bold appeare.”16 
Insisting Charles has not been on the throne long enough to judge his rule 
as either “good or ill” (17), Wither ofers his poem as a holy tribute and ac-
knowledgement of monarchical power: “O! let my Poeme be / A sanctiied 
Sacriice to thee” (32). At the same time, distinguishing between the piety of 
the monarchs and the corruption of their subjects, Wither represents him-
self as a prophet who holds up “a Glasse” by which the king may “Behold 
(without the hazard of infection) / he horrid Pestilence in her true form, / 
Which in your Kingdome did so lately storme” (19). his image of the poem 
as a “glasse” for a diseased kingdom captures Wither’s two- fold ambition to 
relect the reality of plague and dearth in England, even as he frames and 
shapes those realities in ways meant to explore fundamental questions about 
the relationships among politics, religion, and the environment.
In Michael Drayton’s Moses, His Birth and Miracles (1604), written after 
the plague of 1603, food scarcity and theories of contagion come together in 
a poetical and deeply topical description of the ten plagues.17 Personifying 
Egypt as a menstruating female, Drayton describes how God turned the 
“Christalline” river Nile into a “black lake or setled marish (sic)”; ish and 
serpents die, other animals ly from the “contagious stinke,” and the clean 
cisterns and reservoirs of Egypt become “poys’ned” (146). After this God- 
inlicted menstrum, a second plague of frogs is born out of manure. he 
“soyle, that late the owner did enrich/ Him his faire Heards and goodly 
locks to feed” now becomes a “common ditch” where “in their Todder loath-
ly Paddocks breed” (147). Agricultural and domestic spaces metamorphose 
into breeding grounds for vermin. he land subsequently becomes alive with 
the bodies of amphibians “as though in labour with this ilthy frie/ Stirring 
with paine in the parturious throwes.”
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People from windowes looking to the ground,
At this stupendous spectacle amazed,
See but their sorrow every where abound,
hat most abhorring whereon most they gazed.
heir Troughes and Ovens Toadstooles now become,
hat Huswifes wont so carefully to keepe,
hese loathsome creatures taking up the roome,
A croking, there continually do creepe.
(147)
In Drayton’s poem, as in Sadeler’s print, frogs corrupt food systems and 
thereby disrupt domestic and political order. Manuring and related prac-
tices of good husbandry produce a living mass of creeping things rather than 
sustenance for people and locks. Similarly, the implements and eforts of 
housewives— their tables and ovens— become illed with croaking frogs and 
toads rather than bread and meat. Drayton envisions the second plague as a 
kind of agricultural inversion, the spaces of food production and consump-
tion usurped by creatures unnatural to cultivation.
His dense descriptions draw on a variety of myths, beliefs, and obser-
vations about the generation of frogs. “Loathly Paddocks” breed in their 
own “Todder,” an archaic word form that refers to the “spawn of a frog or 
toad,” a “slimy gelatinous matter” (OED). Drayton’s is the only example of 
this word ofered in the OED, but it seems to refer to the egg sacs of frogs 
which, when laid on land rather than water, were often kept moist through 
a combination of saliva and urine. Since frogs, moreover, are not all sexually 
dimorphic, and— even if they are— are notoriously di cult to sex, Drayton 
plays on the widespread belief that frogs were the product of spontaneous 
generation. his belief, which can be traced back to Pliny, had not been dis-
pelled completely even as late as 1646, when homas Browne refers to the 
common garden or grass frog— “Temporariae”— as being born without the 
act of copulation.18 he discourse about frogs, moreover, is always marked 
by associations with the Whore of Babylon, who spewed an unholy mass of 
amphibious creatures from her mouth. Topsell writes about a woman giv-
ing birth to frogs, and Alexander Ross, a seventeenth- century natural phi-
losopher, claims to have seen a person whose swollen belly was “full of small 
toads, frogs, evets, and such vermin usually bred in putriied water,” simply by 
having drunk from a puddle.19 But what makes Drayton’s frogs “loathsome” is 
that, in a fallen world, they not only compete for food but threaten to “tak[e] 
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up the roome” of copulation, gestation, and the feeding practices crucial to 
domestic and social order. he plague of frogs— an image invoked by writ-
ers of diferent political ailiations and theological beliefs— acts as a kind of 
ideological substrate: frogs function as both the material causes of ruined 
harvests and subsequent dearth and as evidence of a providential punish-
ment for humankind’s sins. If Graham Hammill is right in his argument that 
Drayton, instead of “retreating from politics into nature forces a damaged vi-
sion of nature into the sphere of politics,” vermin function as the greatest 
evidence that sovereign power can enact violence in the name of “life.”20
Dearth, Pests, and Britain’s Remembrancer  (1628)
In his list of “pure misfortunes” that plague sovereigns and peoples, Foucault 
lists a series of weather events and “anything that is outside one’s control,” 
but he does not mention small, hungry animals that compete with humans 
for food. Within the Christian tradition, however, the Four Horsemen of 
the Apocalypse— War, Famine, Disease, and Death— were more often than 
not accompanied by vermin, “given power,” according to Revelations 6:7– 8, 
to “kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of 
the earth.” George Wither’s Britain’s Remembrancer begins with a descrip-
tion of how Famine follows the devastation of crops by vermin. Wither ac-
knowledges the roles of bad weather and poor farming but devotes most 
of his energy to personifying Famine as a general commanding a host of 
“Troups” that include caterpillars, locusts, birds, and worms:
he crawling Caterpillars, wastfull Flyes,
he skipping Locust (that in winter dies)
Floods, Frosts, & Mildewes, Blastings, Windes, & Stormes,
Drough, rav’nous Fowles, & Vermine, Weedes, & Wormes:
Sloth, Evill husbandry, and such as those,
Which make a scarcenesse where most plenty grows.
(41)
Aided by “Sloth” and “Evill husbandry,” Famine destroys the “plenty” that 
was universally taken as a sign of God’s favor. In Deuteronomy 9:8, God 
reminds the Jews coming out of the wilderness of all that should make them 
grateful: in the promised land, “thou shalt eat bread without scarceness, 
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thou shalt not lack any thing in it; a land whose stones are iron, and out of 
whose hills thou mayest dig brass.” Abundance is both the cause and efect 
of virtue, scarcity a sign of sins that pervade the socionatural world. Wither’s 
poem admonishes the evil behaviors that bring vermin down on the land as 
a token of God’s displeasure.
Wither was in London during the plague of 1625 and later sided with 
Parliament during the Civil War. A republican poet who admired Edmund 
Spenser, Wither took seriously his prophetic role. David Norbrook regards 
him as the “most ideological” of the Spenserian poets, a group that included 
Fulke Greville, Samuel Daniel, Drayton, Phineas and Giles Fletcher, and 
Wither’s lifelong friend, William Browne.21 By 1628, Wither had twice been 
thrown in prison (once around 1614, again in 1621) for presumably libelous, 
allegedly anti- royalist rhetoric. Norbrook also cautions us, however, against 
reading his poetry too narrowly as a straightforward articulation of repub-
lican ideals because Wither’s politics are often ambiguous and because the 
“motivating force behind [his] political ideas” was not a particular form of 
government but “a strong belief in an impending apocalyptic transforma-
tion.”22 In this respect, the Remembrancer looks forward to a conversion her-
alded by verminous harbingers. As a generic hybrid, Britain’s Remembrancer 
walks a ine line between moral exhortation and targeted satire. Claiming in 
a dedication to Charles that he was “call’d . . . to make this Declaration,” With-
er compares his muse to a falconer who would “spring / hose fowles that have 
been lowne at yet by none / Ev’n those, whom our best Hawks turne taile upon” 
(6– 7). His hunting metaphor— note the pun on “fowles”— characterizes his 
work as too threatening for other “Hawks,” and invites, without overdeter-
mining, allegorical interpretations of his targets. If his raptor muse proves 
insuicient, Wither claims,
I can unkennell such an eager packe
Of deep- mouth’d Hounds, that they afraid shall make
Our sternest Beasts of prey, and cunning’st Vermine,
Ev’n from the Fox- fur, to the spotted Ermine.
(7)
Poet turned hunter, he will deploy his hounds against those who threaten 
humans (“Beasts of prey”) and those who compete for food supplies (“Ver-
mine”). his animal imagery folds easily into the political, juridical- moral 
rhetoric of scarcity identiied by Foucault. Clergymen and peers, who 
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wear fox and ermine, are the targets of Wither’s hunt, the “sternest” and 
“cunning’st” beasts, whose greed and sin threaten society.
Britain’s Remembrancer was written shortly after one of the century’s 
worse food crises— England’s bad harvest year of 1622– 23— followed by a 
severe outbreak of the plague in 1625. Wither remained in London through-
out this period. he subtitle of his poem declares unambiguously its oc-
casion and purpose: “Containing A Narration of the PLAGUE lately past 
A Declaration of the MISCHIEFS present And a Prediction of JUDG-
MENTS to come If Repentance prevent not.” he title page announces a 
“Premonition” of a “dismall Cloud exceeding black” extending over the sin-
ful island of England with “thicke foggie Vapours” that threaten to “darken 
MERCIES beames” (title page). Drawing on the imagery of climatic crisis, 
inspissated air, and disease that Shakespeare had used in Macbeth, Wither 
imagines sin and social corruption in quasi- biblical forms. Within the “dis-
mall Cloud,” the speaker “did behold All Plagues and Punishments” (title 
page). hen, “with a trembling heart,” he sees rays of mercy piercing the 
cloud, making their way through those “Exhalations” and revealing the fol-
lowing inscription:
BRITAINES REMEMBRANCER. . . . hese words me thought he 
Storme is, yet, delaid, And if ye doe not penitence defer, his CLOVD 
is only, a REMEMBRANCER. But, if ye still afect impiety, Expect, ere 
long, what this may igniie.
Crucial to Wither’s apocalyptic imagination— his rhetoric of fear and divine 
retribution— is a comparison of England’s present condition of scarcity and 
disease to the depths of pestilential catastrophe to which it could descend. 
he aptly- named “Remembrancer” functions prophetically. It reminds the 
English they face future torments unless they amend their behavior, a warn-
ing that is conveyed by harrowing descriptions of the nation’s recent past.
Despite— or in conjunction with— its apocalyptic rhetoric, Wither’s 
poem ofers relatively sophisticated and nuanced accounts of both scarcity 
and disease as they were understood in the seventeenth century. Signii-
cantly, Wither demonstrates a sensitivity to the local nature of food short-
ages and, therefore, to the diferences between “dearth” and “famine.” As John 
Walters, among others, has argued, in contrast to Scotland, Ireland, and 
most of its “Continental neighbors,” England “had slipped the shadow of 
famine at an early date” and certainly during Wither’s lifetime.23 England’s 
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dearth was local, never as widespread as on the Continent, in part because 
by the early sixteenth century towns in England, including London, had 
erected storage granaries that helped them weather di cult harvest years 
and combat vermin infestations. England also developed anti- hoarding poli-
cies and a national market in wheat through which local shortages could 
be mitigated.24 Walter estimates that improved agricultural methods may 
have “doubled gross yields between the early sixteenth and mid- seventeenth 
centuries” and that, by the late seventeenth century, England, in fact, had 
become an exporter of grain.25 Contemporary diaries and literary accounts, 
including Wither’s poem, nevertheless reveal a people alarmed about uncer-
tain weather, bearing witness “to the shock of harvest failure on a society for 
which bread was still literally the staf of life.” 26 And even with improved 
technology, some years— the 1590s, 1622– 23, the 1640s— brought with them 
severe harvest failures in a signiicant portion of England.
Wither’s understanding of the English situation is relected in his de-
scription of dearth as at once ecological and theological. One of God’s 
“Hoast of Plagues” is “Dearth,” who is commended by “Justice” and “Mercy” to 
visit England, so as “to make us feare”
A Scarceness: she should scatter here, and there,
A Floud, or Tempest; and at sometime bring
A droughty Summer, or a frosty Spring,
Or Meldewes, to remember us, from whom
he blessings of a plenteous yeare doe come.
(79)
“Scarceness” is regional, associated with storms that God has “scatter[ed] 
here, and there” or precipitated by intermittent— “sometimes”— cold, wet 
summers or “frosty” springs, the unstable seasonal efects characteristic of 
the Little Ice Age. Such weather brings “Meldewes,” a phenomenon not yet 
recognized as fungal, but which was widely known to be associated with 
moisture that produced a destructive white coating on plants. In King Lear, 
a facetious Edgar ascribes such destruction to “the foul Flibbertigibbet” who 
“makes the hare- lip; mildews the white wheat, and hurts poor creature of 
earth” (III.iv.113– 17); Hamlet, in a more naturalistic image, complains that 
Gertrude’s new husband “is like a mildwe’d ear / Blasting his wholesome 
brother” (III.iv.64– 65).27 Wither’s similar characterization of mildew as 
weather- related relects a widespread understanding that precipitation can 
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devastate harvests. Like droughts and unseasonal frosts, mildewed crops 
ground an injunction to his readers to embrace virtuous behavior. “Mil-
dewes” serve as a stark warning that conditions may worsen, reminding an 
ungrateful people about the source and signiicance of God’s bounty. Indeed, 
later in the poem, meditating on God’s mercy to England, where, their “Gra-
nards illed,” the English “feast” while others “fast” (247), Wither reminds 
his readers that they, too, had experienced dearth before the coming of the 
plague.
he Winter last before the Pest began,
hroughout some Northern Shires a Famine ranne,
hat starved some; and others were faine,
heir hungry appetites to entertaine
With swine and sheep, and horses, which have dy’d
By chance.
(247)
Plenty can quickly turn into dearth, and dearth into famine, during which 
Londoners could ind themselves, like the hungry northerners, turning 
carrion- eaters and feeding on fallen livestock. By emphasizing this harbin-
ger of disaster, Wither treats real food scarcity in Foucault’s juridical sense 
as a sign of a “loving . . . Father’s rod” (248), as a merciful, motivating warning 
that, if heeded, would have spared England the plague that followed.
In contrast to conditions in England, widespread starvation on the Con-
tinent is a sign, for Wither, of God’s judgment against Catholics, whose di-
etary practices feature slimy, verminous creatures. Wither’s descriptions of 
European famine foods— foods of last resort during times of agricultural 
failure— are among the most harrowing and fascinating of the poem. Fam-
ine, he insists, taught Spaniards how to “dresse / heir Frogs,” Germans how 
to “make a dinner or a supper on a Snake,” Italians how to feed on the slimy 
snail, and Irishmen “to live upon a weed / hat growes in Marshes” (41). 
(his weed may be Irish moss, a form of kelp.) Foods we now often regard 
as staples of particular national diets become the unclean objects of con-
sumption. his pestilential diet marks the lives of sinful populations at the 
mercy of extreme weather conditions, poor farming practices, and providen-
tial punishment. “hose dainty pallats which could relish nought/ But what 
was set farre of, and dearly bought,” writes Wither, have been so starved, 
or “dieted,” by Famine, “that they could feed / On moldy scraps; and beg 
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them too for need” (42). Foreign luxury has given way to verminous feeding 
practices. Wither then personiies “Famine” as an evil mother who, rather 
than supplying her family with healthy meals, forces them to consume dried 
animal skins and rodents: “he broiling of old shooes, was her device / And 
so was eating Carrion, Rats, and Mice” (42). Sin leads to scarcity, scarcity 
to desperation, and desperation to the collapse among categories— vermin, 
leatherwork, food. Indeed, “Famine” encourages cannibalism: “his Hag, 
hath Townes and Cities famished / With humane lesh, the hungry men 
hath fed” (42). Cannibalism is the ultimate act of degradation and depraved 
minds, and this feminized evil the logical end of humankind’s sin.
Famine, then, compels humans to sink radically below their privileged 
species position and behave like mosquitoes, worms, and other “imperfect 
creatures” who “feed on mouldy scraps,” “suck their horses blood,” and “feed 
on Pigeons dung” (42). In efect, Famine inverts the presumably natural 
food chain, in which humans kill, dismember, cook, and consume selected 
animals, usually medium- size mammals or birds. Graphic descriptions of 
ilial cannibalism instead connect humans to some insects, spiders, rats, and 
other animals that were thought to kill and eat their own young. Wither 
describes how mothers in Famine’s dark and horrible household, mothers 
who would normally suckle their young, use them to sustain their own life. 
Famine
. . . is that unequall’d cruell- one,
Who urg’d a Mother, once, to kill her Sonne,
And make unnaturally that cursed wombe
Which gave him being, to be made his tombe.
(42)
he child returns in pieces to the mother’s belly, irst as food and then as ex-
crement. Wither had precedent for baby- eating mothers in the Bible: Deu-
teronomy 28:56– 57, and 2 Kings 6:28– 29. Josephus provides an extended ac-
count of a Jewish woman consuming her child during the siege of Jerusalem, 
and versions of this tale circulated in the seventeenth century.28 Shakespeare 
draws on the image in Titus Andronicus; Tamora unwittingly eats her own 
children, baked into a pie.29 Wither’s version, however, is not the stuf of 
revenge tragedy but a marker of ecospiritual apocalypse, a collapse of a gen-
dered social, ecological, political, and natural order.
his apocalypse, the end point of Wither’s prophetic nightmare, is ful-
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ly imagined in Canto Eight. Despite all the warnings to the English, God 
eventually visits plague on humans, animals, and the lower ecosystem, “on 
each person, place, and ev’ry thing”: the “pleasant soyle, wherein such plenty 
growes, / And where both milke and honey overlowes” are made “barren” 
(513). he land is stripped of wheat, grass, and corn, and the ields and lakes 
made empty; God drives away “pleasant Fowles” and “all those Fish that play 
/ Within [England’s] waters” (513). he result of sin is a fallen world unit 
for humans:
he very Climate, and thy temp’rate ayre,
Shall lose their wholsomnesses, for thy ofenses;
And breed hot Fevers, Murraines, Pestilences,
And all diseases. . . . 
(255)
In a poetic rendering of Goodman’s vision of the “corruption of Nature,” 
Wither describes common spaces— towns, cities, churches— given over to 
vermin and wild beasts: “the places where much people meetings had/ Shall 
vermine holes, and dens for beasts be made” (514– 15).
his ecological collapse ushers in the reign of vermin. As their punish-
ment for idleness and luxury, diseased women will wear “deformity” rather 
than jewels “about their faces,” and God, unleashing a horde of pricking in-
sects, will
Scourge thee with Scorpions, Serpents, Cockatrices,
And other such; whose tailes with stings are armed,
hat neither can be plucked forth, nor charmed.
(151)
In keeping with the juridico- political discourse of scarcity, such verminous 
and pestilential conditions are both causes and efects of spiritual corrup-
tion. People, Wither warns, will eat without being “suiz’d” and, sufering 
more than “scarcity of bread” and “temp’rall food,” will be deprived of the 
“meat/Whereof the faithful soul desire to eate” (515). To avoid this hell- on- 
earth, they must immediately turn to Christ— to a Christ, we are reminded, 
who in John 6:35 occupies the place of food: “I am the bread of life. Whoever 
comes to me will never be hungry, and whoever comes to me will never be 
thirsty.”
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he eight cantos of rhymed couplets that constitute Britain’s Remem-
brancer consistently blur diferences among religious, medical, and ecological 
devastation. If the poem breaks down barriers between genres, as Norbrook 
maintains, that is in part because Wither seeks to create a collective or work-
ing memory, yoking as many discourses as possible.30 From this perspec-
tive, religious, medical, and agricultural histories (along with speciic farm-
ing and medical practices) provide a common frame of reference for a dark, 
even apocalyptic vision. he performative nature of Wither’s task is aptly 
relected in his title— “Remembrancer”— which turns the poet into a ve-
hicle for, or a recorder of, a social and moral activity that helps constitute a 
community of readers who abjure the sins he describes. Weaving together 
narratives and folk memories of starving peoples, mothers eating babies, and 
present hardships, Britain’s Remembrancer reinforces a providential explana-
tion of Britain’s hardship and points towards a redemptive future. Wither 
relocates the plagues of Egypt— or at least some of the plagues of Egypt— to 
seventeenth- century Europe, thereby evoking and naturalizing the power of 
God as dramatized in the biblical narrative.
In comparing his contemporary, disease- ridden England to the Pha-
raoh’s Egypt, Wither walks a ine line between naturalized explanations and 
typological readings. He warns that, should England “remain impenitent,”
those plagues will all
Descend on thee, which did on Egypt fall
Blood, Frog, and Lice, great swarms of uncouth Flies,
h’infectious Murraine, whereof Cattle Dyes;
Boiles, Scab[ies], and Blaine; ierce Hail, & hunderstorm;
he Locust, and all fruit devouring Wormes.
(517)
Although Wither’s long poem depends on naturalistic interpretations to en-
force his descriptions of famine, dearth, and scarcity, his treatment of the Ex-
odus story in Canto Eight incorporates an emphatic allegorical dimension. 
Vermin proliferate. “All those Plagues shall fall on thee,” he continues, “Ac-
cording as the Letter doth imply, / Or, as in mystick sense they signiie” (517). 
Using noxious animals to represent human failings is a familiar rhetorical 
strategy in early modern literature. Both Jacobean tragedy and natural phi-
losophy employ beasts and bugs to signify the traits of humans who fall into 
violence, greed, gluttony, and dishonesty. Wither uses this tactic in describ-
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ing the “curse of ravenous beasts” that will fall on the “wicked kingdome”: “No 
Tygers Lyons, Wolves, or Beares” will ravage “thee,” he explains, somewhat 
laboriously, but men and women will be assaulted by “beastly minded men” 
who are “farre/ More cruel than those bloody spoilers” (516). In warning his 
readers about the plagues that will be visited on England, Wither is hardly 
subtle about the allegorical interpretations he wants them to draw. “Lyons” 
are “Tyrants,” he clariies; “Tigers” are “men of no compassion”; “heeves” and 
“outlaws vile” are “Beares” and “Wolves.” Beasts of the more perfect variety are 
linked to particular moral weaknesses, to humans who fall into bestial sins. 
In contrast, however, imperfect creatures are linked to a collective national 
and even ethnic failure. “Most loathsome Frogs,” he claims, bred in “unwhole-
some fens, and ditches,” should be read as a “race impure, / Of base condi-
tion, and of birth obscure” (517). Like the frogs of Exodus, they will spread 
over wholesome ields and “make unwholesome (by their sluttishnesse) / 
hy kneading troughs, thy ovens, and that meat / Whereof thy people, and 
thy Princes eat” (517). But these amphibians igure more than a threat to 
food supplies. As part of Wither’s typology, they explicitly link vermin to “a 
nasty Generation,” “Unworthy either of the reputation / Or name of men” 
(517). Imperfect creatures ofer Wither opportunities to characterize the na-
ture of good and bad government in class- based and ethnic terms.
Allegory, in other words, shades into a kind of sociopolitical literalness: 
moral corruption (“sluttishnesse”) disrupts the agricultural economy of the 
kingdom, and the low- born “brood,” evil upstarts (like Shakespeare’s Bushy, 
Bagot, and Green in Richard II) rise to “sing” in the King’s chambers, “spew-
ing evil in bragging, reviling, ribaldries, and slanders” (517). his “nasty Gen-
eration” of counselors easily metamorphoses into the third plague: “as Lice” 
they “shall feed / Ev’n on the body whence they did proceed; / Till poverty, 
and sloven’ly, and sloth” have consumed them (518). On the one hand, the 
comparison of government oicials to frogs and lice invokes a tradition of 
stage characters who embody similarly verminous qualities, like the “para-
site” Bosola in Webster’s he Duchess of Mali. When Ferdinand recruits 
Bosola as his “politic dormouse” and gives him the prestigious (and ironic) 
position of Master of the Horse, Bosola asks: “What’s my place? / he pro-
visorship o’ the horse? Say then my corruption/ Grew out of horse dung” 
(I.i.273– 74).31 In this image, the double- dealing and self- loathing parasite 
identiies himself with leeches, lice, and other vermin ostensibly engendered 
by mud or slime, thereby transforming himself into a soulless thing born of 
putrefaction. On the other hand, however, given Wither’s emphasis on the 
66 imperfect creatures
“nasty Generation” of evil counselors in Stuart England, Egypt’s verminous 
plagues lend themselves to particularistic readings. As God’s punishment of 
a stonehearted leader and a luxuriant people, they signal not a millenarian 
end to history itself but to a particular regime.
As Graham Hammill has argued in the cases of homas Dekker and 
Michael Drayton, plague poems are always ways of reading the sover-
eign body.32 Wither’s Remembrancer is— despite his lengthy pleas to the 
contrary— no exception. Without the providentialist structure of Exodus— 
the punishment of Pharaoh for enslaving the Israelites— the plagues be-
come merely a sequence of horrors. he diference between invoking the 
millenarian end of time, signaled by the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, 
and the plagues of Egypt with their swarming creatures, then, is this: the 
Exodus tale places the poet- prophet and his readers in the symbolic posi-
tion of wandering forty years in the wilderness, beset by dissension, greed, 
sin, and heresy. he reward of reading the politics of Exodus “correctly” in its 
“mystick sense” is, however, not a transcendence of sin through repentance 
but an endorsement of Wither’s critique of corruption, his allegorizing of 
verminous behavior. he end of Wither’s providential politics is a return to 
politics, to the kinds of extermination campaigns promoted by ratcatchers 
and described in Mascall’s Booke of Engines.
Cowley, Frogs, and the Hand of God
In his groundbreaking account of agriculture in early modern England, 
God Speed the Plough, Andrew McRae argues that population explosion, 
from around 2,000,000 in 1500 to approximately 5,000,000 in 1660, was 
the “most important social development of the period,” leading to soaring 
prices and schemes to promote increased agricultural production, includ-
ing national projects for draining the wetlands.33 God Speed the Plough ends 
with a brief discussion of Abraham Cowley, whose work, maintains McRae, 
“helped to deine the revised ethics and aesthetics of rural property.”34 In 
contrast to Wither’s tendency to allegorize natural phenomena, Cowley 
seeks to bridge the gap between the theological and metaphysical. Even in 
his Davideis, written as a youth at Cambridge, Cowley attached to the reli-
gious poem notes demonstrating his acquaintance with natural philosophy: 
the origin of winds and comets, accounts of thunder, and theories of gravity 
are joined to his description of hell.35 Later, he proposed an agricultural col-
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lege, inspired by Virgil’s Georgics, and outlined in his Essays an ethos of im-
provement that inluenced eighteenth- century agricultural practices. Cow-
ley was admitted to Cambridge in 1664 for the M.D.36 A founding member 
of the Royal Society, he brings his lifelong fascination with medicine and 
natural philosophy to bear on his reading of the plagues of Egypt. Acknowl-
edging forthrightly the epistemological problems of interpreting the Bible, 
his poem, he Plagues of Egypt, includes copious notes almost three times 
the length of his pindaric.37 In this metacommentary, Cowley attempts to 
control a cacophony of exegetical debates about the extent of God’s power, 
natural laws, and relationships between humans and other animals. In the 
poem and its appended metacritical commentary, we see how animals— and 
especially vermin— once again provoke competing theological and episte-
mological interpretations.
On the whole, Cowley’s notes attempt to make recent studies in natu-
ral philosophy consistent with the Hebraic and classical accounts of natu-
ral disaster, thereby synthesizing ancient and modern learning. One of the 
most troublesome questions raised by Exodus for natural philosophers was 
about the status of the serpents that the Pharaoh’s magicians conjure up in 
response to the snake produced by Aaron’s rod. Cowley summarizes in his 
notes the four dominant interpretations of this episode and his arguments 
against them: the Egyptian serpents are mere illusions ( Josephus); the Ma-
gicians, through the Devil, did in fact create true serpents; they were true 
serpents but the products of spontaneous generation, rather than the Devil 
(homas Aquinas); and the Devil performed a sleight- of- hand by removing 
the rods and replacing them with serpents (248– 49). Cowley supports the 
last view, arguing it “Agrees better with the Swiftness of the Action” (249). 
His poem resolves the interpretive problem by turning the Egyptian priests 
into mere jugglers or magicians. When the magicians mutter “secret Sounds,” 
their “servile Gods” or “evil spirits . . . snatch the Rods away / And Serpents in 
their place the airy Juglars lay” (236). In addressing the status of the serpents, 
Cowley walks a ine line between naturalistic and religious interpretation, 
acknowledging the power of occult forces to switch out the rods and ser-
pents without people noticing but insisting on this power as kind of theatri-
cal efect. hus, he points out in a previous note that various translators have 
rendered the magicians as “Veneici,” “Poisoners,” “Wisemen,” “Inchanters,” 
“Astrologers,” “Philosophers,” and “Witches” (248). Cowley’s preferred term 
is “Sorcerers,” and his account of the serpents emphasizes the creative power 
of God over an anthropomorphized and material Nature. he “Hebrew- 
68 imperfect creatures
Serpent” lew on the Egyptians ones, breaking their backs, devouring them 
almost at once: “So much was over- power’d / By God’s miraculous Creation / 
His Servant Nature’s slightly- wrought and feeble Generation” (237). In efect, 
the serpents are divided into two species— the agents of God’s miraculous 
power and the vermin that are physiologically inferior, “slightly- wrought” 
and “feeble” (237). As he writes in a later note, “I cannot believe that God and 
the Magicians had the same Agents” (257). he instability of the category of 
vermin forces readers to confront profound epistemological uncertainties; 
vermin raise questions about origins and power that can be resolved only by 
recourse to theological or extra- natural explanations.
Cowley’s strategy, though, is to use disagreements between theological 
explanations as the basis for ofering more naturalistic accounts. In his po-
etic rendering of the plague of frogs, after the Nile has turned to blood,
he River yet gave one Instruction more,
And from the rotting Fish and unconcoted Gore,
Which was but Water just before,
A loathsome Host was quickly made,
hat scal’d the Banks, and with loud Noise did all the Country invade.
(237)
he traditional theological question that troubled commentators was 
whether or not the frogs were newly created by God or, in keeping with an-
cient theories of spontaneous generation, created by natural means. Cowley 
shifts the focus of argument from the question of the frogs’ origin to the 
ways God can alter, at will, the natural behaviors of entire animal popula-
tions. Drawing an analogy between the tainted Nile and the natural proper-
ties of blood “which when it corrupts Boils and burns as it were in the veins,” 
Cowley asserts it is “no wonder” that water “corrupted in this manner  .  .  . 
produc’d a great Number of Frogs” (250). If the river changed temperature, 
it could, like corrupted blood, give rise to living things. he real “Wonder,” 
he continues, is “that the Number was so ininite, in that it was so suddenly 
produc’d upon the Action of Aaron, and that contrary to their Nature, [the 
frogs] came to molest the Egyptians in their very Houses” (251– 52). Cowley’s 
frogs are not in themselves vile— a “race impure,” as Wither asserts— but a 
problem precisely because they deviate from their natural character. Cowley’s 
frogs “mount up higher/ Where never Sun- born Frog durst to aspire,” plac-
ing their “slimy Members” in silken beds in a “Luxury unknown before to all 
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the Watry Race” (238). Although produced “naturally” within seventeenth- 
century understandings of spontaneous generation, frogs become providen-
tial agents sent to punish the Egyptians.
In its treatment of frogs as a “race impure, / Of base condition, and 
of birth obscure,” Britain’s Remembrancer alludes to the still- active notion 
that amphibians are sexually indeterminate and derive from putrefaction. 
Many years later, Alexander Pope exploits this association in his Epistle to 
Dr. Arbuthnot in the igure of the sexually ambiguous Bufo, that “Amphibi-
ous hing!” who latters and lies his way into dinners and courts.38 Cowley, 
in contrast, generally rejects allegorical, satirical, or particularist interpreta-
tions, preferring instead to synthesize classical and biblical accounts of the 
plague of frogs through natural philosophy. Even as he follows Wither and 
other religious writers in maintaining that Exodus is the prime example of 
the divine violence exacted against an unregenerate people, Cowley empha-
sizes the frequent character of such events and their historical (if not en-
tirely material) nature. Citing “profane Histories,” he writes in his notes:
Athenaeus in his eighth Book, Chapt. 2. reports that in Paenoa and 
Dardanium (now call’d Bulgary) there rained down so many Frogs from 
Heaven (that is, perhaps, they were suddenly produc’d after great Show-
ers) that they ill’d all the Publick Ways, and even private Houses, that 
their Domesticall Furniture was cover’d with them, that they found 
them in the very Pots where they boil’d their Meat; and that what with 
the Trouble of the Living and the Smell of the Dead ones, they were forc’d 
at last to forsake their Country. And Pliny reports in his eighth Book, 
Chap. 29. hat a whole City in Gallia hath been driven away by Frogs, 
and another in Africk by Locusts, and many Examples of this kind might 
be collected. (251)
Cowley explicitly characterizes such periodic explosions of animal popula-
tions as “Judgment[s]” exacted against nations, as punishments that ought to 
“be attributed to the same Hand of God, though the Rod was Invisible” (251). 
From his perspective, then, profane histories can reinforce the authenticity 
of the biblical narrative. As signiicantly, they make the “Hand of God” part 
of a universal, rather than exclusively, Christian history. his history is the 
responsibility of natural philosophers, as well as theologians, to elucidate.
Cowley’s Christian rationalism is evident in his determination to dis-
tance himself from suspect theories of spontaneous generation, as in the 
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third plague, the plague of biting insects. he biblical noun kinnim refers to 
an insect that has been variously interpreted as lice, gnats, mosquitoes (com-
mon around Egypt), and sand leas. Cowley writes in his note, “What kind 
of Creature this was, no Man can tell certainly” (251). Ultimately, however, 
he agrees with his contemporaries Benedictus Pererius and Levi Rivet that 
the biblical kinnim was probably “some new kind of Creature, called Ana-
logically by an old known Name” and emphasizes, as he does in discussing 
the irst plague, a distinction between “magick” and God’s creative force: “the 
Magicians could not counterfeit this Miracle, as it was easy for them to do 
those of the Serpents, the Blood, and the Frogs, which were things to be had 
every where” (252). Instead, the “swarming things” defy the “Sorcerers mimick 
Power” and testify to the power of God in punishing the Egyptians:
hey stroke the Earth a fertile blow
And all the Dust did straight to stir begin;
One would have thought some sudden Wind had been
But, Lo, ‘twas nimble Life was got within!
And all the little Springs did move,
And every Dust an arm’d Vermine prove,
Of an unknown and new- created Kind,
Such the Magick- Gods could neither make nor ind.
(238)
his stanza reinforces the voluntaristic power of the Judeo- Christian God 
over the natural world in generating “an unknown and new- created Kind.”39 
In such passages, Cowley demonstrates how old theories of spontaneous 
generation can be given theological explanations, even while leaving the ac-
counts of Pliny, Africk, and other ancients more or less intact. Rather than 
allegorizing the vermin, assigning them a “mystick sense,” Cowley reanimates 
and naturalizes them, casting them as the “little Springs” of God’s volunta-
ristic power.
While Cowley’s Plagues of Egypt has sometimes been read as political 
allegory, it is di cult to reconcile allegorical readings with the poet’s copious 
notes. In many cases, the notes approach the length of mini- essays and attest 
not only to Cowley’s vast knowledge of biblical commentary on Exodus but 
to his naturalist’s interest in plant and animal populations.40 His accounts of 
plagues four (lies), ive (pestilence), and eight (locusts), in particular, relect 
his preoccupation with agricultural reform. he domestic animals struck 
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down by pestilence are drawn with the sensitivity usually reserved for ex-
ecuted human martyrs: the “labouring Ox drops down before the Plow”; 
chickens, “the Crowned Victims,” are “to the Altar lead,” where they “Sink, 
and prevent the lifted Blow” of beheading (239). hese “useful” animals are 
innocent of humankind’s sin, and Cowley conveys their almost anthropo-
morphized sufering in a series of poignant images. he starving sheep that 
“refuse to feed”
bleat their innocent Souls out into Air;
he faithful Dogs lye gasping by them there;
he astonish’d Shepherd weeps, and breaks his tuneful Reed.
(240)
Pestilence breaks down the agricultural system by striking down perfect 
creatures and thereby disrupts complex interdependencies and afective 
relationships among domestic animals, shepherds, companion species like 
dogs, and the larger, imagined ecosystem of ancient Egypt.
In his description of the eighth plague, Cowley anthropomorphizes the 
locusts in a very diferent manner. he “Infant Corn” is blasted by a “scorch-
ing Wind” of “greedy Locusts”:
. . . where- e’er
With founding Wings they lew,
Left all the earth depopulate and bare,
As if Winter itself had march’d by there.
Whate’re the Sun and Nile
Gave with large Bounty to the thankful soil,
he wretched Pilagers bore away,
And the whole Summer was their prey.
(241)
His notes on this passage make no particular theological argument but 
enumerate historical accounts of locusts that document the size of their 
swarms, the havoc they wreak on crops, and, most signiicantly, the seem-
ing coordination of their attacks: “Wonderful are the hings which Authors 
report of these kinds of Armies of Locusts, and of the Order and Regularity 
of their Marches” (255). Cowley recounts how, in 852, locusts, “in manner of 
a formed Army,” descended on Germany, their “Captains” marching ahead 
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to choose the “most opportune Places for their Camp” (255). Eventually, the 
locusts were “driven by a violent wind into the Belgick Ocean” and drowned; 
their bodies, however, covering an area some twenty miles wide, washed 
back on shore, causing “a great Pestilence in the Country” (255). his account 
demonstrates the power of God to punish sinners and characterizes God’s 
power as a principle of order and regularity; the locusts become a military 
wing of divine punishment. In this context, Cowley quotes St. Hier: “When 
the Armies of Locusts came lately into these Parts, and illed all the Air, 
they lew in so great Order, that Slates in a Pavement cannot be laid more 
regularly, neither did they ever stir one inch out of their Ranks and Files” 
(255). While the image of the locusts as scourges of an angry God comes as 
no surprise in the writings of a Christian theologian, Cowley inally turns to 
Pliny and quotes, without commenting on, the ancient naturalist’s descrip-
tion of locusts that “pass in Troops over great Seas, enduring Hunger for many 
days in the search of foreign Food” (255). heir numbers are so great, according 
to Pliny, that they sometimes “overcast the Sun, whilst People stand gazing with 
Terrour, lest they should fall upon their Lands” (255). Locusts, then, appear 
in Cowley as both a speciic instrument of God’s punishment of the Egyp-
tians and a threat to all agriculturalists— a threat that pervades ancient and 
modern history. By interweaving classical, medieval, and biblical accounts, 
Cowley efectively yokes biblical and natural history in a manner consistent 
with the Royal Society’s defense of what Robert Boyle and others called 
physico- theology.
Implicit in these notes on the plague of locusts— and in Cowley’s inter-
pretation of Exodus as a whole— is a new attitude toward vermin. On the 
one hand, far from being the devil’s misshapen emissaries, as they are for 
de Gheyn, locusts and other imperfect creatures are agents of God’s power. 
Indeed, they constitute a kind of verminous sublime, a spectacle of natu-
ral forces marshaled to punish sinful communities by devastating crops and 
disrupting animal- human economies that depend on annual yields of grain. 
On the other hand, vermin incite humans to employ their God- given reason 
in inding ways to strike back against invasions and infestations. hus, Cow-
ley’s note on locusts ends with another quotation from Pliny pitched in a 
decidedly practical, rather than Miltonic, vein: “In the Country of Cyrene there 
is a Law to make War against them thrice a Year, irst by breaking their Eggs, 
then by killing the young ones, and lastly, the old ones, &c.” (255). Citing this 
ancient attempt to eradicate locust populations, Cowley implicitly moves 
beyond a purely theological interpretation of the plague of locusts and to-
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ward a practical solution for working farmers— a speciic historical instance 
of the kind of rational response to vermin infestations that he champions in 
“Of Agriculture.” Cowley’s verminous sublime, coupled with a dose of use-
ful knowledge, edge the demonic forces associated with vermin in Macbeth 
ofstage, or at least to the wings.
Admittedly, despite the lengthy engagement with natural philosophy 
in he Plagues of Egypt, Cowley is not completely above using vermin as 
allegorical machinery in the service of a larger political agenda, most no-
tably in A Vision, Concerning His Late Pretended Highnesse, Cromwell, the 
Wicked, published in 1661. Given the poem’s extended conceit linking ver-
min, Cromwellians, and war, it is easy to see how Cowley can be described 
as a “pew- ranting Anglican.”41 Cowley compares the “Tyrant” Cromwell both 
to a “mischievous Serpent” and to the rod that scourges the land: “A Tyrant 
is a Rod and Serpent too,” he writes, “And brings worse Plagues than Egypt 
knew” (591). Cowley compares the plagues of lice, lies, and locusts to inva-
sive bands of religious dissenters:
What croaking Sects and Vermine has it sent
he restlesse Nation to torment?
What greedy Troups, what armed power
Of Flies and Locusts to devour
he Land which every where they ill?
Nor ly they, Lord, away; no, they devour it still.
(592)
Even in this allegorical rendering, however, politics and natural philosophy 
reinforce one another. What makes the image efective is more than an al-
lusion to the Old Testament; it is a concrete knowledge of how similarly 
armies of men and armies of locusts behave. his analogy registers Cowley’s 
and his readers’ sensitivity to the fragile relations among “Flies and Locusts,” 
consumption, national politics, and food systems. “Croaking sects” situates 
this mid- seventeenth- century version of biopolitics in the context of royalist 
nightmares of “greedy Troups.” To “devour,” a word Cowley repeats several 
times, is to “swallow” greedily, voraciously, recklessly— to eat, in other words, 
like a wild, predatory animal rather than a supposedly civilized human. 
“Eate as it becommeth a man,” we are told in the original King James ver-
sion of Ecclesiasticus, “. . . and devoure not, lest thou be hated.” In the poet’s 
dark satiric vision, the Civil War made prey of human beings, the vermin-
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ous armies of the Parliamentarians— rather than the singular tyranny of 
Macbeth— stripping people of land, life, and sustenance.
Vermin, Reform, and the Balance of Nature
In works both before and after the Interregnum, Cowley answers prophets 
of doom, like Godfrey Goodman, by denying that humans sink naturally 
under the weight of a universal principle of decay. Goodman distinguishes 
between creatures created by God and the ephemeral ofspring of a cor-
rupted nature: if nature were “sound and entire,” he reasons, she would have 
given vermin “a more noble birth, and a longer continuance of life; but be-
ing defectiue, and not able to produce couragious Lions, braue Vnico[rn]es, 
ierce Tigers, stout Elephants, shee makes it her taske and imployment to be 
the mother, and mid- wife of wormes, of gnats, and of butterlies, wherein 
she seemes most to abound, and to bring forth a very plentifull brood.”42 
If Goodman’s imperfect creatures call into question the nature of life and 
emphasize the sinfulness of humanity, most of Cowley’s vermin reinforce 
his view that “he world’s a scene of changes, and to be Constant, in Nature, 
were Inconstancy.”43 Mutability functions as evidence of God’s power and 
providence in the world; this dynamic universe and uniied vision of physi-
cal reality similarly underwrites the argument from design popularized in 
the 1660s.
Even worms, therefore, must have their place in Cowley’s natural or-
der. His iconic essay “Of Agriculture” makes apparent his understanding of 
“corruption” as a physical process in which vermin play important roles. A 
sardonic, if biologically accurate, depiction of parasites occurs in his poeti-
cized herbal, Plantarum Libri Sex (Six Books of Plants), in which a personi-
ied wormwood (Artemisia absinthium) praises its own medicinal eicacy. 
In having the bitter- tasting wormwood celebrate its victories over Death, 
Cowley veers into a sardonic digression, into the discourse of the parasite:
(Voracious Worm! hou wilt most certainly
Heirs of our bodies be whene’er we die;
Defer a while the meal which, in the grave,
Of human viands thou ere long must have.)
hose vermine infants’ bowels make their food,
And love to suck their ill of tender blood:
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hey cannot stay till Death serves up their feast,
But greedily snatch up the meat undress’d.
Why should I speak of leas? Such foes I hate,
So basely born, ev’n to enumerate;
Such dust- born, skipping points of life, I say,
Whose only virtue is to run away.44
Born with infants (or passed though the mother’s milk), worms live in and 
on “infants’ bowels” and will be the “heirs” of the body at death. he birth-
right of parasites is set against the origin of “basely born . . . leas” who, more-
over, do not present wormwood— toasting its own healing prowess— with 
the kind of challenge that it ostensibly seeks. To the extent that Goodman 
imagines an ongoing corruption in nature, Cowley ofers a naturalist’s anti-
dote to speciic instances of “corruption” (Artemisia indeed has antibacterial 
properties) and parodies the hierarchy of humankind, perfect, and imper-
fect creatures on which Goodman relies.
Plantarum Libri Sex is typical of Cowley’s later writing, which often pres-
ents the relationship between humans and animals as a darkly comic series 
of nested connections, too complicated to be collapsed into hierarchical or 
metaphysical schemes. Cowley is the author, after all, who complains in “Of 
Agriculture” that while “metaphysic”— which “may be anything or no”— is 
considered part of the arts and sciences, plant and animal husbandry are 
not. His championing of an agricultural, rather than metaphysical, order is 
historically signiicant; “Of Agriculture” was incorporated in the nineteenth 
century into the mission statement of land- grant colleges and universities 
across the United States. Yet his conception of order itself, as the personiied 
wormwood testiies, is shot through with the ironies and complexities of a 
divine and mysterious creation.
Even in his theological writings, Cowley’s treatment of the human- animal 
relationship is described in the inversions and indirections characteristic of 
a dynamic natural order. In his Pindaric based on Isaiah 34, written before 
he Plagues of Egypt, Cowley describes impending devastation: rivers and 
lakes overlow with human blood; rotting corpses, infecting the air, beget 
plagues and “putrid Venoms;” and streets are overtaken by serpents, wolves, 
ravens, and owls (225). Terriied by vermin, humankind becomes subjected 
to animals. Cowley’s note explains this inversion: “hough Beasts were irst 
created in time, yet because Man was irst and chiely designed, and they only 
in order to him, the Right of Primogeniture belongs to him, and therefore 
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all Beasts at irst obeyed and feared him” (229). Yet “Man,” ostensibly “Gods 
and Angels Kin,” has abdicated his dominion, or has efectively relinquished 
his moral claims to “the Right of Primogeniture.” Correspondingly, Cowley’s 
Pindaric ofers a strong (mis)reading of Isaiah 34:5 in that men, rather than 
animals, are igured as sacriicial oferings. he original King James version 
reads: “For the sword of God is illed with blood, it is made fat with fatness, 
and with the blood of lambs, and goats, with the fat of the kidneys of Rams.” 
Cowley, invoking the horrors of the Civil War, describes the ritual slaughter 
to which sinfulness has led:
God does a solemn Sacriice prepare;
But not of Oxen, nor of Rams,
Not of Kids, nor of their Dams,
Not of Heifers, nor of Lambs.
he Altar all the Land, and all Men in’t the Victims are.
(224)
Cowley’s contemporaries typically interpreted this biblical verse 
allegorically— lambs mean the “common people”; goats signify political lead-
ers; rams represent magistrates. In his notes, Cowley takes issue with this 
interpretation, which he regards as overly ingenious: “these two . . . interpre-
tations of Goats and Rams, seem very slight and forced; the Meaning is, that 
all sorts of men shall be sacriiced to God’s Justice, as lambs, goats, and rams 
were wont to be” (228). While admitting the “Text seems . . . quite contrary” 
to his view, Cowley nevertheless insists on the necessity of the interchange-
ability of men and beasts: “the Names of Beasts in that Place must neces-
sarily be understood, as put for Men; all sorts of Men” (228). His emphasis 
on the generic collectivity— “all sorts of Men”— as sacriicial oferings robs 
them of their agency: rather than sacriicing to God to forgive their sins, they 
are sacriiced by God because of their sins.
Cowley’s somewhat torturous misreading, it seems, articulates a model 
of collective identity that includes animals, and especially domestic crea-
tures.45 hroughout Cowley’s work, domestic animals are portrayed in a 
manner that, a century later, could be termed sentimental. As in his poetic 
treatment of faithful dogs and innocent sheep dying for humankind’s sins 
in he Plagues of Egypt, Cowley’s “translation” of Isaiah similarly emphasizes 
the innocence of perfect creatures:
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Since wicked Mens more guilty Blood to spare,
he Beasts so long have sacriiced been,
Since Men their Birth- right forfeit still by Sin,
‘Tis it at last Beasts their Revenge should have,
And sacriiced Men their better Brethren save.
(224)
Anticipating that many of his readers will take issue with his assertions that 
beasts are the “better Brethren” of “Men,” an explicit inversion of God’s hav-
ing granted Adam dominion over beasts, Cowley addresses the problem in 
his notes. “We should not be angry or ashamed,” he writes, “to have [Beasts] 
called our Brethren, for they are literally so, having the same Creator or Fa-
ther” (229). Indeed, Cowley expands this kinship to include vermin. Quot-
ing Job 17:14, he asserts that “the Scripture gives us a much worse Kindred: 
“I have said to Corruption, thou art my Father; and to the Worm, thou art my 
Mother and my Sister” (229). Although in this reference to Job Cowley may 
appear to align himself with Goodman, Wither, and others for whom the 
verminous nature of man is a foundational principle of Christian theology, 
his allusion seems a bit tongue in cheek. He deploys ironically humans’ kin-
ship to vermin so that vermin can function, as they do in his agricultural 
essay, as an incitement to moral reform.
In he Plagues of Egypt, “reform” seems to imply accepting God’s ability 
to perform divine violence, but increasingly in Cowley’s work, it comes to be 
associated with a kind of self- fashioning through retirement from the city, the 
proper use of medicine, and the stewardship of the land. By virtue of his in-
terest in natural philosophy, Cowley rewrites the plagues of Egypt and the 
prophecies of Isaiah, making vermin signs not of an originary corruption, but 
of intensiications of natural, even, commonplace phenomena. Vermin infesta-
tions speak to a neglect of the land. As such, they are subject to naturalistic as 
well as spiritual corrections, primarily through techniques of good husbandry. 
As he writes in “Of Agriculture,” agriculture can and will exist without philos-
ophy and the other arts, but “no one other” can exist “without this”: agriculture 
“is like Speech, without which the Society of Men cannot be preserv’d” (653). 
Recognizing the role of vermin in nature, Cowley mounts a powerful ideol-
ogy of improvement, agricultural as well as spiritual. In contrast to Macbeth’s 
Scotland, Cowley’s England can be redeemed by shared knowledges and tech-
nologies instead of through another ostensibly restorative regicide.
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John Ray’s Wisdom of God Manifested in the Works of Creation completes 
the rehabilitation of vermin foreshadowed in Cowley’s works. With William 
Derham, the naturalist and divine, Ray articulates what he regards as the 
“use value” of “Animalcula” discovered under the microscope, arguing that 
in their aquatic versions they “serve for Food to some others of the small In-
sects of the waters.”46 He extends the same line of argument to “noxious In-
sects.” In response to why so many are “produced,” he claims, irst, that what 
might appear noxious “to us, are salutary to other Creatures.” Poultry feed 
on spiders and peacocks prey on serpents, both demonstrating that while a 
sting or bite may be poisonous, that efect is neutralized when the creature 
is taken “entire into the Stomach.”47 Second, Ray points out that even ven-
omous creatures “aford us noble Medicines” and rarely use their sting unless 
“assaulted or provoked.”48 “Lastly,” he continues, God sometimes uses such 
creatures “as Scourges, to chastize or punish wicked Persons or Nations, as 
he did Herod and the Egyptians”:
No Creature so mean and contemptible, but God can, when he pleases, 
produce such Armies of them as no humane Force is able to conquer or 
destroy, but they shall of a sudden consume and devour up all the Fruits 
of the Earth, and whatever might serve for the Sustenance of Man, as 
Locusts have often been observed to do.49
hose who use the existence of noxious creatures to argue against the wis-
dom of God, he concludes, might equally argue against the “Prudence and 
Policy” of any state that keeps forces for its own protection. Such forces 
share with populations of insects rudeness and insolence but are “necessary, 
either to suppress Rebellions, or punish Rebels and other disorderly and vi-
cious Persons, and keep the World in quiet.”50
Ray’s apologia for swarming things emphasizes their use value in terms 
that recall the medical and moral qualities outlined, earlier in the seven-
teenth century, in homas Mofet’s foundational Insectorum heatrum. Ray 
justiies his comments on vermin by involving the principles of a “balance 
of nature,” an argument that, as Frank Egerton demonstrates, had its roots 
in Herodotus, Plato, and Cicero.51 he idea of a balance of nature turns on 
the following assumptions: populations of species remain essentially stable; 
when “eruptions” occur, the balance in the long run will be restored; and 
all species have a speciied place in the structure of nature. Predatory spe-
cies have low reproductive rates, and the species on which they prey have 
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much higher ones.52 Synthesized in the seventeenth century, these ancient 
balance-of-nature arguments, iltered through the imperatives of Protestant 
theology, helped formed the roots of modern ecological thinking.53
What ideas of the balance of nature did not bring with them, however, 
was a wholesale rebranding of swarming things as genuinely viable food 
sources for Europeans, despite some persuasive arguments about the nu-
tritional value of locusts and other creatures. Reporting in 1697 on swarms 
of locusts that had recently devastated Ireland and promising to avoid “bare 
Hearsays,” the naturalist and physician homas Molyneux describes how 
the locusts consumed so many trees and hedges that summer looked like 
“the depth of winter.”54 Swarms then spread into houses “where,” he writes, 
they “would often drop on the Meat as it was dressing in the Kitchen,” and 
fall from the ceilings “into the Dishes as they stood on the Table” (744). A 
second generation of locusts, still in the maggot stage, crept underground, 
devouring the roots of corn and grass, thereby ruining “both the support of 
Man and Beast” (744). But in a move worthy of Defoe’s Crusoe, Molyneux’s 
tale avoids environmental disaster by taking a providentialist turn. he “rage” 
of this plague was checked by both by fortunate winds and the foresight of a 
God who allowed the locusts to serve as a substitute food source for starving 
animals (745). Swine and poultry, Molyneux reports, began to watch for the 
locusts to fall from trees:
And when they came to the Ground eat them up in abundance, being 
much pleased with the Food, and thriving well upon the Diet. Nay, I 
have been assured that the poorer sort of the Native Irish (the Country 
then labouring under a Scarcity of Provision), had a way of dressing 
them, and lived upon them as Food; nor is it strange that what fattened 
our domestick Poultry and Hogs, should aford agreeable and suicient 
Nourishment for the Relief of Man. (746)
Molyneux’s description of the locust infestation demonstrates a nascent (if 
theologically structured) understanding of how humans and the “more per-
fect” creatures not only share basic food sources and appetites, but how they 
can survive in a shared agricultural and ecological system under threat.
In his letter, Molyneux imagines a holistic ecology based on the recycling 
of locusts into a providential agro- economy. his agro- economy is remark-
able in its inclusion of the imperfect creatures that had been banished from 
the Garden of Eden, booted from Noah’s Ark, and converted to a benign, 
80 imperfect creatures
buzzing landscape in seventeenth- century georgic. What enables his strange 
utopia are two rhetorical moves: irst, Molyneux demonstrates the double- 
sided nature of plagues— as scourges, as in Sadeler, but also, following Cow-
ley, as incitements to practical salvation. Second, he shows how locusts, usu-
ally regarded as an “unclean” food, may be reinterpreted through Mosaic law 
into a viable part of a providentially sanctioned food system. “Forseeing the 
great Dearth and Scarcity that these Vermin might one Day bring upon 
his People,” writes Molyneux, Moses “gives them a sort of Hint what they 
should do” when the locusts and beetles have destroyed provisions (753). 
Rather “than starve,” Moses tells them, “they might eat, and live upon, the 
ilthy Destroyers themselves, and yet be Clean” (753). While most Western 
scholars are unlikely to ind in Molyneux’s remarkable description of beetle 
nutrition an example to imitate, it does raise questions not only about the 
role of imperfect creatures in Judeo- Christian dietary practices, but also 
about their continuing constitutive functions in our systems of thought.55 I 
explore the latter problem in the next chapter by focusing on the scientiic 
perceptions of imperfect creatures, particularly in the works of the compara-
tive anatomist, homas Willis. If Cowley begins poetically to reassess the 
role of vermin in a traditional balance of nature, Willis, working in a dif-
ferent part of natural philosophy, challenges the fundamental, Aristotelian 





Imperfect Creatures, Neuroanatomy,  
and the Problem of the Human
Beasts are either perfect or imperfect.
— Thomas Brown, Nature’s Cabinet Unlock’d (1657)
homas Shadwell’s 1676 comedy he Virtuoso, a pointed and very popular 
satire of the Royal Society, lambasts Sir Nicholas Gimcrack, a would- be 
experimentalist who embodies the follies of pursuing impractical knowledge 
rather than managing his family and inances. His rebellious nieces, Clar-
inda and Miranda, describe Sir Nicholas to their suitors, Bruce and Longvil, 
as “A sot that has spent two thousand pounds in microscopes to ind out the 
nature of eels in vinegar, mites in cheese, and the blue of plums,” and who 
“has studied these twenty years to ind out several sorts of spiders, and never 
cares for understanding mankind.”1 he seeming triviality of Sir Nicholas’s 
pursuits is celebrated enthusiastically by his parasitical friend, Sir Formal 
Trile:
[N]o man upon the face of the earth is so well seen in the nature of 
ants, lies, humble- bees, earwigs, millipedes, hog’s lice, maggots, mites in 
a cheese, tadpoles, worms, newts, spiders, and all the noble products of 
the sun by equivocal generation. (III.ii.1– 5)
hroughout the play, Sir Formal’s rhetoric, as Andrew Black has sug-
gested, is essential to making Sir Nicholas’s seemingly useless knowledge 
signiicant— or signiicant sounding.2 Responding to Sir Formal’s compli-
ment, Sir Nicholas eagerly adds: “Indeed, I ha’ found more curious phe-
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nomena in these minute animals than in those of vaster magnitude” (III.
iii.6– 7). Yet, even given Shadwell’s satiric intentions, the Virtuoso is self- 
aware enough to insert himself into some illustrious company, going back 
to Sir Francis Bacon. Writing in 1627, Bacon emphasized the ability of what 
were still called “insecta,” or creatures born of putrefaction, to serve as ex-
emplars of the wonders of the Book of Nature: “the Nature of hings,” he 
writes in Sylva Sylvarum “is commonly better perceiued, in Small, than in 
Great, and in unperfect, than in perfect, and in Parts, than in whole: So the 
Nature of Viviication is best enquired in Creatures bred of Putrefaction.”3 
Long before professional exterminators penned works like John Southall’s 
A Treatise of Buggs (1730), vermin were enlisted to advance inquiries into the 
very nature of life.4
hroughout the seventeenth century, creatures ostensibly born from 
mud or dung— including lies, gnats, frogs, earthworms, eels, and snakes— 
had served as experimental subjects for Ulessa Aldrovandi, homas Mofet, 
Francesco Redi, Antony van Leeuwenhoek, Martin Lister, Robert Hooke, 
Jan Swammerdan, and Marcello Malpighi, among others; all of these natural 
philosophers sought to dispel theories of spontaneous generation. With the 
invention of the microscope, Bacon’s “unperfect” beings (“the noble products” 
of Sir Formal’s “equivocal generation”) took on new signiicance because, as 
Hooke argued in Micrographia, leas, mites, gnats, and other “little objects” 
can, by virtue of the microscope, “be compare’d to greater and more beauti-
ful Works of Nature,” like a “Horse, and Elephant or a Lyon.”5 Although the 
microscope became a key technology in bringing vermin into the order of 
a providentially designed world, as Tita Chico argues, it also posed some 
di cult theatrical problems for Shadwell; audiences can no more can see 
through the lens of a microscope than they can spot the lunar creatures that 
Baliardo claims to have spied through his telescope in Aphra Behn’s farce, 
he Emperor of the Moon (1688).6 Sir Formal’s rhetoric is one of Shadwell’s 
strategies for trying to make vermin visible, as well as risible.
But it is not the only one. he Virtuoso’s funniest and best- known scene 
demonstrates a kind of verminous experiment diferent from those Hooke 
or Bacon had in mind. Gimcrack’s swimming lesson depends on Shadwell’s 
satiric parody of the Royal Society’s close observation of imperfect creatures 
and on what Chico identiies as the shared illusional space of the theater and 
the laboratory.7 As Gimcrack’s young (and unfaithful) wife takes Bruce and 
Longvil to see the Virtuoso in action, she explains: “He has a frog in a bowl 
of water tied with a packthread by the loins; which packthread Sir Nicholas 
holds in his teeth, lying upon his belly on a table; and as the frog strikes, he 
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strikes; and his swimming master stands by to tell him when he does well or 
ill” (II.i .295– 99). he libertine heroes come upon the harnessed Sir Nicho-
las being egged on by Sir Formal, as the Swimming Master delivers a blow- 
by- blow commentary of the action: “Ah! well struck, Sir Nicholas. hat was 
admirable; that was as well swum as any man in England can. Observe the 
frog. Draw up your arms a little nearer, and then thrust ‘em out strongly. 
Gather up your legs a little more. So. Very well. Incomparable” (II.Ii.6– 10). 
he satire in this scene cuts in two ways. In one respect, Shadwell takes aim 
at the overblown rhetoric and seemingly impenetrable jargon that critics of 
the Royal Society invariably mocked. “So it is wonderful,” Sir Nicholas says 
to Sir Formal, “to observe the agility of this pretty animal which, notwith-
standing I impede its motion by the detention of this ilium or thread within 
my teeth which makes a ligature about its loins, and though by many sudden 
stops I cause the animal sometimes to sink or immerge, yet with indefati-
gable activity it rises and keeps almost its whole body upon the supericies 
or surface of this humid element” (II.ii.15– 23). Gimcrack’s language under-
mines the Royal Society’s ostensible goal of clear and concise prose— the 
ideal, as homas Sprat put it, “to return back to the primitive purity and 
shortness [of language], when men deliver’d so many things almost in an 
equal number of words.”8 In another respect, the Swimming Master’s in-
junction to “observe the frog” demonstrates how close the Baconian injunc-
tion to study “the Nature of hings  .  .  . in unperfect” creatures comes to 
self- parody— verbally, theatrically, and conceptually. he actor playing Sir 
Nicholas has to mimic the motions of the frog because members of the au-
dience, even in the comparatively close quarters of the Restoration theater, 
could not see a frog onstage. he animal has to be conjured into imaginative 
existence; much like the unseen leas in Crespi’s paintings, imperfect crea-
tures can be made visible only (or primarily) in the actions, descriptions, and 
metaphors of the humans who share their environment. While perfect crea-
tures (such as Launce’s dog Crab in Shakespeare’s Two Gentlemen of Verona) 
frequently upstage actors, this is one case in which an imperfect creature, 
with Sir Nicholas serving as his surrogate, steals the scene. he Swimming 
Master’s injunction to “Observe the frog” suggests the power of unseen ver-
min to provoke and organize human activity, including an understanding of 
the natural world. he frog (presumably without being onstage) becomes 
the absent, normative center— a creature doing what comes naturally— of a 
satiric world given to presumption, imitation, and self- parodic folly.9
he comic nature of the swimming lesson should not distract us from 
acknowledging its experimental structure. Gimcrack’s experiment plays with 
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similarities and dissimilarities between the amphibian and human body; the 
intellectual eforts of the virtuoso become tethered, both literally and igura-
tively, by a thread to the musculature of a frog. he scene is funny because it 
forcibly yokes two presumably unlike things— the experimental subject and 
object, the human and the frog—thereby collapsing diferences between the 
high- minded scientists and the struggling member of a lower species; it is 
analytically important, however, because it reminds us that animals, both 
more and less “perfect,” were foundational to experimental science and ef-
forts to reimagine the “human” in ways compatible with changing views of 
the natural world.
his posthumanist insight has driven work in early modern animal 
studies. Unlike many contemporary philosophers who found in Descartes 
a fundamental frame for understanding the posthumanist project, histori-
cist scholars have uniformly cautioned against treating the Cartesian “beast- 
machine” as the dominant cultural metaphor, especially in early modern 
English literature.10 As Erica Fudge argues, many “modern critics read the 
Cartesian human back onto pre- Cartesian writings, even while those crit-
ics are assessing the workings of Aristotelian psychology. In so doing, they 
implicitly and anachronistically assert that the Cartesian human is the only 
model of the human available.”11 Fudge, Bruce Boehrer, Karen Raber, Rich-
ard Nash, Laura Brown, Laurie Shannon, and Jonathan Lamb, among oth-
ers, have rehistoricized this discourse of the human in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries, demonstrating, in diferent ways, the often peripheral 
role of Descartes in English scientiic and literary texts. What Shannon calls 
“Descartes’s indelible formula” of the human- animal divide is often project-
ed, ahistorically, back on to early modern texts.12
Shadwell’s Virtuoso, like Jonson’s Volpone before it, rejects Cartesian dis-
tinctions, creating a satirical space for more nuanced, less theologically uni-
vocal perceptions of human- animal connections.13 More precisely, it draws 
on an additive model of the soul inherited from Aristotle and reworked 
through the various branches of natural philosophy. he Virtuoso opens with 
Bruce and Longvil satirically comparing the “race of gentlemen” in Restora-
tion London to ill- bred horses (I.i.21– 24), and then to vegetables (“untimely 
fruit”) rotting on the vine: “hese are sure the only animals that live without 
thinking,” complains Bruce about men of the town: “A sensitive plant has 
more imagination than most of ‘em” (I.i.60– 63). While it may appear that 
these opening salvos collapse a normative diference between the “human” 
and the “animal” conceived as a binary, the presence of vegetables indicates 
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that Bruce draws on an additive or tripartite model of the soul, in which 
souls can be vegetative (nutritive, or what is termed “vital”), animal (sensi-
tive or corporeal), and rational (intellectual or noncorporeal). he tripartite 
model of ensoulment destabilizes any opposition between the “human” and 
the “animal,” or, to put it another way, forces those terms into a chain of zoo-
political diferences.14 Indeed, concepts of the “sensitive soul” or the “soul of 
brutes,” deined as “an heap of animal spirits everywhere difused thorow the 
Brain and Nervous Stock,” seems ready- made for a lusty satire on human 
pretensions.15 he play’s witty heroines, Miranda and Clarinda, describe Sir 
Samuel Hearty, a would- be wit, as “a well- educated spaniel” (I.iii.28– 29), 
and Snarl, a hypocritical declaimer against vice, as both a “mad dog” in need 
of worming (I.ii.38– 39) and as a “stingless drone” (I.ii.135). For his part, 
Snarl repeatedly labels Miranda and Clarinda “paltry, lazy cockatrices,” that 
is, cockroaches (I.ii.81– 82). Later, in Act 2, this promiscuous universe of ani-
mal spirits is materialized in Gimcrack’s claims to have transfused the blood 
of a sheep into a madman, an account that makes a mockery of what Boyle 
defended as the “usefulness” of laboratory science.16 Gimcrack’s “patient” 
goes from “being maniacal or raging mad” to “wholly ovine or sheepish,” with 
“wool growing on him in great quantities,” and a “sheep’s tail” growing “from 
his anus or fundament” (II.ii.190– 95). Humans, dogs, sheep, cockroaches, 
frogs, horses, and spiders seem to exist as part of the same order of life and 
with the same basic nervous system; Gimcrack’s experiments, as John Sha-
nahan aptly puts it, make “basic ontology problematic.”17
Seventeenth- century neuroanatomy similarly thwarts any simple and 
stable human- animal diference. A decade before he Virtuoso was per-
formed, the English physician and comparative anatomist homas Willis 
published Cerebri Anatome (1664), a groundbreaking study in work on the 
brain, followed by the Latin edition of De Anima Brutorum (1672), or Of 
the Souls of Brutes (trans. 1683). In these texts, Willis describes neurologi-
cal structures in oysters, worms, and other creatures in order, he says, to 
show the “vast diference” between the souls of these creatures and those of 
humans (AB 44).18 With contemporary interest in neuroanatomy, cognitive 
science, and MRIs, Willis’s often- neglected works are again being read and 
his inluence reassessed.19 Willis’s lectures on anatomy were transcribed by 
Boyle and Locke, and he was widely regarded as being “tutor” to the latter.20 
Shadwell may or may not have known any of the Oxford physician’s works.21 
Both, however, were the heirs of Aristotle’s De Anima and its driving as-
sumptions that humans shared with other animals a “corporeal” or “sensitive” 
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soul, responsible for autonomic functions as well as memory, imagination, 
and certain forms of intellection. In the seventeenth century, Pierre Gas-
sendi (following Aristotle) claimed that because animals show evidence of 
memory and other functions, they must have souls. Willis attributes these 
characteristics to a “corporeal” or “brute” soul shot through with “animal 
spirits,” which, in turn, were connected to the brain; his work “transformed 
the traditional three- part soul  .  .  . into the corpuscular philosophy of the 
nervous system.”22 His 1683 treatise Of the Soul of Brutes ofered empirical 
evidence for a sensitive soul “Common to Brute Animals with Man” (AB 1), 
even as it sought to establish a rational or incorporeal soul that, located in 
the brain, ostensibly controlled the corporeal one. Taking issue with both 
Lucretius and Descartes and focusing on comparative anatomies of creatures 
from oysters, to chimps, to humans, Willis examined the brains of the “more 
perfect Brutes” and the nervous systems of “unperfect” ones. What emerged 
from his investigations are not absolute diferences between humans and 
animals but a spectrum of physiological distinctions and similarities.
Rather than add Willis’s experiments to the list of he Virtuoso’s sources, 
I want to read Shadwell’s comedy and Willis’s neuroanatomy contrapuntally 
in order to emphasize the ways in which late seventeenth- century satirists 
and natural philosophers challenged the Cartesian assumption that the 
souls of men and the souls of animals were distinct.23 Together, Willis’s sci-
entiic analyses and Shadwell’s trenchant satire on scientiic texts and prac-
tices reveal the extent to which our own habits of analysis are shaped by 
often unacknowledged Cartesian values and assumptions, if by “Cartesian” 
one means a strict metaphysical dualism naturalized by formalist interpre-
tive procedures. A default Cartesianism imposed on British seventeenth- 
century natural philosophy results in missed opportunities, occlusions, and 
elisions; we tend to overlook the experiments that structure, categorize, and 
carve up biological systems.24 By examining the ways in which Willis and 
Shadwell treat the continuum of human- animal relations, we can, however, 
regain some sense of how Bacon’s “unperfect creatures” helped to shape un-
derstandings of human physiology and the human soul.
“Twin species”
Natural philosophers, from Bacon on, argued that the lower creatures 
shared a complex sensory system with humans. Bacon claims in Sylva Syl-
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varum that the “Insecta have Voluntary Motion, and therefore Imagination,” 
a belief he supports by the evidence of ants going “forwards to their Hills” 
and bees who “admirably know the way, from a Flowry Heath, two or three 
Miles of, to their Hives” (177). While he is willing to admit that gnats and 
lies have a more “mutable” imagination than bees and ants, he insists most 
of the “insecta,” just like dogs, apes, and humans, have more than one “sense 
of Feeling” located in the head (177). Reasoning from the example of bees, he 
argues “if they goe forthright to a Place, they must needs have Sight: Besides, 
they delight more in one Flower, or Herbe, than in another, and therefore 
have Taste: And Bees are called with Sounde upon Brasse, and therefore they 
have Hearing; Which shewith likewise that though their Spirit be difused, 
yet there is a Seat of their Senses in their Head” (177). By “spirit” Bacon means 
the animals spirits that, as George Rousseau argues, were in the forefront “of 
all theories explaining life” between 1400 and 1800.25 he head, or “Seat of 
the Senses,” housed or served as a kind of switchyard for the animal spirits. 
he central clearinghouse for these sensations constituted the corporeal or 
sensitive soul.
In the seventeenth century, after William Harvey’s work on circula-
tion, these unseen “vital spirits” began to be conceived as part of a network 
conjoined by blood; the brain, according to Zimmer, “worked like a bel-
lows, pulsating and driving the spirits in to the nerves.”26 Neuroanatomists 
sought to identify what was described variously in the seventeenth century 
as a luid, an ether, or a ire “which mediates between mind and body in the 
eternal search for consciousness, emotion, and memory.” 27 he cornerstone 
of this tradition was Willis’s 1664 Cerebri Anatome, the irst text, accord-
ing to Rousseau, to argue unequivocally that the “seat of the soul is strictly 
limited to the brain.”28 Cerebri Anatome went through four editions within 
a year; over the next century, these ballooned into twenty- three editions.29 
he project of Cerebri Anatome is in keeping with Willis’s theological im-
perative: to locate in the animal body proof of divine workmanship. Unlike 
Descartes, Willis promotes a method to establish an empirical (rather than 
philosophical) basis for the relationship between neuroanatomical form and 
behavioral function.
In his irst chapter, Willis defends his comparative method, claiming not 
only that “humane Heads” are less readily available for dissection than those 
of other creatures and the “immense bulk” of the human head can itself be a 
“hindrance” to anatomical investigation, but, signiicantly, that quadrupeds 
can stand in for humans, given marked similarities between their brains (CA 
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6). Based on this “compared Anatomy” between “Beasts” and men, he de-
clares his method is able to reveal “the impressions, inluences, and secret 
ways of working with the sensitive soul” (CA 6). Summarizing the difer-
ences readers should expect to encounter between “perfect” and “imperfect” 
creatures and explaining the organization of his treatise, Willis writes:
Concerning the Heads of living Creatures .  .  . it was observed .  .  . that 
there was a notable Analogy between man and four- footed Beasts, also 
between Birds and Fishes; For when the irst Inhabitants of the new- 
made World were produced, as one day brought forth Fowls and Fishes 
at once, another in like manner Man and four- footed Beasts; so there is 
in either twin species a like form of the Brain; but between the Child of 
the former, and this of the following day, there is found a great diference 
as to those parts. For as much therefore as Men and four- footed Beasts 
have got more perfect Brains, and more alike among themselves, we have 
Ordered our Observations from their Inspection; hen afterwards we 
shall deliver the Anatomy of the Brain in Fowls and Fishes. (CA 6)
he organization of Cerebri Anatome, then, mirrors a theological order, in 
which creatures of the waters and sky were created on the ifth day, and man 
and other beasts on the sixth. (Genesis 1:20– 31) (hat God created “creep-
ing things”— themselves regarded as “imperfect” on day six as well does not 
seem to trouble Willis’s scheme.) In this theocentric view, humans and quad-
rupeds are “twin species” in the same way birds and ish are; their analogous 
brains both relect and reairm their origins and place in the divinely creat-
ed order of nature. Although this “twinning” of humans and higher creatures 
creates practical opportunities for the comparative anatomist in articulating 
the windings of the sensitive soul, it also poses a theological danger because 
these similarities cannot override the physiological diferences that under-
write human exceptionalism.
Willis argues that similarities, and therefore diferences, are located, in 
part, in the cerebral cortex or the surface of the brain, which distills and 
distributes the animal spirits. Produced by arterial blood, the animal spir-
its are conveyed to the grey cortex, “and then carried through white matter, 
the brain stem, and through the nerves into the rest of the body: muscles, 
organs, and ibrous membranes.”30 Higher cognitive faculties require “free 
and changeable” pathways for the circulation of the animal spirits (CA 60). 
herefore, the texture of the cortex— even more than brain size— seems 
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to be responsible, in Willis’s mind, for the uneven distribution of memory, 
imagination, and intellection across species. he cortices of humans and the 
more perfect animals are characterized by variegation— “uneven and bro-
ken, with turnings, and windings and rollings about, almost like those of the 
Intestines” (CA 59)— but the brains of “lesser four- footed beasts” and “Fowls 
and Fishes” are “plain and even” (CA 59). In human brains, the pathways are
far more and greater . . . than in any other living Creature, to wit, for the 
various and manifold actings of the superior faculties . . . hose Gyra-
tions or turnings about in four- footed beasts are fewer, and in some, as 
in a Cat, they are found to be in a certain igure and order: wherefore this 
Brute thinks on, or remembers, scarce anything but what the instincts 
and needs of Nature suggest (CA 59– 60).
In this neuroanatomical drama of diference, four- footed beasts share with 
humans a birthday and a brain that distinguishes both species from ish and 
fowl, but their status as “twin species” is qualiied by the comparatively less 
complex brain texture of quadrupeds. Willis’s method enables iner distinc-
tions than gross neuroanatomy, and many of these reinforce culturally spe-
ciic stereotypes and biases. His description of the cat’s regular arrangement 
of neural tissues, for example, ofers an anatomical corollary for “typical” 
feline behavior, which was thought to be driven less by memory or learn-
ing than by predatory and instinctive actions.31 To have a species’ cerebral 
“Gyrations” appear in “a certain igure and order” is to characterize its ability 
to learn in a qualitatively and quantitatively diferent manner from humans. 
A more regular “order” of brain tissue limits the cat to “comprehend or learn 
by imitation fewer things, and those almost only of one kind” (CA 60). For 
Willis, neuroanatomy is destiny.
hese structural correlations between form and function also obtain in 
other parts of the brain. Willis is “especially intrigued,” according to Hans 
Isler, by the quadrigeminates, including the pons and the medulla, that “con-
vey the natural impulses from the cerebellum to the cerebrum where they 
cause moods that result in more or less purposeful movements.”32 Domesti-
cated farm animals— Willis mentions sheep, cattle, goats, and swine— seem 
to have small pons and large quadrigeminates.33 In his mind, this neuroana-
tomical arrangement signiies the predominance of instinct and a paucity 
of emotional capability; but in animals with strong emotions, those spe-
cies in which intelligence dominates instinct, this “relation,” as Isler notes, 
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“is reversed.”34 Formulating a law of comparative anatomy, Willis claims the 
preceding correlation “holds good in most Animals which I have yet hap-
pened to dissect,” including a monkey. he largest pons, logically enough, 
are to be found in humans, whose greater passions require more complex 
housing and transportation arrangements. Man “is wont to be suddenly and 
vehemently disturbed,” he writes, “therefore the Promptuary or Store- house 
is required to be more large, in which a greater plenty of Spirits may be kept, 
to be bestowed on such inordinations of the Afections” (CA 100). Yet Wil-
lis implicitly rejects a Cartesian division between humans and those animals 
that seem closely related in terms of brain structure. As in the human brain, 
the neuroanatomy of three “more perfect” creatures relects some fundamen-
tal similarities to humans in their behavior: “Next to a man,” Willis notes, 
“this part [the pons] is greatest in a Dog, Cat, and Fox” (CA 100), and the 
underdeveloped quadrigeminates in these animals indicate their inability to 
rely exclusively on instincts: “in a Man, a Dog, Fox, and the like, who are 
more apt to learn and acquire habits, these Prominences are very small; and 
these Animals being newly born, are furnished with only a rude and imper-
fect sense; besides, they are found wholly unapt to seek out their food” (CA 
101). As his use of the phrase “wholly unapt” suggests, these creatures need 
a form of animal socialization, a model to imitate, in order to learn how to 
hunt.
As this account implies, Willis opposes “instinct” to “wit,” a faculty in-
timately related to passion, which, in turn, is intrinsic to the sensitive soul. 
“hey in whom the Afections are wont to predominate,” Willis writes, “and 
who are furnished with a certain wit, (as besides Man, are Dogs, Foxes, 
and some other hotter Animals) are less powerful in Instinct” (CA 101). 
he brains of dogs and foxes (the cat, once mentioned, drops out of the 
chain of equivalences) show physiological evidence of their intellectual and 
behavioral similarities to humans. he sensitive or corporeal soul, there-
fore, provides a neuroanatomical basis for a kind of “twinning” apparent be-
tween humans and perfect creatures that resonates throughout Restoration 
literature—particularly in satires that call into question humans’ pretense 
to have mastered the sensitive soul and its corporeal appetites. Although 
Willis was not focused on apes, an uncommon experimental subject in the 
1660s, his work inluenced Edward Tyson’s Anatomy of a Pygmy (1698), 
another scientiic treatise that destabilized, intentionally or not, Cartesian 
assumptions about humans and animals. In his 1695 letter to John Dennis 
on comedy, the playwright William Congreve concedes he is disturbed by 
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“seeing things, that force me to entertain low thoughts of my Nature,” and 
then admits he “could never look long upon a Monkey, without very Morti-
fying Relections; tho [he] never heard any thing to the Contrary, why that 
Creature is not Originally of a Distinct Species.”35 Congreve’s “mortifying 
Relections” stem from his and his culture’s nagging fear that the physi-
ological similarities between humans and the “more perfect” creatures may 
undermine the philosophical and religious principles that grant what he 
calls our “God- like Species” dominion over the rest of creation. His triple 
negations (“never heard  .  .  . to the contrary  .  .  . not Originally”) signify a 
marked anxiety about maintaining humankind’s privileged position in 
creation. Willis and other advocates of the tripartite or additive model of 
the soul contribute to such anxiety because their ambiguous chains of spe-
cies distinctions do not readily conform to Christian notions of absolute 
spiritual diference. As the Earl of Rochester’s famous portrait reminds us, 
monkeys, too, can be poets.36
Congreve’s uneasiness with the human resemblance to monkeys, in turn, 
leads back to the question of how to diferentiate human wit from animal 
intelligence. In this regard, Willis’s neuroanatomy resonates with his contem-
poraries’ eforts to deine exactly what “wit” is and how it divides the “true” 
wits of Restoration London from pretenders to wit. In a passage in he 
Virtuoso that mimics hundreds of others in late seventeenth- century com-
edy, Miranda disparages Sir Samuel Hearty’s pretensions to being a wit by 
turning him into a satiric hybrid. Although Sir Samuel “takes himself to be 
a wit,” his wit, she claims, is imitative and dog- like: he has “as many tricks 
as a well- educated spaniel” and “some tricks of a man, too” (I.ii.27– 33). hat 
he nevertheless can “pass muster among the young gay fellows of this town, 
and [can] sing all the new tunes and songs in the playhouses” suggests that 
diferences between true and false wit are not invariably apparent; so there is 
no confusion about his status the audience has to be told he is spaniel- like 
(I.ii.27– 33). Indeed, this comparison of Sir Samuel’s wit to a spaniel’s both 
confuses and clariies his intellectual stature. John Dryden, in a well- known 
passage, constructs his deinition of wit by analogizing it to a “nimble spaniel” 
who “beats over and ranges through the ield of memory, till it springs on the 
quarry it hunted after; or, without metaphor,” he continues, “which searches 
all over the memory for the species or ideas of those things which it designs 
to represent.”37 Despite Dryden’s efort to dispense with igurative language, 
the “faculty of imagination,” even “without metaphor,” is constituted spatially 
(“searches over”) and therefore does not really dismiss the spaniel simile as 
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much as anthropomorphize it. Like Willis’s attribution of “a certain wit” to 
dogs and foxes, Dryden’s metaphoric spaniel and Shadwell’s Sir Hearty co- 
implicate human intellect and the sensitive soul in culturally resonant ways.
It is worth pointing out, however, that even so- called vermin could be 
pressed into the service of framing human wit. In an extended image, Wil-
liam Davenant into “he Author’s Preface” to his heroic poem, Gondibert, de-
scribes wit as “the laborious, and the lucky resultances of thought, . . . a Web 
consisting of the subtilest threads.”38 “Like that of the Spider,” Davenant con-
tinues, it “is considerately woven out of ourselves; for a Spider may be said to 
consider, not only respecting his solemnesse and tacite posture (like a grave 
scout in ambush for his Enemey) but because all things are done either from 
consideration or chance; and the works of chance are accomplishments of 
an instant, having commonly a dissimilitude; but hers are the works of time, 
and have their contextures alike.”39 Davenant’s considering spider becomes, 
at least metaphorically, a creator contemplating strategies and technologies 
realized in material ways. In anthropomorphizing the spider, Davenant uses 
a language of “time” and “contextures” to evoke a kind of motivated intelli-
gence that conforms more closely to Bacon’s idea of insect imagination than 
it does to Dryden’s example of wit, his spatial metaphor of a spaniel ranging 
over the ields. If Davenant is right that wit is the consequence of both “la-
borious” design and “lucky” circumstance, and if such design is best realized 
by the spider, Davenant efectively extends to the mind Bacon’s observation 
that principles of physiology are “commonly better perceiued, in Small, than 
in Great, and in unperfect, than in perfect” creatures. Paradoxically, human 
exceptionalism rests on similes that liken humankind to the very beings from 
which “man” is trying to distinguish “himself.”
For his part, Abraham Cowley in his much- anthologized “Ode of Wit,” 
elevates this tendency to describe human wit through animal behavior to 
the status of a biblical exemplum:
In a true Piece of Wit all things must be,
Yet all things there agree.
As in the Ark, join’d without force or strife,
All Creatures dwelt; all Creatures that had Life.
(4)
Although, as I argued in the previous chapter, Cowley tried to bring a 
seventeenth- century naturalistic perspective to his verses on the plagues of 
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Egypt, he resorts to the archetypal Ark to analogize wit as characterized by 
a capaciousness and unity, “without force or strife.”40 Yet as his curious half 
line “all Creatures that had Life” seems to imply, vermin generated by putre-
faction may be excluded from this image, just as, presumably, inelegant or 
inappropriate things must be banished from “a true Piece of Wit.” Yet wit re-
mains a kind of human- animal hybrid; Cowley’s insistent negative catalogue 
of what wit is not— homonyms, puns, bombast, or “some odd Similitude” (4) 
ultimately calls attention, in its own way, to the diferential economy of wit 
and satire. his diferential economy turns on animals. To be a seventeenth- 
century wit like Davenant, Dryden, and Cowley— indeed, like Bruce and 
Longvil— is to master constitutive metaphors of animal behavior and de-
ploy them to other humans. In he Virtuoso, a play that satirically suggests 
Sir Nicholas can claim no right of precedence over a frog, images of vermin 
ground this chain of similarities and diferences.
Pathology, Posthumanism and Purification
As Willis’s De Anima Brutorum suggests, the problems of characterizing “a 
certain wit” in animals are entangled with those of human and animal en-
soulment. Once British natural philosophers rejected the Cartesian beast- 
machine metaphor (implicitly or explicitly), the empirical di culty of iden-
tifying what elevates human intelligence above that of the perfect creatures 
becomes crucial to the emergence of a range of biological and medical sci-
ences. In We Have Never Been Modern, Latour argues seventeenth- century 
natural philosophers did not inherit a world divided neatly into persons, 
who had souls, and things, which did not. While “modernity,” he argues, usu-
ally is deined by the advent of humanism, this construction itself is a prod-
uct of what he calls “the modern constitution” because “the human” remains 
asymmetrical, essential to “the simultaneous birth of non- humanity— 
things, objects, or beasts.”41 he hallmark of modernity is the will to purify, 
to establish a clear Nature- Culture divide that allows “modern” culture to 
distinguish itself from its own past, from nonmodern peoples and from a 
world of de- animated things, including animals. Puriication, therefore, in-
volves the political, scientiic, and conceptual practices of proliferating dis-
tinctions and taxonomies: “Century after century,” writes Latour, “colonial 
empire after colonial empire, the poor premodern collectives were accused 
of making a horrible mismash of things and humans, objects and signs, 
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while their accusers inally separated them totally.”42 Modern science, as it is 
traditionally depicted, is given the task of sorting out, identifying, classify-
ing, and regularizing the “horrible mishmash” that pervades the thinking of 
“pre- modern” cultures.
In the late seventeenth century, pious natural philosophers, like Willis 
and Boyle, sought to eradicate one of the more egregious examples of this 
“horrible mishmash” by combating the pagan or heretical belief that hu-
mans and animals shared a soul. Versions of this belief could be found in 
Platonism, Pythagoreanism, animism, pantheism, ideas of transmigration, 
and diferent characterizations of anima mundi, or the World Soul. Boyle 
rejected all Eastern religions, partly on the grounds that they represent “a 
discouraging impediment to the empire of man over the inferior creatures.”43 
For his part, Descartes was adamant: “here is none which sooner estran-
geth feeble minds from the right way of vertue, then to imagine that the soul 
of beasts is of the same nature as ours.”44 Given his turn to Gassendi and a 
tripartite model of ensoulment, Willis has gone down in medical history as 
something of an animist, his concept of the corporeal soul “criticized as a 
retrograde animistic step, in contrast to Descartes’ animal spirits which were 
thought to be entirely physical and part of a machine.”45 Willis’ neuroanato-
my resists a Cartesian impulse toward puriication. William Bynum argues 
Willis’s anatomical texts are characterized by two “sometimes conlicting 
views” of the human nervous system: on the one hand, it is a more “compli-
cated and reined” version of the nervous system of all animals, and, on the 
other, it is so similar to the nervous system of the higher quadrupeds that 
“some immaterial principle . . . must be postulated to in order to account for 
the mental diference between man and animals.”46 If diferences between 
human and animal nervous systems are foregrounded, then, humans can be 
seen as “puriied” versions of animals on a continuum of physiological devel-
opment; and if similarities between human and animal nervous systems are 
emphasized, then humans emerge as hybrid creatures, more- than- animal 
only because they are endowed, deus ex machina corpore, with an immortal, 
and a physiological, soul.
One can see both of these processes clearly in De Anima Brutorum, or 
Two Discourses Concerning the Soul of Brutes. In this text, Willis addresses 
directly and systematically the issues of animal immortality, and thus hu-
man exceptionalism, a subject “almost worn thread- bare,” he concedes, by 
ancient and modern writers (AB 38). Willis explicitly rejects the idea that 
the “Soul of the Beast is an Incorporeal Substance, or Form,” a belief he as-
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sociates with the “Platonick Fiction, concerning the Soul of the World” (AB 
4); he also cannot stomach the beliefs of Originists, a heretical Christian 
sect that believed in the preexistence of souls. Although admitting he can 
“be a little solicitious, for [the souls of ] the almost ininite multitude of the 
more perfect Beasts, which have liv’d, and do live,” Willis balks at the idea 
that vermin can lay claim to any kind of “Incorporeal” soul. In challenging 
this “Fiction,” he asks:
Yet where do many Myriads of Souls, even innumerable, of Insects and 
Fishes, which are daily produced, subsist, and what do they? he Bodies 
of very many of these serve only as Food to other Creatures. And for 
that the Souls to these Bodies, serve chiely to preserve them only for a 
little time, and as it were pickle them to keep them from putrefaction, 
there is no need that these should be therefore immaterial and immortal. 
Besides, when of old, Egypt was infected by Divine Punishment, with 
Swarms of Fleas, Flyes, and other Various Kinds of innumerable Insects, 
and that the same also abounded every where, it is not easily to be Con-
ceived, from whence so many Souls were so suddenly Called, and into 
what places, the same being by and by separated, could be placed. (AB 4)
Produced “daily,” the insecta serve largely as “Food to other Creatures,” even 
as they multiply and swarm in their roles as instruments of “Divine Punish-
ment.” hey are purely instrumental beings, called into existence beyond the 
regimes of human counting and calculation. Because their sheer number 
boggles the mind, it is impossible “to be Conceived” how their souls could 
pre- or post- exist transitory lives. Countering the logic of metempsycho-
sis, Willis points out so many freed or “separated” insect souls could not be 
housed or “placed” in the more inite number of more perfect creatures.
Even as Willis casts vermin beyond the pale of theological belief, his 
insistence that humans share with the “more perfect” creatures important 
neuroanatomical similarities makes him, at least in his own mind, vulner-
able to charges of theological unorthodoxy. Published in English almost 
twenty years after Cerebri Anatome, his Two Discourses Concerning the 
Souls of Brutes makes clear the stakes in the constitution of the “human,” 
perceived both in resemblances to the other creatures— as an embodied 
modiication of a single animating energy— and in terms of profound dif-
ferences. In “manifold and comparative anatomy,” he explains at the begin-
ning of De Anima Brutorum,
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the manifold and wonderful wisdom of the Creator is manifested; so 
are by the same discovered, even in the smallest and most despicable 
Animals, not only mouths and limbs, but also hearts, being as ‘twere so 
many altars and hearths to perpetuate this vital lame. Here the reader 
will meet with very skillful and accurate Dissections of the Silk- worm, 
Oyster, Lobster, Earthworm; as also of divers Brains; and irst, of that 
of a Sheep. . . . And secondly, of a new one of a Humane Brain. . . . hat 
so by confronting these Brains, the vast diference of the Soul of a Brute 
and that of a Man may the better be shewn. (152)
Even the “most despicable Animals,” those that presumably lack souls, wit, 
and therefore any kind of agential capability, are marshaled to demonstrate 
“the manifold and wonderful wisdom” manifested in living creatures. Trac-
ing the animal spirits up the Great Chain of Being, from earthworms and 
crustaceans to humankind, Willis tries to ofer incontrovertible evidence— 
“through very skillful and accurate dissections”— that humans, despite be-
ing theological “twins” to hot- blooded animals, are indeed God’s chosen 
creatures on earth.
hroughout this text, Willis attempts to reinforce ideas of human ex-
ceptionalism not by Cartesian puriication— by casting animals as mere 
“machines”— but by creating “double soul’d” humans who are characterized 
(unlike the brutes) by both a corporeal and rational soul. In other words, in 
Latour’s terms, he re- creates the human as a hybrid. In a frequently cited 
passage, Willis writes:
truly it is most evidently plain, from what hath been said, hat man is 
made, as it were, an Amphibious Animal, or of a middle Nature and Or-
der, between Angels and the Brutes, and doth Communicate with both, 
with these by the Corporeal Soul, from the Vital Blood, and heap of 
Animal Spirits, and with those by an intelligent, immaterial, and immor-
tal Soul. And Indeed, Reason persuades us plainly that ‘tis so, to wit, for 
as much as we ind in ourselves, as by and by shall be more fully shown, 
the Strifes and Dissensions of one Soul with another, sometimes this, 
and sometimes that getting the Rule, or being in Subjection. (AB 41)
Understandably, this characterization of the two souls in conlict has cap-
tured the imagination of historicist scholars looking to tie early studies in 
neuroanatomy to Restoration culture.47 Elsewhere, Willis uses explicitly 
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political language to describe the relationship between the corporeal and 
incorporeal souls: these two souls “difer among themselves, yea sometimes 
are wont to dissent, and move more than Civil Wars” (AB 38). In the after-
math of the English Civil War, and particularly during the Exclusion Crisis, 
any mention of civil strife had wide- ranging and usually destructive (or self- 
destructive) implications. In one respect, then, the “double soul’d” human its 
conveniently into both a traditional Protestant rhetoric (the sinful body and 
immortal soul) and the mindset of late seventeenth- century politics. Yet, in 
another sense, this political imagery is only one of many metaphors Wil-
lis deploys to explain tensions between these two souls: besides a civil war 
within the human, the relationship between the corporeal and rational souls 
is igured as a solar eclipse (AB 11), a metamorphosis (AB 11, 32), a storm 
(AB 24), musical pipes (AB 34), an oxen overthrowing a yoke (AB 43), “a 
double Army” (AB 43), captivity (AB 43), “Twinns” in the “same Womb” 
(AB 43), a turbulent sea (AB 48), waterworks (AB 40), and a lute (AB 60). 
Employing a commonplace traceable to Epictetus and recently revived by 
homas Browne in Religio Medici, Willis describes “man” as an “Amphibious 
Animal,” implicitly rejecting Cartesian and theological dualisms.48 Willis 
seems to multiply these metaphors because none of them can be deinitive: 
the human exists only in the disjunctions between the corporeal and rational 
souls. As his igurative language suggests, this conlict manifests (as it does 
for Freud) in internal dysfunction, strife, and dissension. Such dissension, in 
turn, is disclosed somatically in the pathologies that Willis describes in the 
second half of the book: insomnia, headaches, lethargy, nightmares, vertigo, 
apoplexy, palsie, delirium, melancholy, madness, stupidity, and (a malady 
that alicted Shadwell) gout.
In addition to coining the term “neurologie,” then, Willis ofers the world 
a new “psychologia,” or psychology, making important contributions to sev-
eral disciplines, including pediatrics and etiology.49 By psychology, writes 
Carl Zimmer, “Willis meant an account of the workings of the human soul 
as a compound of a rational, immaterial substance nested within a swarm 
of chemical spirits traveling along pathways through the brain and into the 
nerves.”50 Zimmer’s use of “swarm” to characterize the unpredictable move-
ment of the animal spirits hardly seems accidental. For Willis, the “human” 
is founded on the ability of the rational soul to manage the proliferation of 
impulses and thoughts that frequently, if not characteristically, are igured 
in animal form. In a revealing passage, he describes sleepwalking in terms of 
“ierce” and “unquiet” animal spirits that “will not lye down together, but . . . 
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some of them, more ierce than the rest, leap forth of their own accord, and 
enter into Motion, like as perhaps one or two Dogs, starting out without 
government, leave the company of the rest and fall to Hunting” (AB 18). 
As is often the case in his prose, Willis almost unleashes the vehicle of the 
metaphor from the tenor: the igurative dogs are granted an unruly agency 
(“of their own accord”) that points to the lack of a controlling “government” 
as well as to their own refusal to act in concert with the “company.” he con-
licts within human “psychologia” that result in sleepwalking suggest the 
extent to which Willis’s “double-soul’d” man remains imbricated in a world 
of animal populations that are subject, but only barely, to control or domin-
ion. When control slips, humans experience the stings, pricks, passions, and 
swarms of corporeal life.
he greatest source of internal dissension for this “Amphibious Animal” 
is the conlict between lust and “Reason and Religion” that Willis explains 
biologically as the competing demands on the circulation of the blood and 
animal spirits. In this conlict, he writes, “may be most clearly discerned the 
distinct Strivings, and contrary Endeavors, of two Souls”:
because, whilst the Corporeal Soul being incited to Lust, inclines her-
self wholly towards the Genital Members, and compels thither greater 
loods of the Blood, and greater Store of the Animal Spirits, the Heart 
and Brain being left wanting of Provision; on the contrary, the Superior 
Mind, rising up, and shewing the Commands of Reason and Religion, 
shows a receipt to the other, and commands that the Animal Spirits re-
turn to their tasks, to be performed within the Brain. . . . Hence the lame 
of Lust being re- extinct for a time, and the Powers of the Inferior Soul 
being reduced into Order, the Acts of Sobriety, Prudence, and of other 
Science, and Discipline, may be exercised; but if the Reins of Reason 
be let loose, or new incentives of Lust are brought, the Corporeal Soul, 
shaking of the yoak, snatches her self again to the like Enormities. (AB 
55)
Willis’s version of the conlict between lesh and spirit difers from, say, Pla-
to’s account of the passions in its medico- physiological focus on the circula-
tion of the blood and the role of the brain. In “Lust, even against the Mind,” 
he writes, “the Blood boils up, the Marrow in the Back grows hot, the eyes 
are inlamed, the Genitals are inlated, so that there wants little (unless Rea-
son coming between recalls her, and prohibits her from the Beastliness of it) 
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but that the whole Corporeal Soul, on every occasion, should be dissolved 
in Lust” (AB 55). To overcome “Beastliness”— that is, the natural strivings 
of the corporeal soul towards what Willis calls “Propagation”— the brain 
must enlist a host of practices designed to alter the course of blood. Strong 
prayer, he maintains, can “call back the Blood towards the Praecordia,” the 
part of the brain where animal spirits are “inkindled” and housed (AB 47). 
In addition to these spiritual exercises, purgatives and herbals— many of the 
former, not coincidentally, composed of animal parts— can help encourage, 
if not fully restore, something closer to proper distillation and circulation.
“Life” and the Human
Based upon a sliding scale of diferences, this new psychology, or doctrine 
of the soul, requires vermin play their part to shore up the argument from 
design. Willis’s insistence that insecta or vermin can demonstrate more ef-
fectively than perfect creatures the nature of life was a commonplace in the 
seventeenth century, particularly in theological treatises directed against Lu-
cretian atomism. In he Darknes of Atheism Dispelled by the Light of Nature 
(1652), the physician Walter Charleton, who knew Willis’s work, asks us to 
imagine the principle— the organizing intelligence— that makes the bodies 
of all animals seemingly irrefutable evidence of a metaphysical agent at work 
in the design of living creatures:
should we take a man, who had been born and bred up to maturity of 
years in some obscure cavern of the earth, and never lookt abroad upon 
the World, nor heard of more then what immediately concerned his 
aliment and other natural necessities; on a suddain educe him from his 
dungeon, and shew him an Animal cut in pieces, and all its dissimilar 
parts, as skin, muscles, fat, veins, arteries, nerves, tendons, ligaments, car-
tilages, bones, marrow, &c. laied together in a promiscuous heap: doubt-
less we could not quarrel at his incredulity, if he would not be perswaded, 
that any thing but Chance had a hand in that confusion. But should we 
instantly present him another Animal, feeding, walking, and performing 
all the comely functions of vitality; instruct him in the several uses and 
actions of all those parts, which he had formerly surveyed in the disorder 
of an heap; then kill that Animal also, and for his farther information, 
anatomzie its carcase; and exhibite to him the several parts, in all things 
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respondent to the former: tis conjectural that we should inde, that the 
rudeness of his education would not so totally have extinguished the 
Light of Nature in him, as not to have left some spark, by the glimmering 
whereof he might discover some more noble Principle then Fortune, to 
have been the Eicient of that more then ingenious machine.51
Charleton’s argument turns on the ability of his illiterate man to perform a 
series of interpretive operations: he must witness an animal “cut in pieces,” 
anatomized into “all its dissimilar parts”; observe another, live animal of the 
same species eating, drinking, and performing other functions; listen to a 
narrative about the relationship between form and function; witness the 
dissection of that second animal, accompanied by a second lecture that elu-
cidates the relationships among these muscles, tendons, ligaments, organs, 
and the animal’s earlier actions. Two dead animals and two lectures later, the 
uneducated man, insists Charleton, would “discover some more Noble prin-
ciple than Fortune”— providential design— in the creation of “that more 
than ingenious machine.”
As Charleton’s thought- experiment suggests, the theological value of 
comparative anatomy turns on a tautological argument: sophistication of 
form in animate nature points to a higher intelligence as the agent of cre-
ation; the assumption of an intelligent creator demands the structure of all 
living things— perfect and imperfect— demonstrate a transcendental prin-
ciple of providential design. Imperfect creatures are especially important 
to such arguments because they demonstrate, as Hooke’s lea suggests, the 
aesthetic beauty and unity of form and function indicative of divine work-
manship. For this reason, Charleton claims the “aediice of a spontaneous 
Animal ” (an animal born of putrefaction) has a structure “more di cult” 
and less given to “Chance” than a city, and then copiously piles example on 
example: “the Heart of a Pismire” has more “magisterial artiice” than the 
Eschurial monastery (which had just been built); “the proboscis or trunk of 
a Flea more industry in its delicate perforation” than the Roman aqueducts 
or the Arsenal of Venice; “the breast or laboratory of a Bee” contains more 
“anfractuous convolutions” than the St. Lawrence monastery, regarded as 
the eighth wonder of the world; and “the skull of a Louse” has more ventricles 
for the “numerous swarms of Animal Spirits” than the Roman amphithe-
ater had seats for spectators.52 No one, Charleton asserts, can “admit the 
managery of an Architect, or knowing principle, in the structure of a house, 
and yet determine the more magniicent Creation of the Universe upon the 
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blind disposal of Fortune” (64). Once the question of life is framed in terms 
of agency— what “Architect, or knowing Principle” designed the lea?— then 
the answer is overdetermined: a Supreme Being. Atheism, as the title of his 
treatise suggests, is refuted.
he argument from design is especially important in an environment in 
which natural philosophers, like Willis and Charleton, readily admit that 
neither the corporeal nor incorporeal souls can be perceived by the senses. 
Brain and nerve structure may seem to make visible what were imagined 
as (al)chemical processes.53 From his dissections of oysters, lobsters, earth-
worms, pikes, salmons, oxen, foxes, dogs, cats, and sheep, Willis tried to as-
certain “not only the faculties and uses of every organ, but the “impressions, 
inluences, and secret ways of the workings of the sensitive soul” (CA 6). 
In efect, this meant positing a vital principle, endowed by God and locat-
ed in the blood, an animating energy diferentially distributed across the 
animal kingdom. In De Anima Brutorum, following Gassendi (rather than 
Descartes), Willis argues the corporeal soul lies “hid in the Blood, or Vital 
Liquer” and can be described as a “certain ire of lame” (AB 5) whose suste-
nance is “supplied from sulphur or some other nitrous thing in the air” (AB 
6). He inds historical precedents for this deinition of life in Critias, Em-
pedocles, and, signiicantly, in the Scriptures, where “eating of Blood is for-
bidden, because it is the Life, or the Soul” (AB 2). In chapter 5 of De Anima 
Brutorum, Willis considers the “proper essence” of the animal spirits, admit-
ting this is a matter “hard to be unfolded” because “we can hardly meet with 
anything in Nature, to which they can be compared in all things. Wherefore, 
it is better . . . that we liken these Spirits sent from the Flame of the Blood, 
to the Rays of Light, at least to them Interwoven with the Element and the 
Air.” Like the air, the animal spirits “can often break forth into meteors, viz. 
Winds, Hurricanes, and Horrid hunder” (AB 23). hese Galenic images 
of heat and ire were central to a number of scientiic inquiries during the 
late seventeenth century, notably alchemy and its purifying lame that served 
not only as a means for (supposedly) separating gold from dross but as a 
potent image for natural philosophy more generally: to seek knowledge is 
to purify the soul.54 Willis acknowledges that this commonplace metaphor 
of enkindling— “the Ancients did declare the Soul to be Fire, and the more 
modern Fire or Flame”— is merely a igure for the operations of the corpo-
real soul “which cannot be perceived by our Senses, but is only known by 
its Efects, and Operations” (AB 6). Heat comes closest to being an actual 
empirical phenomenon in the “more perfect creatures” where it appears as 
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“a certain ire or lame”: anyone witnessing the exhalations of a furry beast 
“may well believe,” writes Willis, “that that the blood doth truly lame forth, 
and that Life is not so like to lame, but even lame itself ” (AB 7).
he belief that “Life” is located in a corporeal soul that “cannot be per-
ceived by our Senses” helps explain why imperfect creatures were essential 
to the early modern project. Latour argues modernity set itself the task of 
carving out two realms, one characterized by a free- thinking subject, the 
realm of humans and politics, and one inhabited by mute objects, the realm 
of “Nature”— that, through scientiic investigation can be made to “speak the 
truth.” hese “nonhumans,” writes Latour, “lacking souls but endowed with 
meaning, are even more reliable than mortals, to whom will is attributed but 
who lack the capacity to indicate phenomena in a reliable way.”55 On the one 
hand, as with Charleton, the sophisticated design of imperfect creatures can 
be held up as proof of divine authorship. “his little living creature,” writes 
Willis of the worm, “though it be esteemed vile and contemptible, hath al-
lotted to it vital organs, as also other viscera and members, made most ad-
mirably by a Divine Workmanship” (AB 13). As importantly, the nervous 
systems of imperfect creatures make visible the presence of animal spirits; 
vanishing “after life is extinct,” he writes, animal spirits “leave no Foot- steps 
of themselves” (AB 6). Maimed reptiles also helped make the argument that 
a corporeal soul is spread throughout the entire body since, when worms, 
eels, and snakes are cut into pieces, they will “move themselves for a time” 
(AB 5).
Finally, worms, oysters, and lobsters “speak the truth” not by demonstrat-
ing their similarities to humans, as do dogs, cats, and foxes, but by mani-
festing their quiet, cold diference. Willis places living creatures into three 
classes according to the “Various Constitution of the Vital Humour”: those 
without blood (insects, certain ishes, oysters, lobsters, and crabs); those 
with “less perfect” or frigid blood (earthworms, some ish, frogs, serpents, 
lizards); and those of “more perfect” or hot blood (fowls and four- footed 
beasts) (AB 7). Each class of animals has varying concentrations of the 
“vital” liquor, and thus diferent kinds of corporeal souls, with the soul of 
hot- blooded brutes being “a Rule or Square, by which others more inferior 
ought to be measured, and as the same actuating the humane body” (AB 18). 
he souls of “less perfect, or frigid animals,” in contrast, are characterized 
by their proximity to a heat that is, and is not, metaphoric: “although we do 
not say the soul is properly lame,” Willis writes, “yet (which is next to it) we 
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say it is a most thin heap of subtil particles, and as it were, iery, a certain 
spirituous breath” (AB 7). Even lower down the chain of being, earthworms, 
some ishes, frogs, serpents, and reptiles have a false ire, and therefore mere-
ly the appearance of life: “we suspect the Souls of these [“frigid” creatures, 
like worms], though of a iery nature, to have not a lamy Hypostatis” but 
a breathy vapor “hardly or not at all inkindled, like an ignis fatuus or false 
ire, . . . destitute of sensible heat” (AB 13). In arguing for a “vast diference” 
between classes of animals based on the presence and motion of animal spir-
its in the blood— in making a cut between the hybrids—Willis creates a 
structural, neuroanatomical basis for the uneven distribution of “life” across 
species. What Willis’s imperfect creatures “indicate,” inally, is not simply 
complexity of design but proof of a system. he chain of diferences that be-
gins with worms and ends with humans can itself be igured only as a mode 
of hybridity, so that what distinguishes humans is the incorporation of the 
qualities of other beasts.56
Indeed, Willis’s argument for human exceptionalism— for the exis-
tence of a rational, incorporeal soul— is also based primarily on efects, 
rather than causes, on function rather than form. In chapters 6 and 7 of De 
Anima Brutorum, Willis addresses diferences between what he calls “the 
Science of Brutes” and the forms of knowledge peculiar to humans and 
their rational souls by emphasizing, irst, that humans are capable of con-
templating things beyond the realm of immediate sense, “Material or Im-
material, true or ictitious, real or Intentional” (AB 38), and second, that 
the rational soul “excels” the corporeal soul in the exercise of “Apprehen-
sion, Enunciation, and Discourse.” A dog, for example, seeing a human in 
the distance, formulates a response to a sensible thing, based on memory 
and associations: he will fawn on a friend or bark at an enemy. he “hu-
mane Intellect,” in contrast, judges objects of sense “whether they be true 
or false, Congruous or Incongruous,” and is, moreover, capable of ordering 
and disposing such objects of sense into “Series of Notions, accommo-
dated to speculation or practice” (AB 39). Sounding a bit like Descartes, 
Willis emphasizes the presumably unique human ability to deduce “many 
other thoughts unknown to the sense”; to conceive the “formal notions of 
Corporeal things, abstracted from all matter”; and to “understand axioms 
or irst principles alone, and as it were by a proper Instinct, without regard 
to Corporeal Species” (AB 39). While the more perfect beasts do indeed 
exhibit acts of “Judgment and Discourse, or Ratiocination” (AB 39), com-
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pared to the “Scientiick Habits” of humans, such acts “will hardly seem 
greater than the drop of a Bucket to the Sea”:
For to say nothing of that natural Logick, by which anyone endowed 
with a free and perspicacious mind, probably and sometimes most cer-
tainly concludes, concerning all doubtfull things, or things sought after, 
if that we mind how much the humane mind being adorned by Learn-
ing, and having learnt the Sciences and the liberal Arts, is able to work, 
understand, and search out; it would be thought, tho in an Humane 
Body, to be rather living with Gods or Angels. For indeed here may 
be Considered, the whole Encyclopedia or Circle of Arts and Sciences, 
which (excepting Divinity) hath been the Product or Creature of the 
Humane Mind, and indeed argues the Workman if not divine at least to 
be a particle of the Divine Breath, to wit, a spiritual Substance, wonder-
fully intelligent, Immaterial, and which therefore for the future is Im-
mortal. (AB 39– 40)
In an argument for human uniqueness that Swift will later satirize in 
Gulliver’s Travels, proof of the “Superior Soul” can be found, insists Willis, 
in “mathematicks, especially algebra, geometry, astronomy, and mechanics,” 
and in the “artiicial Smiths- Works wonderfully made” (AB 40).
Willis’s “neurologie,” then, culminates in an argument for culture and 
technology as all that distinguishes humans from other hot- blooded crea-
tures. Animals, in contrast, are “altogether ignorant of the Causes of things, 
and know not Rights or laws of political Society; further, they make no Fires 
or Houses, nor ind out any mechanical Arts, they put not on clothes, not 
dress their food, yet unless taught by Imitation, they know not how to num-
ber three” (AB 40). In emphasizing the obvious, Willis concludes with a 
second and equally tautological argument from design. he apparent so-
phistication of human learning— “the whole Encyclopedia or Circle of Arts 
and Sciences”— stands as proof that the “Workman” must at least embody 
“a particle of the divine breath” (AB 40). his proof of “divine breath,” in 
turn, as we have seen, is manifest not so much in positive qualities as in 
humankind’s metaphorically imagined diferences from animals. Because 
hot- blooded humans serve as what Willis calls “a Rule or Square, by which 
others more inferior ought to be measured” (AB 18), the scale of hierarchi-
cal relations is never distinct from the physiology of minute diferences that 
Willis documents in Cerebri Anatome.
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“I Am a Person”
Shadwell’s satire of Sir Nicholas Gimcrack depends, in part, on the audi-
ence’s distaste for Gimcrack’s verminous objects of attention— the mites, 
maggots, and lies about which his nieces complain. But it also turns on the 
ability of audience members literate enough in science to recognize that Sir 
Nicholas is an outrageous poseur. He repeatedly reveals himself to be alto-
gether ignorant of what Willis calls “the Causes of things,” inally admitting 
at the end of the play that he wished he had “studied mankind instead of 
spiders and insects” (V.vi.122– 23). his comment is usually taken as a satire 
on natural philosophy as a whole, but natural philosophy, as we have seen in 
Willis’s eforts to describe the corporeal and rational souls, always included 
the relations between things, human and more- than- human, material and 
immaterial. Gimcrack’s problem, from this perspective, is not that he studies 
natural philosophy but that he does it badly— exaggerating his discoveries, 
misrepresenting his experiments, and failing (hilariously) to demonstrate 
that he is capable of distinguishing between “true or false, Congruous or 
Incongruous.”57 He is, in other words, incapable of rising to that uniquely 
human capacity of disposing phenomena “into Series of Notions, accom-
modated to speculation or practice” (AB 39).
Given that the ability to order nature is a mark of the rational soul, the 
spectacle of Sir Nicholas parading his presumed knowledge is as destabi-
lizing to the pretense of human exceptionalism as is the transpecies blood 
transfusion he claims to have facilitated. In an allusion to Martin Lister, 
who had identiied thirty- seven spider types in England, Sir Nicholas brags 
of having found out “more phenomena or appearances of nature in spiders 
than any man breathing” (III.iii.39– 40).58 He retains Lister’s number, more 
or less, but confuses types of arachnids with breeds of dogs: “here’s your 
hound, greyhound, lurcher, spaniel spider” (III.iii.40– 43). When Longvil, 
egging him on, mentions the “tumbler spider”— the “tumbler,” like the 
“lurcher,” is a name for dogs trained to catch meat— Gimcrack enthusiasti-
cally takes the bait: “O sir. I am no stranger to’t. It catches lies as tumblers 
do conies” (III.iii.45– 46). he joke is not directed at Sir Nicholas’ arcane 
knowledge, but at his foolishness in conlating two categories of creatures, 
perfect and imperfect, dogs and spiders. His inability to distinguish between 
“true or false, Congruous or Incongruous” even more outrageously leads him 
to elevate a “spaniel” spider to the status of a hunting dog. “I had called him 
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Nick,” brags Sir Nicholas, “and he knew his name so well he would follow me 
all over the house. He was the best natur’d, best condition’d spider that ever 
I met with” (III.iii.73– 76). Sir Nicholas’s enthusiasm turns him into what 
Shadwell called in his Preface to he Humorists “a proper object of comedy” 
(4), a gentleman exhibiting “the artiicial folly of those who are not coxcombs 
by nature but with great art and industry make themselves so” (4).
hroughout he Virtuoso, Gimcrack fails the Royal Society’s test of the 
usefulness of experimental knowledge. Sir Formal (in a travesty of Boyle’s 
argument from design) brags that there is “Not a creature so inanimate . . . to 
which [Gimcrack] does not give a tongue, he makes the whole world vocal” 
(I.i.270– 74). Yet in marked contrast to Charleton’s anonymous anatomist 
explaining the relationship between a “promiscuous heap” of body parts and 
a live animal, the creatures in Gimcrack’s laboratory reveal no universal prin-
ciples of design and disclose nothing about the nature of physic, respiration, 
or locomotion. his is especially true of his swimming lesson. Instead of 
trying to understand kinetics, the relationship between form and function 
(which, according to Charleton, would have required at least one dead frog), 
Gimcrack tries to “outswim” the struggling amphibian and thereby to “exceed 
nature” (II.ii.25). As he says to Sir Formal, “I doubt not, sir, in a very little 
time to become amphibious. A man by art may appropriate any element to 
himself ” (II.ii.26– 30). Paradoxically, then, in a play that satirizes the Royal 
Society, Gimcrack is ridiculous not because he is too speculative, but because 
he is not speculative enough. Rather than investigating what Charleton calls 
“the comely functions of vitality” by demonstrating the unity between form 
and function, Gimcrack desires to “become amphibious”; far from speaking 
“Nature,” Gimcrack’s frog, tethered to a bufoon, is forced to swim for its life. 
From the perspective of physico- theology, Shadwell’s attack on Gimcrack is 
not an attack on the Royal Society or its principles— Gresham College, after 
all, “refus’d” Gimcrack— but a send- up of the excesses to which such study 
can lead when it privileges the policing efects of Willis’s “rational soul.”
I emphasize this point not as an apology for the Royal Society and its 
experiments, some of which are clearly satirized in Shadwell’s play, but by 
way of shifting critical emphasis from the value of experimental science, 
as a practice, to debates about the nature of ensoulment that, as we have 
seen, motivated a good number of Royal Society experiments. he Virtuoso 
satirizes the self- defeating delusion that the rational soul governs corporeal 
desire through repeated, often jarring, incongruities between characters’ pre-
tenses to what Willis calls “he Sciences and the Liberal Arts”— as proof of 
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a “Superior Soul”— and their comic identiications with horses, dogs, lob-
sters, cockroaches, frogs, maggots, lies, and mites. Indeed, the play opens 
by foregrounding such an incongruity. Bruce delivers a paean to the “great 
Lucretius,” who demonstrated, in his Epicureanism, that “poetry and good 
sense may go together” (I.i.5– 6). “Good sense,” as the scene soon makes 
clear, is based on atomistic philosophies and materialist accounts of the 
human- animal soul. But Bruce’s rhapsody— and he quotes from Lucretius 
in the original Latin— is quickly corporealized by Longvil’s entrance with 
this question for his friend: “What great author are thou chewing the cud 
upon?” (I.i.13– 14). he random swerves of Lucretian “sense” almost imme-
diately become entangled comically with the sexual desires that Willis la-
ments cannot always be controlled by the rational soul. By turning Bruce 
into a ruminant, Longvil initiates a witty but perhaps too- anxious efort to 
distinguish himself and his friend from the usual butts of 1670s satire, a “race 
of gentlemen more degenerated than that of horses” (I.i.23). heir derision 
of what they term “over grown animals” (I.i.29– 30) resonates ironically with 
Willis’s characterization of the lustful corporeal soul: “gentlemen care not 
upon what strain they get their sons, nor how they breed ‘em when they have 
got ‘em” (I.i.25– 27). By casting upper- class education and sociability in terms 
of animal husbandry (“breed”), Longvil underscores the hybrid, rather than 
satirically bestial, nature of Restoration society. Bruce and Longvil are im-
plicated ironically in the very behavior they ostensibly mock: both have sex 
with Lady Gimcrack at the masquerade— a “temptation,” says Bruce, “too 
strong to be resisted”— and, in Act 5, easily switch the objects of their desire 
when they ind (by eavesdropping) that Miranda loves Bruce (not Longvil, 
who has been pursuing her) and Clarinda loves Longvil rather than Bruce 
(V.iv.80).
For Shadwell, then, struggles between the corporeal and incorporeal 
souls are the subject of sexual farce rather than moralistic philosophizing. 
Far from appearing to live “with Gods or Angels,” the men and women in 
he Virtuoso, in pursuing a series of sexual assignations, end up cornered, 
like rats or mice, in a woodhole. In Act 4, Lady Gimcrack and Hazard turn 
the word “husband” into various species of noisome vermin or inanimate ob-
jects: as a “a clog” (IV.ii.43), a “dog in a manger” (IV.ii.44); “an insect, a drone, 
a dormouse” (IV.ii.48); “a cuckoo in winter” (IV.ii.50); and “a body without 
a soul” (IV.ii.52). his slide of cuckolded husbands down the Great Chain 
of Being ends with Sir Nicholas imagistically reduced to “a pitiful utensil,” 
a thing good only for the veneer of legitimacy he provides (IV.ii.60). But 
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Lady Gimcrack and her lover have to cut their assignation short and hide 
in the woodhole when Sir Nicholas enters with his mistress, Mrs. Flirt. In 
a chaotic scene of comic discovery, husband and wife accuse each other of 
inidelity, and then, after they realize that Flirt and Hazard have been having 
an afair, turn on their lovers to excoriate them for betrayal,. he woodhole 
becomes a refuge for the very behavior that reduces the characters to vermin.
Every human pretension descends into corporeal degradation and sex-
ual farce. he play’s second- string “virtuoso,” Sir Samuel Hearty (Miranda’s 
“well- educated spaniel”) imagines himself a “lashy wit”; yet his wit, accord-
ing to Bruce, consists largely of “nonsensical bywords” (I.i.136) that mean 
“no more to him than breaking wind” (I.i.136). During the course of the play, 
dressed irst as footman and then as a woman, Sir Samuel is “kick’d, beaten, 
pumped, and toss’d in a blanket” (V.vi.115– 16) by Longvil, who refers to him 
as an “impudent dog” (II.i.102). Later, Sir Samuel escapes “naked” through a 
window but ends up the victim of mob punishment. Snarl, the play’s would- 
be moralist, who complains about the lewdness of women and the “ilthy 
lascivious beasts of this age” (IV.ii.188– 89), joins Mrs. Figgup, who defends 
herself as “civil and virtuous” (IV.ii.185), in some sadomasochist jollies, while 
denouncing the “ranting rogues” of the “impudent vicious age” (IV.ii.4– 5) 
Snarl wants to be whipped with rods. Indeed, he is the irst to secure a key 
to the woodhole for his pleasure. One after another, Shadwell’s pretenders 
to disembodied reason are confronted with their own hypocrisy. Most vul-
nerable, in this regard, is Sir Formal Trile, who, trying to pacify the aptly 
named Snarl, ofers moralizing advice on the dire efects of unregulated pas-
sions: “Sir, I have often intreated you to avoid passion, it drowns your parts, 
and obstructs the faculties of your mind, while a serene Soul, like that which 
I wear about me, operates clearly, notwithstanding the oppression of Clay, 
and the clog of my sordid humane Body” (II.i.226– 30). Sir Formal’s claim 
to “unbodi’d” desire— “I am all Rapture, all Extasie, my Soul, methinks, is 
led from its corporeal clog”— turns to hash in Act 4 when, “inlam’d” by Sir 
Samuel in a woman’s dress, Sir Formal tries to rape him. As Sir Formal’s at-
tempts to fondle the would- be wench threaten to reveal the “diference of the 
sexes,” Sir Samuel ights back (literally), while calling his attacker “a libidi-
nous goat” and a “lustful swine” (IV.i.69, 79). While the obvious satiric butt 
in this scene is Sir Formal, his pretensions to subdue the animal spirits— 
the goats and swine within the human that deine the corporeal soul— mark 
him, as Snarl says, as a “ine, formal hypocrite.” Caught with his whore, Sir 
Formal has to endure being outfaced by another’s hypocrisy when Snarl asks 
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mockingly, “Does your noble soul operate clearly without the clog of your 
sordid, formal body now?” (IV.iii.143– 144).
In satirizing pretenders to scientiic wit, Shadwell returns again and again 
to their denial of corporeal pleasures and material responsibilities. Early in 
the play, Gimcrack proudly declares that “I seldom bring anything to use; ‘tis 
not my way. Knowledge is my ultimate end” (II.ii.84– 86). his rejection of 
Boyle’s usefulness of natural philosophy assumes comic form in Act 5 when 
a mob of ribbon weavers, under the impression that Sir Nicholas has in-
vented a new weaver’s loom, descends on his house clamoring for revenge.59 
hese ribbon weavers— yet another clever allusion to spiders, worms, or 
vermin— are confronted by Sir Trile Formal, who imagines he can quell 
their “rash outrage”— their intention to destroy “the engine and the rogues 
that invented it” (V.iii.14– 15)— by his already discredited oratory. Before he 
even begins, the mob grabs him and debates whether to hang him or let him 
speak. While he begins in his familiar vein— “Englishmen, good common-
wealth’s men, and sober, discreet ribbon weavers,” he declares, “should [not] 
be thus hurried by the rapid force of the too dangerous whirlwind or hur-
ricane of passion” (V.iii.40– 45)— his extended metaphor- making quickly 
exceeds their vocabulary, patience, and sense: “Of passion, I say, which with 
its sudden and, alas, too violent circumgyrations does too often shipwreck 
those that are agitated by it, while it turns them into such giddy confusion 
that they can no longer trim the sails of reason or steer by the compass of 
judgment” (V.iii.48– 52). For his eloquence, Sir Formal is kicked, beaten, and 
pelted with oranges before he cries out— “All this I can bear, gentlemen. I 
am a person” (V.iii.62– 63). he Weavers’ response is signiicant precisely be-
cause it challenges Sir Formal’s claim to personhood: “A person— a rogue, a 
villain, a damn’d vertoso! A person! . . . We’ll use you like a dog, sir” (V.iii.64, 
66). Not only is Sir Formal reduced to the level of a cur, his rhetoric of 
subduing the passions provokes only more fury. For his part, Sir Nicholas, 
cowering behind his door with a blunderbuss, tries to save himself by call-
ing out, “I never invented an engine in my life . . . I never invented so much 
an engine to pare cream cheese with. We virtuosos never ind out anything 
of use, ‘tis not our way” (V.iii.76– 79). Both of the “damn’d, lying vertoso[s]” 
have to be rescued by Longvil and Bruce, armed with pistols.
Both science and politics, then, descend into violence. he play’s two 
wits treat the weavers as animals that, in Willis’s formulation, “know not 
Rights or laws of political Society,” even as Sir Nicholas, in declaring his 
mechanical ignorance, undercuts one of Willis’s arguments for the rational 
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soul: animals, we recall, remain “altogether ignorant of the Causes of things, 
. . . nor ind out any mechanical Arts.” Shadwell frames the conlict between 
the would- be virtuosi and the rioting weavers as a kind of street ight among 
diferent breeds of dogs. His refusal to condemn the weavers for their 
uprising— what one moralistic, anonymous writer called the “great Mischief 
and disorders [that] happened by the Insurrection of the Weavers”— difers 
from the responses of some of his contemporaries.60 Instead, Shadwell uses 
the street scene as a way to make clear that the technological privileges of the 
upper- classes— the gentlemen who can aford and legally own guns— do 
not correlate unproblematically to moral superiority. Indeed, “civil society,” 
one of Willis’s tests for human diference, is absent from this play or, more 
precisely, is always and already represented in terms of more- than- human 
relations. Rather than lamenting the tendency of the incorporeal soul to slip 
the leash of reason, he Virtuoso, it seems to me, represents the pure, Car-
tesian rational soul as a kind of metaphysical superstructure that cannot be 
wished into existence; creatures who walk on two legs are no less governed 
by Willis’s animal spirits than are the frogs and dogs that populate the play. 
Indeed, seventeenth- century neuroanatomy medicalizes and literalizes per-
ceived tensions between the “human” and the “animal” in ways that put into 
motion what Laura Brown identiies as a “tendency either to alienation or to 
association,” apparent not only in natural philosophy but in post- Darwinian 
behavioral animal studies.61 Because we have always imagined animals as in 
some sense kin— whether happily or not— they ofer us desired or despised 
models of social and political order. he next chapter explores this point 
of view by returning to Shadwell, this time in his tragic rather than comic 
mode. Focusing largely on dogs and parasites as contemporary models of so-
ciosexual relations, I examine in Shadwell, Bernard Mandeville, Rochester, 




Dogs, Bitches, and Parasites in Shadwell, 
Rochester, and Gay
Companion comes from the Latin cum panis, “with bread.”
— Donna Haraway, When Species Meet
In Cowley’s version of he Plagues of Egypt, dogs appear as the faithful, 
stricken companions of shepherds during the time of pestilence, the ifth 
plague. “he starving sheep refuse to feed,” writes Cowley, “hey bleat their 
innocent souls out into air; / he faithful dogs lie gasping by them there; 
/ h’ astonish’d Shepherd weeps, and breaks his tuneful Reed” (240). In this 
heart- wrenching inversion of the pastoral, Cowley reinforces the role of 
dogs as economically valuable and blameless victims of a metaphysical ca-
tastrophe. Yet, in some versions of the ten plagues, dogs act as scourging 
agents rather than as humankind’s sufering aides. he Hebrew term arov 
in the fourth plague refers, ambiguously, to a “swarm” or to some other kind 
of “mixing,” whether of “lies” or “wild beasts”; the Haggedeh of Venice in-
terprets these swarms as predatory dog- like creatures, rather than insects, 
and depicts them attacking citizens.1 In Journal of the Plague Year, Defoe 
reports over 40,000 dogs were destroyed, an oicer having been “appointed 
for the execution.”2 hat dogs can be either the instruments of God’s anger 
or the shared victims of his punishment reinforces the unstable diferences 
between domestic creatures and vermin. Loyal companions can easily be-
come scavenging or threatening packs.
I focus on dogs in this chapter because, of all the “more perfect” creatures, 
they are the ones who most frequently and characteristically cross and re-
cross the lines between singular objects of afection— “man’s best friend”— 
and dangerous populations. Even now, this is true: in 2014, Russian oicials 
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hired a pest control company to exterminate roaming dogs in Sochi’s Olym-
pic Village, while animal welfare advocates set up makeshift shelters and 
“adoption centers” on the outskirts of town. But in the seventeenth century, 
the potentially dangerous status of dogs was even more pronounced. In May 
1636, London exterminated 3,720 dogs, roaming animals that, according to 
Mark Jenner, were perceived as “visible sources of disorder, out of control 
and unsanitary . . . without a master and not visibly and physically ixed in a 
social relationship.”3 Pet culture arose in the context of civic- minded exter-
mination of canines, and Restoration writing bears many traces of the curs 
who ofer a diferent and more dangerous kind of trans- species relationship 
than do the individuated lapdogs of eighteenth- century satire, as in Pope’s 
Rape of the Lock. During this period, loose, wandering dogs— especially 
dogs in a pack— continued to be regarded as vermin because, like rats and 
lies, they were associated with ilth, infection, and madness. In literary texts, 
correspondingly, dogs frequently serve as abjected surrogates for humans in 
dystopian versions of pastoral or civic order. his chapter examines works 
by homas Shadwell, John Wilmot, Earl of Rochester, and John Gay, all of 
which, in diferent ways, explore parasitism, disease, desire, and the wavering 
line between the domesticated and the verminous.
Precisely because of their radically unstable position, dogs are critical 
in thinking through seventeenth- century versions of biopolitical order. Al-
though much has been written about the role of bees as a model for early 
eighteenth- century socioeconomic ideals— a tradition represented by the 
he Grumbling Hive and, later, he Fable of the Bees— Mandeville’s 1705 ar-
gument that private vices lead to public beneits was itself a response to a 
prior and complementary discourse in which the polis was imagined not 
as a well- ordered hive but as a chain of parasites, one feeding on another. 
Populating Mandeville’s hive are “Sharpers, Parasites, Pimps, Players,/Pick- 
pockets, Coiners, Quacks, and South- sayers,” along with the “Fools” who be-
lieve that an “Honest Hive” can prosper.4 Seventeenth- century satire often 
depicts rivalrous socioeconomic and personal relationships as inherently 
parasitic, the city inhabited by real and metonymic dogs, leas, and latter-
ers.5 In Ben Jonson’s Volpone; or, he Fox, Mosca (from the Latin musca, 
ly) vies against warm- blooded vermin— a Raven, a Vulture, a Crow, and a 
“she- Wolfe”— to be named Volpone’s heir. he play opens with Mosca con-
gratulating himself for raising the usual “Court- dog- trickes” of lattery and 
fawning to the level of an art. his art, in turn, reveals the underlying, if dis-
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avowed, principles of sociobiological relations. “O! Your Parasite / Is a most 
pretious thing,” he declares:
. . . dropt from above,
Not bred ‘mong’st clod, and clot- poules, here on earth.
I muse, the Mysterie was not made a Science,
It is so liberally profest! Almost,
All the world is little else, in nature,
But Parasites, or Sub-parasites.6
Mosca inverts the conventional medico- physiological view of vermin— 
parasites as the product of putrefaction, “bred ‘mong’st clod, and clot- poules, 
here on earth”— to imagine himself as a “true” parasite of divine origin, 
“dropt from above.” Mosca’s comic claim to heavenly birth is troubled by 
the identiication that he celebrates: “parasite” comes from the latinization 
of the Greek: para means “beside” or “by” and sitos means “wheat” or, more 
generally, “food.” As Volpone demonstrates, the parasite is neither above nor 
below but “beside,” operating in conjunction with host bodies and inevitably 
surrounded by other parasites.
Given their ubiquitous presence and proximity to sources of food, dogs 
are essential actors in the parasitical system.7 (Indeed, it is worth remember-
ing that Jonson’s suppressed, politically provocative play was entitled he 
Isle of Dogs.) It is nearly impossible to ind a portrait of an early modern 
dining hall that does not include at least one canine, looking longingly at 
a handful of meat, or waiting expectantly for a scrap to fall on the loor. 
Such postures make dogs vulnerable (like Jonson’s Mosca) to charges of self- 
interested pandering. As Cliford Davidson has demonstrated, the “most 
important emblem of the deceptive language of lattery is the dog”: Henry 
Peacham’s Minerva Brittanica (1612) uses dogs as an emblem of lattery.8 In 
Henry Hartlete’s “he Hunting of the Fox: or, Flattery Displayed” (1632), 
lattery is described as a “fawning” and “dog- like vice”: the latterer uses his 
“mouth as the dogge wags his tayle, the one to obtaine a boone from his friend, 
the other to gaine a bone from his Master.”9 When Mosca refers to “the usual 
Court- dog trickes,” then, he draws on this perception of domesticated ca-
nines as embodying a shameless lattery that drives socioeconomic relations 
in seventeenth- century society. Jacobean city comedy, like Volpone, is full of 
parasites, not only because the symbolic yoking of animals and latterers of-
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fers a convenient means of inveighing against luxury and corruption but also 
because the city is already corrupted morally and ecologically by humans 
who draw dogs, lies, and other vermin— the whole cast of Volpone’s animal 
symbolism— in their wake.
Outside the city, moreover, removed from a ready food source, packs of 
dogs could become dangerous. What Davidson calls dogs’ “equivocal” status 
stems from the recognition that interspecies accord was largely situational; 
dogs could and would turn against humans if compelled by food scarcity.10 
Ripa’s igure of Ingratitude tellingly includes the following words: “Feed 
dogs, until they eat you.”11 his characterization pervades the Restoration. 
“Dogs, “ writes Bernard Mandeville in Fable of the Bees, “tho’ become Dome-
stick Animals, are ravenous to a Proverb, and those of them that will ight 
being Carnivorous, would soon become Beasts of Prey, if not fed by us.”12 
Sources of both afection and aliction, dogs are capable of moving, within 
a single generation, from domestic companions to wild beasts. his point 
was driven home to seventeenth- century readers by accounts of shipboard 
dogs turning feral and menacing once they got to overseas colonies, where 
they were abandoned. Dogs had accompanied European voyagers to the 
Americas since Columbus; cast aside on shore, they had reproduced with 
indigenous canine populations. Particularly in the Caribbean, these wild or 
feral dogs were exterminated en masse. In the 1670s, Alexandre Exqueme-
lin, an oicial with the French West India Company, describes the situa-
tion on Tortuga, an island of the coast of Venezuela, where colonists were 
confronted by packs of wild dogs. Fearing the dogs would eat all the wild 
boar, the “common sustenance of the Island,” the island’s governor set out a 
“great quantity of poison, to be brought from France, therewith to destroy 
the Wild- Mastives”:
his was performed in the year 1668, by commanding certain horses to 
be kill’d and envenom’d, and laid open in the wood and ields, at certain 
places, where mostly Wild- Dogs use’d to resort. his being continued 
for six Months: there were kill’d an incredible number, in the said time. 
And yet all this industry was not suicient to exterminate and destroy 
the race; yea, scarce to any diminution thereof, their number appearing 
almost as entire as before. hese Wild- Dogs are easily rendered tame 
among people, even as tame as the ordinary dogs we breed in Houses. 
Moreover the Hunters of those Parts, whensoever they ind a wild- bitch, 
with young whelps, do commonly take away the puppies and bring them 
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to their houses, where they experiment them, being grown up, to hunt 
much better than other Dogs.13
Exquemelin’s account underscores the status of wild dogs as markedly lim-
inal animals, both vermin and hunters, competing with humans for food 
and helping them to procure it. he wildness of the domesticated dogs, their 
proximity to nature, is simultaneously the source of their ability to hunt and 
the reason they can revert to an atavistic state. In their complex role as ver-
min, predators, and companion animals, dogs represent better than any oth-
er creature the conditional nature of being vermin. hey demonstrate how 
this status is mediated by a host of factors— including population numbers, 
food scarcity, and indigenous theories of disease.
By the time Jonson wrote Volpone, dogs, humans, and parasites (both 
biological and behavioral) were closely linked, their connections being re-
inforced through several interrelated discourses: the political, the medical, 
the agricultural, and the moral. A term originally applied to humans who 
fed at the tables of their human hosts, “parasite” had not yet been appro-
priated by the natural sciences as an exclusive descriptor of what Anders 
M. Gullestad calls “sponging animals and insects”14— that is, of nonhumans, 
mostly leas and lice. Instead, much like “vermin,” “parasite” names a subject 
position somehow related to feeding practices. What interests me here is 
what this classic social type can tell us about seventeenth- century literature 
and science as they struggled to articulate new sets of social relations, or to 
reform old ones. Canines are crucial to the depiction of the social not only 
for the reasons outlined above but also because, as we have seen, during this 
period biological diferences between humans and dogs (like that between 
humans and apes) largely disappear under the pressures of comparative 
anatomy. Indeed, to the extent that late seventeenth- century neuroanatomy 
treated dogs and humans as “twin species,” endowed with similar appetites 
and similar forms of intellection and afection, traditional typological con-
nections among humans, dogs, and parasites are further intensiied, feral 
dogs and packs of dogs providing for Shadwell and Rochester models of the 
social, sexual, and political order. he irst section of this chapter focuses 
on homas Shadwell’s adaptation of Shakespeare’s Timon of Athens. Like 
he Virtuoso, this play is heavily populated by vermin; Timon casts dog- like 
humans in a tragic— and paradoxically satiric— system of socioeconomic 
relations, in what Serres calls “an endoparasitic cycle [of ] mammalian re-
production” (230). Shadwell’s dark, squirming vision of the collective chal-
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lenges simple notions of afective ties and calls attention to the critical role of 
mimetic contagion in parasitical economies. Mimetic desire creates rivalries, 
and the proliferation of rivalries eventually leads to seizing on a scapegoat, 
who is excluded and sacriiced for the sake of the group. Rivalry, in this re-
spect, is accompanied by an act of foundational violence, a disruption and 
reformation of the system itself.
Packs of dogs exemplify the violence at the heart of the parasitical order 
and what Serres calls its cycle of “mammalian reproduction”; like sexed and 
gendered humans— or so the argument goes—dogs turn on each other if 
pressed by either hunger or lust. Masculine rivalries threaten idealized vi-
sions of the polis. When their “Fury is provok’d by a Venereal Ferment,” ac-
cording to Mandeville, males “exert themselves chiely against other Males of 
the same Species. hey may do Mischief by chance to other Creatures; but 
the main Objects of their Hatred are their Rivals, and it is against them only 
that their Prowess and Fortitude are shewn.”15 In their violent relationships 
to one another dogs embody parasitical culture in a more profound and gen-
dered way than contemporary scientiic deinitions of “the parasite” as living 
in, rather than beside, the host might suggest.
I trace the above set of relations in Rochester’s poetry of the 1670s, es-
pecially his “A Ramble in St. James’s Park”; here the mirrored cognitive and 
emotional structures of canines make them not only appropriate surrogates 
for humans but also ready scapegoats, capable of being kicked, beaten, and 
removed from “civilized” spaces. Both parasited and cast as parasites, dogs 
slink in and out of seventeenth- century literature, begging, stealing, barking, 
mating, lattering, eating, and ighting, so, at times, it is no longer possible to 
distinguish between human parasites and their canine twins. Such twinning 
is literalized in contemporary descriptions of rabies or hydrophobia in which 
dogs and humans manifest the same symptoms and the same desires. Focus-
ing on signs of rabies in Rochester and John Gay, I conclude this chapter by 
exploring how, nested within these parasitical relationships are depictions of 
madness, igured in both gendered and canine terms.
Dogs and Flatterers in Timon of Athens
While he Libertine (1675) and he Virtuoso (1676) may be the best known 
of homas Shadwell’s plays, his Timon of Athens was one of the most popu-
lar tragedies of the Restoration period, irst produced in 1678 and regularly 
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restaged for the next seventy- one years.16 Like Volpone, Timon satirizes 
luxury and corruption, but instead of Jonson’s sadistic miser, Shadwell’s 
titular hero, like his Shakespearean progenitor, is an overly generous host, 
the foolish representative of a dying tradition of noblesse oblige. Timon of 
Athens begins with Demetrius greeting a Poet or, as he puts it, “a Fellow 
Horse- leech.”17 hese two bloodsuckers quickly fall into a discussion about 
the stylistics of lattery, or how best to ingratiate themselves at the “Lord’s 
Table,” by considering which animal— lion, bull, fox, raven— is most suited 
to the “lofty and high sounding” verse of panegyric (2). hrough this ironic 
meta- discussion about the appropriate use of animal metaphors in liter-
ary pandering, Shadwell depicts Timon’s body as crawling with parasites, 
feeding on his lifeblood— his wealth. Like Jonson’s fox and ly, Shadwell’s 
parasites gorge on Timon, even as they violate the bond between word and 
intention. Apemantus, the honest but “snarling Cur” who stands in for the 
Cynic, makes this point very early in the play by warning Timon that “these 
smell- feasts” who “lye and fawn,” lattering to feed on his “Mutton” and “Par-
tridge,” are mere “Flies, who at one cloud of winter- showers” will drop away 
(19). In commenting on Timon’s feasts, mostly through a series of asides, 
Apemantus characterizes the host as the main course: “Ye Gods, what a 
number of men/ Eat Timon!”
. . . and yet he sees ‘em not.
It grieves me to see so many dip their meat
In one man’s Bloud, and all the madness is
He cheers ‘em to’t.
(20)
Apemantus condemns both Timon and his lies and leeches, but the power 
of the image resides in the hero being cast as a kind of living gravy pot, en-
couraging his guests to “dip” in his “Bloud.”
he nature of the parasite is to consume under the cover of a iction of 
exchange. As Serres reminds us, the parasite never pays in kind for what 
he or she receives, instead ofering words and noise in exchange for food 
and privilege. While there is no way to escape the play’s parasitical econo-
my, Apemantus occupies a diferent place within it; the word “cynic,” after 
all, is derived from Ancient Greek kynikos, or “dog- like.” hou art “a thing,” 
says Timon to Apemantus, “whom Fortunes tender arms/ With favor never 
claspt, but bred a Dog” (52). To be “bred a Dog” is, in Timon’s view, to lack 
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investment in the social order. Unlike the “smooth Parasites around him,” 
Apemantus— the name means “without afect”— neither trades nor equivo-
cates in afection; refusing to engage in a “Horse- Leech” style of lattery, he 
maintains a satiric distance from the economy of Timon’s court. Patrolling 
the borders of the social order, Apemantus growls at the vermin who swarm 
about the house and threaten the gullible Timon; he travels back and forth 
between the house and the woods, following Timon, behaving not only as a 
Cynic but also as its prototype, the cur. As homas Nashe writes of cynic / 
dog igures, “for they will snarl and bite; / Right courtiers to latter and to 
fawne; / Valiant to set upon the enemies / Most faithfull and most constant 
to their friends.”18 While his movements between the castle and the woods 
may evoke the scavenging habits of dogs, his refusal to join Timon’s table, 
despite repeated invitations, removes him from the interspecies feeding 
frenzy that characterizes Timon’s Athens. Instead, Apemantus consumes 
roots and berries in the woods. his vegetarian diet makes him less dog- 
like. As street scavengers during a time of comparative scarcity, dogs fed on 
feces and carrion.19 In extreme cases, dogs would eat corpses, especially dur-
ing plague years or in the aftermath of battles when bodies could be found 
putrefying on the streets of London and battleields. Dozens of early mod-
ern writers use some variant of the term “foule- mouthed” to describe their 
distaste for dogs’ feeding practices, a revulsion exacerbated by the canine 
tendency (as one writer puts it) to “feast on his own heave,” or “to vomit up 
his shame again.”20 When Apemantus claims, “I devour no Lords,” he clearly 
distinguishes himself from the pack (8).
By rejecting the rich food and luxury of Timon’s feasts, Apemantus at-
tempts to live outside a chain of mimetic desire, with its inevitable produc-
tion of rivalry. In some sense, he serves as a model for Timon after misfor-
tune and the discovery of his false friends turn the generous patron into 
a scavenger himself. Mimicking the behavior of Apemantus, Timon leaves 
the city for the woods and survives by digging for roots. At one point he 
addresses the earth itself, pleading with it to yield roots, not gold— to “Sear 
up thy fertile Womb to all things else”— because humans, he now recog-
nizes, are little more than “ungrateful” sponges on the natural world (50). 
“Dry up thy marrow, thy Veins, thy Tilth and Pasture,” Timon commands 
of the earth, “’Whereof ungrateful man with liquorish draughts/ And unc-
tuous morsels greases his pure mind, / hat from it all consideration slips” 
(50). By “ungrateful man,” Timon evokes a class of beings very close to what 
Serres calls “Parasitus sapiens,” the thieving, greedy species that has managed 
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to convince itself of its own claims to devour without bounds or limits (104). 
“History,” Serres writes, “hides the fact that man is the universal parasite, 
that everything and everyone around him is a hospitable space”:
Plants and animals are always his hosts; man is always necessarily their 
guest. Always taking, never giving. He bends the logic of exchange and 
of giving in his favour when he is dealing with nature as a whole. (24)
Timon’s injunction to Nature, then, exposes the continuities between the 
rhetoric of parasitism and Enlightenment critiques of excess and luxury: 
while it may be better to dig for roots (“unctuous morsels”) than for the gold 
in nature’s “Veins,” humans are always in the position of feeding on an earth 
ravaged to supply their insatiable desires. Not even the Cynic can escape the 
one- way “logic of exchange” that characterizes parasitical relations.
Within the seventeenth- century version of this system, dogs and dog- 
like igures occupy equivocal positions; as igures of greed, lust, and rivalry, 
they typify its workings; but as igures of loyalty, obedience, and sacriice, 
they seem to ofer hope of escape. Several times in the play, Timon evokes 
dogs as an absent emblem of allegiance. “How much is a dog more gener-
ous than a Man,” he laments after losing his wealth, “Oblige him once, hee’l 
keep you Company, / Ev’n in your utmost want and misery” (37). In Act 5, 
Timon declares to Alcibiades, “I am misanthropos! I hate Mankind: / And 
for thy part, I wish thou wer’t a Dog / hat I might love thee something” 
(59). In both cases, Timon seems to hold out the paradoxical possibility 
that canines, traditional emblems of either lattery or ferocity, transcend the 
system of one- way relations in which he is enmeshed. Dogs embody the 
(absent) virtues that ostensibly deine humankind’s better nature. Timon’s 
mistress, the “constant” Evandra, similarly fulills this fantasy canine func-
tion. Shadwell’s most extensive revision of Shakespeare’s play, as critics have 
noted, is the addition of a love plot in which Evandra and the jilt Melissa vie 
for Timon’s attentions.21 In Act 1, Evandra warns Timon that Melissa’s love 
is “Most mercenary, base,” mere “Marriage- Love”; she gives her body in “vile 
exchange” for his liberty (13). In contrast, after having witnessed Timon’s 
humiliating demise and Melissa’s light, Evandra ofers Timon her gold and 
professes her unconditional devotion: “I am no base Athenian Parasite / To 
ly from thy Calamities,” she declares, “I’ll help to bear ‘em” (39). Abandoning 
the property that makes her human, Evandra joins Timon in his homeless 
scavenging. If Melissa’s name associates her, however ironically, with lattery, 
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with honeyed words that vanish in the light of Timon’s poverty, Evandra’s 
behavior links her to another group of animal images, the “generous” (or 
masochistic) spaniel who, while sufering kicks and rejection, follows her 
“master” in his hardship, even to the grave.22
As Apemantus exits in Act 4, Timon curses him of the stage with 
“Slave! Dog! Viper! Out of my sight” (53). Timon’s unsettling linkage among 
chattel, curs, and poisonous vermin suggests how dogs, as the middle term 
in this chain of invectives, trouble the distinctions between useful com-
panion and toxic threat. he Cynic often functions in classical tragedy as 
a scapegoat igure, an individual singled out as a collective object of con-
tempt. Apemantus, however, is only one of several scapegoats in the play. 
In Serres’ analysis, scapegoating is a function of rivalry: because “humans 
are parasites to one another,” explains Steven Brown, “rivalry must occur, 
which is solved by sacriice— the existing guests work together to expel the 
uninvited guests.”23 Scapegoating serves a useful but short- lived function; 
expulsion ofers a temporary solution to the problem of rivalries, helping to 
“adapt social relations to subsequent acts of parasitism,” thereby shifting “the 
basis of community towards new norms.”24 Both Timon, the philanthropi-
cal benefactor, and Alcibiades, the military hero in Shadwell’s play, can be 
regarded as scapegoats, then. At more or less the same time Timon retreats 
to the woods, Alcibiades is exiled from the city, only to return, triumphantly. 
In Serres’ reading of parasitical relations, the scapegoat once excluded, al-
ways returns. he play ends with Alcibiades being swept into power, prom-
ising a new freedom for the Athenians, the overthrow of “Tyrants” who have 
functioned as state- parasites, robbing and pillaging from the people to in-
crease their own “private stores.” When “the Government / Is in the Body 
of the People,” he pronounces, “they / Will do themselves no harm” (68). 
his statement, written six months before the advent of the Popish Plot 
and the Exclusion Crisis, is in keeping with Shadwell’s opposition political 
principles; it implies parasites are foreign or alien forces corrupting a body 
politic that otherwise would be self- regulating, autopoietic.25 Commanding 
the people to return home, to repair to their “several Trades, their Business 
and Diversions,” Alcibiades assures them he will protect the borders of the 
city and guard them “from [their] active Foes” (68). In this respect, Timon 
reinforces a critique of Charles II’s court as a nest of latterers and parasites, 
feeding, like Timon’s poet and painter, on the body of the King as well as 
the nation.
he double suicides of Timon and Evandra seem to ofer, in the end, a 
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sentimental alternative to the feeding frenzies of city life, even as they under-
score, in a grimly ironic way, the impossibility of escaping a parasitical econ-
omy. Both Evandra and Timon succumb to an originary order of parasites, 
becoming food, as Prince Hal says over the body of Hotspur, “for worms.” If 
Timon teaches anything, it is that parasites feed and breed within the body 
politic, confusing what one imagines to be distinct. Humans and lies eat at 
the table; men become dogs; gold turns to shit. Consequently, an absolute 
freedom, in the sense of a nonparasitical economy, is an illusion. Timon’s 
epitaph reads, “Here lies a wretched Corpse, of wretched Soul bereft / Timon 
my name, a Plague consume you Caitifs left” (68). While this parting shot im-
plies that, unlike the living “Caitifs” or slaves, Timon is now “free” from the 
plagues he wishes on others, the audience knows that, in their mingling and 
decaying bodies, Timon and Evandra have given themselves over to a sub-
terranean world of feeding things, to the biological forces that, throughout 
the play, deine the parasitical social and political world. However entombed 
and memorialized, their rotting, worm- ridden corpses call into question the 
conident assertions of Alcibiades that any government can “protect” the 
interspecies citizen- body from the self- consumption of “Parasites and Sub-
parasites.” In this sense, writes Brown, the history of human relations, is “not 
the war of ‘all against all’ that Hobbes described. It is the war of all against 
one: the parasite who will become the scapegoat.”26
In Praise of Jowler: Rochester on Parasites
he satiric overtones of Shadwell’s reading of Shakespeare’s text become 
full- blown strategies in other libertine writers, wit- laced condemnations of 
the hypocrisy and double dealing that deine the social order. Rochester’s 
“Satyre Against Reason and Mankind” ofers a biting portrait of parasitical 
relations. In his best- known work, Rochester describes “natural” order in 
terms of feeding systems perversely corrupted by humans. What he regards 
as necessary violence in the animal world gives way to frenzied destruction 
and self- destruction among men:
Birds feed on birds, beasts, on each other prey,
But savage man alone does man betray,
Pressed by necessity, they kill for food,
Man undoes man to do himself no good.27
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“Good,” in the speaker’s view, means whatever contributes to “life’s happi-
ness,” a condition associated with bodily pleasure and health, with stalking, 
sex, and feasting. Instead of acting like dogs and other predators that “hunt 
/ Nature’s allowance” (l. 134), humans are motivated by fears that cannot 
be pinned down to speciic agents or conditions. Humans’ only recourse is 
to insinuate or force themselves into deceptive and self- deluding positions 
on a parasitical chain where they can feed on others. Although he does not 
use the word “parasite” here, Rochester describes man as inherently given 
to hypocrisy and lattery: man, “with smiles, embraces, friendship, praise / 
Inhumanly his fellow’s life betrays” (ll.135– 36). In contrast to animals who 
“ight and tear” for “hunger or for love,” man is undone by an imagination 
that piles fear upon fear:
wretched man is still in arms for fear.
For fear he arms, and is of arms afraid
By fear to fear successively betrayed;
(ll. 140– 42)
Because fear is “the source whence all his best passions came: / His boasted 
honor, and his dear- bought fame” (ll. 143– 44), man, in efect, has internal-
ized the parasitical economy; every move is motivated by his recognition that 
he himself is being, or is about to be, victimized. In such passages, Rochester 
adapts Hobbes, who similarly treated the “dominion” of men over the other 
creatures as a function of animal fear, rather than any natural authority. he 
“dominion of man consists in this . . . though a Lion or a Bear be stronger 
than a man, yet the strength, and art, and specially, the Leaguing and Soci-
eties of men, are a greater power, than the ungoverned strength of unruly 
Beasts.”28 If a “hungry Lion” were, however, to meet an “unarmed man” in 
the desert, the lion would have dominion. Human power over the other 
creatures, then, is situational rather than aixed to species being, and what 
we wrongly term human “dominion” over domestic animals, such as sheep 
and oxen, is in fact “hostility” on our parts rather than obeyance on theirs.29 
Rochester explicitly echoes this view: fear of parasitism or predation pro-
duces parasitical and predatory behavior. His skepticism about inding a 
man who, like Alcibiades, has apparently broken free from the parasitical 
chain, is manifest in the poem’s inal couplet: “If such there are then grant me 
this at least, /Man difers more from man than man from beast” (ll. 220– 21).
he apparent distinction between “beast” and “man” in this iconic cou-
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plet, like Rochester’s portrait with the monkey, has led critics to conclude 
that Rochester, following Boileau’s version of Juvenal’s ifteenth satire, re-
jects religious and philosophical arguments for humankind’s superiority to 
animals. It is hard to deny the binary set up in Rochester’s theriophilic open-
ing. he speaker desires to exchange his human “case of lesh and blood” for 
the body of a “dog, a monkey, or a bear / . . . anything but that vain animal / 
Who is so proud of being rational” (II.4– 7). hroughout the poem, Roches-
ter redeines the traditional ideas of the Great Chain of Being to claim that 
“beasts are, in their degree / As wise at least, and far better than” a human-
kind wracked by fear, doubt, and duplicity (ll. 115– 16). What is crucial, how-
ever, and requisite for his satiric critique, is that Rochester’s identiication 
with animals is bound up with his satiric disidentiication from the parasite 
man— “the mite who thinks he’s an image of the ininite.” Both the “mite” 
and the “dog” allow Rochester to lay bare the parasitical order as a way to 
counter the false economy of reciprocal exchange:
hose creatures are the wisest who attain,
By surest means, the ends at which they aim.
If therefore Jowler inds and kills his hares
Better than Meres supplies committee chairs,
hough one’s a statesman, th’ other but a hound,
Jowler, in justice, would be wiser found.
(ll. 117– 22)
Poking fun at the frustrated ambitions of Sir homas Meres to ascend to 
the ranks of Parliamentarian forces eager to block the ascension of James II, 
the speaker makes Jowler an ironic standard for beings whose desires and 
accomplishments converge. Dogs, unlike human parasites, serve as models 
of “right reason” in action. Jowler’s ability to locate, chase down, and catch 
hares demonstrates the success of creatures who follow their senses and are 
naturally suited to their environment, in contrast to “man” who conjures up 
a “sixth” sense— abstract reason divorced from “certain instinct”— to “contra-
dict the other ive” (ll. 9– 10).
Despite this avowed identiication with “more perfect” creatures, Roch-
ester is no Jowler. Given his own dependence on Charles II and his position 
at the court (from which he was temporarily banished), Rochester occupies 
the ironic position of the hyperparasite, the courtier who feeds of the host 
who, in turn, feeds of others. Although I borrow the term from contempo-
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rary biology, one can ind the concept of hyperparasites in Mosca’s division 
of the world into “Parasites and Sub-parasites” or, more wittily, in Jonathan 
Swift’s depiction in “On Poetry: A Rhapsody”:
So nat’ralists observe, a lea
Hath smaller leas that on him prey;
And these have smaller leas to bite ‘em.
And so proceeds Ad Ininitum.
(ll. 337– 40)30
Ad ininitum— into ininity. Both in the “Satyre” and elsewhere, Rochester’s 
poetry reveals the logic of reciprocal exchange, far from being the law of 
things, is an idealized exception, much like the ideal of the “good man” who 
gives as much as he takes. he default economy is instead a series of ill- 
disguised, one- way relations practiced cynically by persons who pretend to 
ofer service or objects in return. As John Gay writes in “he Man and the 
Flea”: “For thee! Made only for our need/hat more important leas may 
feed” (ll. 45– 46).31
When Rochester turns to the igure of Timon in his poem “Timon” he 
recasts Shakespeare’s and Shadwell’s blasted idealist as a distrustful town 
wit, misled by parasites whom he does not trust but whom he cannot escape. 
he poem begins with a question by Apemantus to Timon:
What, Timon! does old age begin t’approach
hat thus thou droop’st under a night’s debauch?
Hast thou lost deep to needy rogues on tick,
Who ne’er could pay, and must be paid next week?
(ll. 1– 4)
Apemantus’s suggestion that Timon may have lost money to people who 
played with nothing— “on tick,” or with the (empty) promise that money 
would be forthcoming if they lost— locates the poem in a credit rather than 
patronage economy. Intentionally or not, the colloquialism “on tick” also 
weaves together the biological and economic orders, conlating Timon’s 
“needy rogues” with small arachnids that live of the blood of others. Ape-
mantus’s question, however, turns out be a mere prelude to another version 
of the parasitical relationship, whereby literary endeavor is igured as a form 
of unequal exchange.
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Timon explains to Apemantus that a “dull dining sot” had “(s)eized” him 
in the Mall and bribed him to dinner with promise of witty companions: 
“Sedley, Buckhurst, and Savile” (l. 34). Because food, words, speaking, and 
eating are conjoined in parasitical economies, this dinner invitation should 
result in pleasure and even patronage for the speaker, whose literary reputa-
tion provoked it: “He knew my style, he swore, and ‘twas in vain/ hus to 
deny the issue of my brain” (l. 25– 26). Instead, Timon reaches the would- be 
wit’s home, only to discover his companions are not the elite circle of Resto-
ration literary culture but Halfwit, Huf, Kickem, Dingboy, and a wife— the 
worst kind of pretenders to wit, taste, and learning. Like his namesake, then, 
Rochester’s Timon is victimized, but in a sardonic mode, the results satiri-
cal rather than tragic. Half- bribed, half- coerced with lattery, Rochester’s 
Timon is condemned to a bad beef dinner with ignorant, blustering would- 
be playwrights. he meal descends to chaos when Halfwit, Huf, Kickem, 
and Dingboy turn to violence, their disagreements about politics leading to 
isticufs, which become the night’s entertainment: “we let them cuf / Till 
they, mine host, and I had all enough” (l. 173). Like the meals Serres invokes 
in he Parasite, from Plato’s Symposium to the fables of La Fontaine, this one 
is interrupted, and Timon leaves vowing “nevermore / To drink beer- glass 
and hear the hectors roar ” (ll. 176– 77).
his poem, suggests Kirk Combe, satirizes Charles II and his court and 
displays how Rochester works as “an agent of chaos against order.”32 Extend-
ing Combe’s point, I suggest that Rochester depicts an intrinsically rival-
rous order, which must be shored up and remade; in a parasitical system, 
order is less the law of things than it is the ideal that must be disrupted: 
“By virtue of its power to perturb,” write Serres’ editors, “the parasite ulti-
mately constitutes, like the clinamen and the demon, the condition of pos-
sibility of the system.”33 Rochester’s “Timon” reveals that the contractual basis 
of parasitism— good words in exchange for good food— is always in the 
process of collapsing into violence, in part because it is the nature of the 
parasite to disrupt and redirect energies. If the parasite is a scapegoat, it is 
also what Serres calls “a conductor” (190), which, precisely because it dis-
rupts, creates the very conditions that constitute the system. In this respect, 
the interrupted feast of Rochester’s poem allows Timon to see through the 
social illusions of reciprocity and to acknowledge his own vulnerability to 
lattery. But Rochester’s “Timon,” the poem, allows the reader to see how 
the literary system is populated by “Parasites or Sub-parasites,” the diference 
between them determined largely by one’s proximity to Sedleys, Buckhurts, 
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and Savilles, rather than Halfwits, Hufs, Kickums, and Dingboys. In both 
cases, lattery, rivalry, and violence deine the system’s operations.
Scents and Sensibility in St. James’s Park
In Rochester’s and Shadwell’s texts, dogs and other vermin function largely 
(although not exclusively) as metonymical igures typical of seventeenth- 
century satirical tradition. his tradition, in turn, is bound up in with dis-
courses of disease, and especially zoonotic disease, in which infection and 
infestation travel in tandem. As beings who “shared human spaces, food, and 
names,” dogs, according to Jenner, could “readily be imagined as the means 
by which infection was communicated.”34 Mullett reports on a “little book” 
reprinted in 1603 that advocates people “keep their houses, street, yards, 
sinks and ditches sweet and clean from all standing puddles, dunghills and 
corrupt moistures, and not let dogs ‘which be a most apt cattle’ to carry the 
infection, come running in to the house.”35 What interests me in Roches-
ter’s poetry is how sixteenth- century zoopolitics are rethought in the late 
seventeenth- century urban space. Before germ theory, the open spaces of 
London’s parks provided sunlight and fresh air in a dirty and polluted city, 
and therefore, writes Nan Drehrer, “were believed to inhibit disease.”36 St. 
James’s Park in particular, a former wetland drained at great expense by James 
I and redesigned by Charles II, represented for Londoners the triumph of 
art over nature, the miasmic conditions of an unhealthy swamp converted 
to playgrounds for fashionable humans, exotic animals, and domesticated 
creatures. he irst keeper of St. James’s Park, Moses Pitt, prided himself on 
having illed in all the low ground around “the Birdcages” and Storey’s Gate, 
where water “stagnated” and “was the cause of fog and mist, so that thereby 
that part of the park was clear from fogs, and healthy.”37 Animals were an im-
portant part of the reclamation project. In his diaries, John Evelyn describes 
at length the creatures of Charles II’s park, focusing on pelicans and other 
exotic birds, which he perceives as “great devourers”; a “Balearian crane” on 
a prosthetic leg; and “numerous locks of ordinary and extraordinary wild 
fowl,” which, he says, “for being near so great a city, and among such a con-
course of soldiers and people, is a singular and diverting thing.”38 In addition, 
he continues, “here were also deer of several countries, white; spotted like 
leopards; antelopes, an elk, red deer, roebucks, stags, Guinea goats, Arabian 
sheep, etc.”39 Evelyn’s description emphasizes the extent to which St. James’s 
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Park ofers a spectacle of the world’s animals, many ripped from their natu-
ral habitats and restricted to speciic areas in a kind of aestheticized display.
Although Evelyn does not focus on dogs in his description, we know 
dogs traditionally wandered freely throughout the park. L. R. Sadler ( James 
Larwood), the major historian of London’s parks, mentions that dogs chased 
the nearly tame, wild animals on exhibit in the park during the reign of 
Charles I.40 Charles II, known by the nickname “King of the Curs,” kept his 
dog kennel in St. James’s Park and, according to Sadler, was “constantly los-
ing [dogs] in the Park, and advertisements about these animals appear fre-
quently in the newspapers during his reign.”41 In 1660, a humorous descrip-
tion of a “Black Dog, between a Greyhound and a Spaniel,” “His Majesty’s 
Own Dog,” appeared in Mercurious Politicus. “It doubtless was stoln,” reads 
the ad, “for the Dog was not born nor bred in England and never forsake his 
Master.” 42 In 1671 he London Gazette reports a “Dog of His Majesty, full 
of blue spots, with a white cross on his forehead, and about the bigness of a 
tumbler” was lost in St. James’s Park. Because other dogs were harassing his 
fowl, Charles at one point banned all hunting dogs, or dogs over a certain 
size, from the Park. Coincidentally or not, eighteenth- century paintings by 
Gainsborough, Ricci, Rowlandson, and Sandby that depict individuals and 
couples strolling down the avenue, “taking the air,” feature small to medium 
dogs, usually frolicking, sometimes on scent. he dogs in these paintings in 
no way threaten either grazing animals or the humans around them.
Such airy pastoral versions of London’s most famous public green dif-
fer radically from Rochester’s “A Ramble in St. James’s Park.” In this satiric 
poem, “Strange woods spring from the teeming earth,” the product of ancient 
kings masturbating on their “mother’s face” (ll. 12– 19). Men and women of 
all classes mingle with the dogs in an environment both venal and venereal, 
reminding its readers that St. James’s Park was originally a miasmic swamp. 
hese miasmic conditions and the disease and ilth they represent return in 
the form of Corinna’s “grace cup” (l. 122), her vagina “full gorgéd” with “nas-
ty slime” (ll. 117– 18). In Rochester’s satire, the dogs, correspondingly, have 
at least as much in common with plague dogs as they do with the playful, 
companionate ones that are featured in eighteenth- century versions of the 
Park. William Austin’s Anatomie of a Pestilence reads: “When dogs combine 
in numerous company/And arm themselves to make a mutiny, / hey’re 
such presaging heraulds make appear, / Plague is to follow victor in the rear.”43 
Defoe’s Journal of the Plague Year defends shutting up the infected because 
otherwise, like a “mad Dog” running through the streets and biting everyone 
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“he meets,” the sick would have “ofer’d all sorts of Violence,” wounding oth-
ers who would, in turn, have become “incurably infected.”44 Even if Roches-
ter’s human- canine hybrids are not plague carriers, both Corinna and the 
speaker become associated through the poem with “frenzies” and related 
illnesses that reinforce the close relationships between dogs and humans in 
the parasitical economy.
Despite the striking examples of the monkey in Rochester’s portrait, 
dogs are the most frequent partners in his species dysphoria, and crucial to 
his argument about their virtues and vices is their canid sense of smell. One 
could even argue that dogs’ olfactory capacities help ground his materialist 
philosophy. Robert Boyle, in 1673, had deployed the hunting dog in his cor-
puscular philosophy to illustrate what he called “he Determinate Nature 
of Eluviums.”45 Boyle ofers an anecdote about a Bloodhound capable of 
tracking real and decoy poachers for seven miles or more, and argues that 
a gentleman can determine whether his hounds chased a hare or a fox “by 
their way of running, and their holding their Nose higher than ordinary 
when they pursue a Fox, whose scent is more strong.”46 Boyle’s argument, 
like Rochester’s, is not simply that hounds are ine- nosed but that their be-
havior may be taken as proof of the physical nature of otherwise invisible 
phenomena: corpuscular philosophy, in Boyle’s case, “right reason,” in Roch-
ester’s “Satyre.” he hunting dog thus ofers Rochester and Boyle an alterna-
tive to the parasite and a ready source of identiication or disidentiication.
he dog pack serves a similar but more overtly corporate function, pro-
viding a model of political order suited to seventeenth century England. 
he pack’s— or kingdom’s— stability can never be taken for granted but 
must be policed, maintained, or “restored” through acts of exclusion or 
violence. Freed of their “masters,” free- roaming hunting dogs, like Exque-
melin’s feral mastifs on Tortuga, revert to rivalry and mimetic contagion, 
quickly returning, for distraught humans, to the status of vermin, canid 
“smell- feasts” competing with each other for food and sex. Under condi-
tions of scarcity, hunting dogs resemble wolves more than hounds, and in 
early modern England, the wolf symbolizes the Hobbesian universe, always 
in a state of Nature at odds with humankind’s eforts to domesticate ani-
mals and protect the agro- political order. he now- ubiquitous expression 
“son of a bitch” is based on the intense rivalry and violence of lupine pro-
creation. What beast is it, asks one of Donne’s Satyres, which his “own sire 
ne’re knows” for “at th’ engendring he his life doth lose?” he answer to this 
riddle is the “Bitch Wolf ” who
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. . . when she’s proud with dogs do go
Raving and raging ever too and fro.
Where they a ilthy coil about her keep,
Till wearied out, at last they fall asleep,
She wakes one, which her lines, & when each misses
His prey, they tear him limmally in pieces.47
his satire reinforces the biologically valid notion that a “proud” female, one 
in heat, will be followed by many dogs during her ive- to- seven- day oestrus; 
right before she is ready to mate, she releases sex hormones to which all male 
members of the pack, including puppies, respond. Donne’s description of 
the “Bitch Wolf ” is coupled with the less- defensible idea, however, that the 
act of reproduction among wolves is always violent, since wolf packs usually 
have an established hierarchy in which the alpha male and female, deter-
mined long before, are the only ones who mate.48 Nevertheless, because pack 
survival depends on successful procreation between powerful males and fe-
males, canine and lupine hierarchies are easily mapped onto seventeenth- 
century human categories of rank and gender.
Rochester’s “A Ramble in St. James’s Park” exploits this assumption about 
dogs, pressing it into the service of an extended satire on humanity’s pretens-
es to reason.49 His “Ramble” begins where “Timon” ends. he speaker, having 
just left a feast— a “diet at the Bear”— wanders drunkenly into St. James’s 
Park, hoping, he says, “to cool my head and ire my heart” (l. 8). He sees his 
mistress Corinna, who, in “proud disdain” (l. 36) walks by him without ac-
knowledgment, followed closely by three men who “with wriggling tails made 
up to her” (l. 44). he word “proud” rather than “disdain” initiates the canid 
imagery that structures the rest of the poem. his scenario is reminiscent of 
Henry Bulkely’s complaint in a letter to Rochester: fops, he laments, “herd 
with one another” because their “Honour, Honesty, and Friendship is like the 
Consent of Hounds, who knowe not why thay runn together, but that they 
hunt the same sent.”50 “A Ramble in St. James’s Park” dramatizes a similar 
ambivalence about hypergendered, heteronormative masculine behavior, and 
the homosocial rivalries accompanying it, through the four men who ind 
themselves in a pack, pulled along by Corinna’s invisible something. hree of 
these men are described metonymically as a trio of “wriggling tails” or “whif-
ling fools”; the fourth is the narrator, trying desperately to manage his rage 
after Corinna walks by him in her “proud disdain.”
Within this misogynist fantasy of female desire and desirability, it is not 
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immediately clear who or what the object of satire is: the parasitical fops who 
follow Corinna, Corinna for exercising such poor judgment in encouraging 
them, or the jilted speaker, who resorts to cursing the woman and her “lewd 
cunt” (l. 113). What is clear, however, is that Rochester is imagining human 
social order as comparable to that of canines, and that his vision of canine 
pack behavior is as uncertain and potentially destructive as the complex par-
asitic economy of Charles’s court. he “Whitehall blade” in St. James Park 
cannot lay claim to being a irst- order parasite but is himself a hyperpara-
site who boasts of being distantly related to a woman who procured him a 
place at the “Waiters’ table” where he heard a story about the King’s prefer-
ence for “Banstead mutton” (ll. 47– 50). he “Gray’s Inn wit” lives by lattering 
his landlady, and the third, “an eldest son,” pins his sexual fortune partly on 
the abilities of the irst two. hese men hunt instinctively after fashions in 
a chaos of mimetic desire that escapes any rational justiication. In a para-
sitical economy, as Rochester writes of the irst parasite he encounters, such 
scenting after fashion leads the fop to try “to do like the best”; lacking “com-
mon sense,” however, he is capable only of converting “abortive imitation / To 
universal afectation” (ll. 54– 58). he parasites, therefore, fail the Jowler test.
“A Ramble in St. James’s Park” describes a male homosocial order gone 
awry. here are biblical precedents for Rochester’s portrayal of Corinna, 
which would have been familiar to Rochester’s audience. “Moses,” writes 
John Trapp, “itly compareth a whore to a salt- bitch that is followed after by 
all the dogs in a town.”51 Rochester’s parasites/dogs are described as “humble 
curs” who “obsequiously . . . hunt / he savoury scent of salt- swol’n cunt” (ll. 
85– 86). hese hangers- on blindly follow a salted, or “proud,” bitch, hoping 
to be the one who will “line” her, or mate. And much to his horror, the speak-
er inds himself at the wrong end of this parasitical chain. A thorough- going 
Hobbesian, the speaker assumes he and Corinna had an agreement based on 
libertine principles: she would pursue sexual pleasure where she found it, as 
he would. But Corinna’s structural position within the parasitical economy 
is more powerful than his. If Hobbes sees society as a state of nature me-
diated by self- interest and fear, for Serres, “sociality is neither an atomistic 
adding together of individuals, nor an abstract contractual arrangement. It 
is a collectivity assembled and held together by the circulation of an object” 
(21– 22). In Rochester’s poem, Corinna is that object, the salted bitch, func-
tioning as the source of both order and disorder. What the speaker discovers 
in the park is not only the indiference of his mistress but also the secret 
of the parasitical economy: identity is conferred not by the subject but by 
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the object. In actor- network theory, the quasi- object is that which accords a 
relational identity on the players of the game— in Charles II’s favorite game 
of Pall- Mall, the ball bestows identity on the players not simply as a passive 
object, but as actant. Similarly, in coursing, the hare bestows identity on the 
greyhound, the greyhound on the master. he minute Corinna passes by the 
narrator without acknowledging him, she alters not only his position in the 
game, whose terms he thought he had created, but also his identity. Stripped 
of his iction of libertine exchange— “Such naturals freedoms are but just: 
/ here’s something generous in mere lust”— he can now imagine what he 
calls “her treachery” only as a one- way movement— that is, only in parasiti-
cal terms (ll. 97– 98). She becomes the verminous eater of men.
At this point, Rochester’s speaker conlates the diference between sex 
and eating. He describes Corinna’s “devouring cunt” in terms of its gluttony, 
taking into itself “the seed of half the town”:
My dram of sperm was supped up after
For the digestive surfeit water.
Full gorgéd at another time
With a vast meal of nasty slime
Which your devouring cunt had drawn
From porters’ backs and footman’s brawn,
I was content to serve you up
My ballock- full for your grace cup.
(ll. 115– 23)
While Corinna’s “Full gorgéd” and “devouring cunt” has been perceived as a 
igure of the vagina dentata, the extended metaphor of the “vast meal” also 
serves a more complex function than mere misogyny. It allows Rochester’s 
narrator to represent himself as the victim, much like Shakespeare’s Timon, 
as the too- generous host of a voracious guest. hat what he served Corinna 
was primarily a “ballock- full” of spermatic juices relects a libertine ethos 
that translates parasitical consumption into sexual license. he “head” and 
“tail” are “interchangeable”; at “her mouth her cunt cries, ‘Yes!’” (l. 78).
Because it collapses diferences between female dogs and human women, 
“A Ramble” has been regarded as one of Rochester’s most misogynist po-
ems. It is worth pointing out, however, that what makes Corinna “vile” to 
the hyperparasite speaker is not her animality but her pretense to having 
been, like Mosca, “dropped from above”: anyone witnessing her contempt 
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for him would have “swore / She dropped from heaven that very hour/ For-
saking the divine abode / In scorn of some despairing god” (ll. 38– 40).he 
speaker revenges himself precisely on those pretensions; in a kind of onto-
logical throwdown, inverting the image of sacred birth, the narrator claims 
he will plague Corinna until “Crab- louse, inspired with grace divine / From 
earthly cod to heaven shall climb” (ll. 147– 48). his startling image of a para-
site climbing out of human pubic hair into heaven introduces the rejected 
speaker’s curse.
Returning to his familiar canid imagery, the speaker imagines Corinna 
alone and sufering under perpetual oestrus: “May your depravéd appetite 
/ hat could in such whiling fools delight / Beget  .  .  . frenzies in your 
mind” (ll. 135– 37). Signiicantly, the English word for Latin oestrus is frenzy; 
the period between the female canine’s two annual heats is called anoestrus, 
“without frenzy,” and it lasts about ive months. In efect, the speaker wish-
es on Corinna painful and unrequited sexual desire; her “longing arse,” he 
imagines, will be turned to “th’ air” waiting for a north wind to “bluster” in 
her “cunt” (ll. 138– 41). A dry north wind was thought to be most capable of 
carrying scent— the scent, according to the logic of the poem, of her salt- 
swollen genitals— but this time, no wind blows.52 Nature conspires with the 
jilted narrator to punish Corinna, leaving her in a state that, in eighteenth- 
century humans, would be called furor uterinus or, in the nineteenth century, 
nymphomania.53 he speaker intends to defer his “revenge,” however, until 
the now- desperate Corinna is married and pregnant, or “limed”(l. 154), after 
which he will provoke jealousy in her “poor cur” (l. 158) until
. . . I have torn him from her breech
While she whines, like a dog- drawn bitch,
Loathed and despised, kicked out of th’ Town
Into to some dirty hole alone
To chew the cud of misery
And know she owes it all to me.
(ll. 159– 64)
In this especially sadistic fantasy of coitus interruptus, Rochester’s speaker 
takes advantage of his knowledge about canine reproduction to inlict pain 
on Corinna and provoke rage in the would- be father: a single litter can con-
tain pups from diferent dogs.54 In the speaker’s own frenzied imagination, 
the alpha female is driven from the human pack— indeed, from the species, 
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given that she is transformed into an cud- chewing ungulate— by “scandals, 
truth, or lies” (l. 157). Put another way, he has removed Corinna from the 
libertine game by imagining her pregnant and alone: “And may no woman 
better thrive / Who dares profane the cunt I swive” (165– 66). he patrilineal 
imperative— to secure familial inheritance and identity through the virtue 
of the mother— becomes turned, in the bestial world of “A Ramble,” into 
the speaker’s fantasy position as the alpha male. At least in his imagination, 
his stories about Corinna’s liaisons will result in a pup without a father, in a 
yet- to- be- born son of a bitch.
As the most sexualized, freely circulating, and scavenging inhabitants of 
London, dogs provide a ready source of libertine identiication: through the 
dog, sex is naturalized and can be presented as a simple matter of appetite, 
a form of feeding. But those who feed too freely or too often are igured as 
sexual gluttons, as in the satire on the Duchess of Cleveland, also attributed 
to Rochester: “Full forty men a day provided for this whore / Yet like a bitch 
she wags her tail for more.”55 he reason “A Ramble in St. James’s Park” re-
mains powerful, then, is that it explores, through dogs, the mimetic conta-
gion at the heart of Restoration sexual relations. Carole Fabricant points out 
that “Rochester’s poetry is characterized, not by the exaltation of sexuality 
as commonly assumed, but by an unequivocal demonstration of the latter’s 
transience and futility.”56 At stake in the performance of libertine frustration 
is less the value of sex than the fragility and violence of intersubjective relations 
that sex demystiies. he libertine recognizes that the mistress endows his 
subjectivity. She is the quasi- object who, in the words of Serres, “designates 
a subject who, without it, would not be a subject. . . . he quasi- object, when 
being passed, makes the collective,” and “if it stops, it makes the individual” 
the “it” (225). To be without the quasi- object is to be part of an undiferenti-
ated horde, and, in one sense, this is the threat haunting libertine wit: the 
fear of being socially indistinguishable, of being lost in what Bulkeley calls 
“the herd.”
Libertine freedoms may promise to unleash desire and “free” the subject, 
but libertine men, as Rochester seems to recognize, ind themselves embed-
ded in a pack, chasing a predesignated object, pulled along by one or another 
invisible scent. Raging against the curs and the “vile” bitch they pursue does 
little to improve the speaker’s lot and disqualiies him from the privileged, 
ostensibly afectless subject position of the Cynic. But because foaming at 
the mouth, rather than the pintle, is a sign of danger for Restoration readers, 
his misogynist curse ofers the speaker only the illusory comfort of distin-
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guishing himself from the “arrogant oafs” pursuing Corinna. he speaker 
embraces the ironic fate of having transformed himself into a more danger-
ous, because more furious, member of the breed.57
Animal Spirits, Wet Women, and  
Zoonotic Disease
In his “A Satyr Against Wit,” Richard Blackmore lampoons fashionable wits 
in a stock character who descends, dog- like, into spewing fury: “He grins and 
snarles, and in his dogged Fit/ Froths at the Mouth, a certain Sign of Wit.”58 
Rochester’s speaker fares little better: he begins drunk and ends furious in 
a culture in which both states were legally- recognized departures from the 
supposedly normative state of being compos mentis.59 John Brydall describes 
“Mad, or Distracted Persons” as sufering from “over heated” animal spirits: 
“When the Animal Spirits, by some Accident or other, are so over- heated, 
that they become unserviceable to cold and sedate Reasoning; and then 
Reason being thus laid aside, Fancy gets the Ascendent, and Phaeton- like, 
drives on furiously, and inconsistently.”60 “Madness,” from this medico- 
poetic perspective, may have many causes— “Love, in Grief, in Jealousie, in 
Wrath, and Vexation.”61A seventeenth- century physician, then, might di-
agnose Rochester’s speaker rambling through St. James’s Park as sufering 
from melancholic rage, his animal spirits coursing through a heated body 
and seething brain. “Spirits are set on ire,” writes Brydall, “by the Violence 
of their own motion; and in that Rage are not to be governed by Reason.”62 
So close are the connections among heat, agitation of the animal spirits, 
and madness that the term “Mad- man,” in Brydall’s text and elsewhere, is 
used interchangeably with the hybrid noun “Furor- Man”— or, more simply, 
“Fuiriosus.”63 Rochester’s speaker, in this context, is the poetic counterpart 
of Mandeville’s description of male dogs pursuing a bitch in heat: “When 
their “Fury is provok’d by a Venereal Ferment,” Mandeville writes, males “ex-
ert themselves chiely against other Males of the same Species.”
In Rochester’s poem, as we have seen, a good deal of the speaker’s fury is 
directed towards “vile” and gluttonous Corinna; in other words, he projects 
the verminous qualities of feral dogs onto the igure of the bitch, herself a 
hybrid incarnation of “Venereal Ferment.” his double displacement— men 
are mad dogs but bitch women are worse— is a cornerstone of eighteenth- 
century misogynist satire, particularly, if not exclusively, in “the lady and 
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the lapdog” genre, explored by Laura Brown.64 In Brown’s view, the lapdog 
stands metaphorically, or almost metonymically, for female sexuality in “a dy-
namic that places the animal simultaneously within and outside the realm of 
the human, or— from another perspective— places the woman both within 
and outside the realm of the animal.”65 Corinna’s status as a salted bitch 
demonstrates the extent to which the uncertain organic boundaries between 
dogs and humans could be exploited in seventeenth- century satire. Deining 
both male and female sexuality in canine terms, and explicitly connecting it 
to madness and fury, Rochester follows Gassendi and Willis (discussed in 
chapter 3), in promoting a nuanced, anti- Cartesian view of human and non- 
human animals. Humans and the “more perfect” creatures are “twin” and en-
twined species, capable of sharing memories, desires, and diseases.
Animal studies scholars have coined the term “transcorporeality” to insist 
the human body is porous, permeable, and deeply entangled with those of 
other species. In the seventeenth century, what we would now call transcor-
poreality (real and imagined) extended beyond the discourses of the plague 
(discussed in chapter 2) and the domain of comparative physiology (chapter 
3) to include the realm of madness and fury that igures prominently in “A 
Ramble.” Indeed, early modern biopolitics in general and libertine biopoli-
tics in particular depended on a collective understanding that humans and 
the more perfect creatures shared ainities, dispositions, and vulnerabilities, 
including zoonotic disease. he most dramatic symptom of this organic and 
cultural entanglement was rabies. Before 1700, no clear distinction existed 
between the psychological state of being furious and the medical state of be-
ing rabid; indeed, the term rabies (based on the Latin rabere “be mad, rave”) 
was applied primarily to humans and only secondarily to dogs. Rabies often 
was described as an “ungovernable fury.”66 I want to close this chapter by 
exploring, in a preliminary way, the relationships among an Enlightenment 
discourse on rabies, new views of the parasite, and libertine biopolitics, fo-
cusing on John Gay’s “he Mad Dog” (1730). What is imagistic in Roches-
ter’s poem— the nexus of dogs, disease, and desire— becomes an explicit and 
sexualized aspect of Gay’s poem.
By 1730, London was more than sixty years beyond its last major out-
break of the plague, if not beyond recurrent fears.67 In its own way, rabies 
was equally terrifying and only slightly less mysterious. Dogs were widely 
agreed to be the most common source of infection, but why they acted as 
disease vectors was not understood. Popular theories during the seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries emphasize dogs’ emotional susceptibility, eat-
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ing habits, and biological makeup: dogs had a “more melancholy temper and 
nature” than other animals (thus the “Black Dog of Melancholy”); they ate 
carrion; and they were more susceptible to heat. Often these explanations 
overlap. Relying on classical writers, who sometimes identiied melancholy 
with hydrophobia, Robert Burton describes the poisoned “Braine” of the 
mad dog as “so hote and dry, that it consumes all the moisture in the body.”68 
In his Tractatus de Venenis; or, a Discourse of Poysons (1661), William Ramsay 
abdicates trying to solve the “Controversie” of why dogs, more than other 
creatures, turn rabid; he claims only that dogs “are more addicted and pro-
pence unto this Delirium, then other Creatures; out of a peculiar inherent 
or innate property in themselves; which, in plain English, is as much as to 
say, I am ignorant of the cause.”69 Rabid dogs mark the limits of human 
knowledge.
Despite dissent about the etiology of rabies, physicians agreed about its 
symptoms: infected humans assumed the characteristics of canines. Men, 
women, and children barked, bit, foamed at the mouth, and otherwise dem-
onstrated the collapse of human- animal diference. Daniel Peter Layard 
puts the matter succinctly: “A Person thus afected may be said in a Degree 
to have put on the Canine Nature.”70 Consequently, persons who died of ra-
bies were sometimes denied sacrament. his was the case for James Corton, 
a London upholsterer, bitten by his neighbor’s dog. Martin Lister— better 
known for his work on conchs and spiders than rabies— published A Re-
markable Relation of a Man Bitten with a Mad Dog, and Dying of a Disease 
called Hydrophobia, which was presented to the Royal Society in 1683. It re-
counts in considerable detail Corton’s demise over an eight- week period: the 
pain in his bones, nausea, vomiting, and thirst, accompanied by an inability 
to drink— he “started and trembled at the approach” of any “luids.”71 Much 
of the treatise rehearses what Lister took to be the victim’s assumption of 
canine characteristics. Since “in the erect posture of a man,” writes Lister, 
“he could not so much as endureth the approach of liquor,” Corton was per-
suaded to hang his head over the side of the bed:
In this posture then of a Dog, he sufereth a large Bowl illed with small 
Beer to be brought under his head, and imbraceing it with raptures of 
joy, he declared he was ininitely refrest with the smell of it; that he now 
saw it with delight, and assured us he should be able soon to drink it all 
of . . . he endeavored with great earnestness to put down his head to it, 
but could not; his Stomach rose as often as he opened his Lips; at length 
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he put out his tongue and made towards it as tho he would lap; but ever 
as his tongue never so little touched the Surface of the beer, he started 
back afrightened.72
When his family members exchanged the beer for ale, Corton lapped in the 
air, but was unable to drink. Repositioning him, they tried to hydrate him 
through a quill, “but he could not manage it, nor such no more than a Dog” 
(166). Soon he fell into a convulsion, “bit and snarl’d and catch’d at every 
body, and foamed at the mouth” (165). Within two days, he was dead.
Lister draws two conclusions from this “remarkable” case. he irst and 
most surprising is that Corton had metamorphosed physically: he “had 
some of the organic parts of his body transformed into, or afected after the 
nature of a Dog, especially the Gula, Tongue &c; so that what was ofer’d him 
in the erect posture of a man was very frightful, as well as di cult for him 
to take, because against his new nature, as much as it would be for us to get 
a dog to drink standing upon his hinder legs.”73 Lister’s second conclusion is 
that Corton is contagious— his “spittle is envenomed”— so that, having been 
bitten by a mad dog, Corton becomes one, adopting not only its “afect” but 
its bodily luids. hat the dog who bit the upholsterer was still alive, appar-
ently well, and potentially wandering through the streets at the time of Cor-
ton’s death creates a kind of panic in Corton’s neighborhood. A mercer ex-
hibits extreme concern about a “black Dog, which he verily believed to be the 
same”; it “came and bit a Whelp of his in his Shop. he next day the Whelp 
ran mad up and down the House, and bit both him and the Maid, him in 
the hand, and the Maid in the leg, and dyed that very day.”74 While there 
was no clear chain of contagion— the mercer fell ill and recovered but the 
maid was never afected—Lister’s detailed description sheds light on how 
humans and dogs coexisted in seventeenth- century London. he doctor, the 
mercer, the upholsterer, his cousin, the whelp, the black dog, and the maid 
crossed paths in and out of households. Lister’s account of the rabid uphol-
sterer shows us how dogs, like other vermin, were entangled in attempts to 
control public health— in practices, knowledge, and forms of power that, 
after Foucault, go under the name of “biopower” and “biopolitics.”
While as late as 1665, canines had been subjected to mass extermina-
tion in plague- ridden London, in the eighteenth century, the threat of rabies 
forced city dogs into regimes of hygiene, containment, and control. Both 
the feeding practices and the sexual habits of domesticated dogs were made 
more predictable, their real and imagined parasites minimized through reg-
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ular baths and fresher meals. Indeed, by 1738, in A Treatise on the Venereal 
Distemper, the French physician Pierre- Joseph Desault argues, following 
Mathiolus, that rabies is caused by “little Worms”; “Dogs,” in his view, “are 
more subject to Madness than any other Animals” not because they so are so 
hot- blooded, as Burton had suggested, but “because they eat Carrion; per-
haps these rotten Carcases are proper Matrixes to hatch these mad Worms, 
which stick to the Dog’s Spittle whilst he is feeding.”75 Desault cites as evi-
dence for this “Conjecture” a specifc pattern of infection: even though the 
number of dogs in the towns surpasses those in the provinces, “mad Dogs 
are more frequent in the Country, because they meet there with more Car-
rion; whereas in Towns where they are better fed.”76 he relationship among 
worms and rabies, rabies and diet, and diet and disease, he argues, is “not 
built upon Supposition, for the Cause appears evidently even to the eye of 
an old Man without the help of Microscope or Spectacles.”77 He claims that 
his analysis, while still imperfect, at “least . . . has the Advantage of present-
ing the Hydrophobia under an Aspect susceptible of Cure.”78
Desault’s insistence that biological parasites can be a source of madness 
provides a medical context for reading John Gay’s “he Mad Dog,” an anti- 
Catholic, antifeminist, and almost pornographic satire that depends on the 
ambiguous nature of dogs as human companions and disease- ridden vermin 
for much of its libertine wit. he poem features a Catholic woman who, 
alicted with an ardent desire for men, repeatedly sins, confesses, does pen-
ance, sins, then goes back to church where she “piously confes(ses) the same 
(l. 48).”79 he priest exclaims that it is “strange” to ind an otherwise devout 
“woman” so driven by sexual desire— “to one sin conin’d!”— and asks about 
the source of this strong “appetite” (l. 70– 79). he woman blames her behav-
ior on a “sad disaster” with her dog:
hat she a fav’rite lapdog had,
Which, (as she strok’d and kiss’d) grew mad;
And on her lip a wound indenting,
First set her youthful blood fermenting.
(ll. 87– 90)80
his poem shares an allied set of images with Rochester’s “A Ramble in St. 
James’s Park”: sexual desire, rage, contagion, insanity, aggression, and “heat.” 
hese behaviors are imagined as both as dog- like and, as in medical writ-
ing, illustrative of a more general principle of heightened “animal spirits,” 
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nervous ibers thought to be responsible for emotional and sexual states. In 
the image of the supposedly rabid lapdog, Gay conlates the sexual and the 
medical: it is not apparent whether the dog was already mad or was driven 
mad by the women’s stroking and kissing. he “wound” left by the “mad” dog 
on her lip that “First set her youthful blood fermenting” can therefore be 
seen either as an efect of rabies or as a return of the woman’s latent passions 
now enlamed by an interspecies, sexualized encounter. Her story in turn 
infects the priest with what Gay calls “zealous fury” (l. 91), and he blames her 
for not turning to doctors who “by various ways” can “Treat these distem-
pers of the mind” (ll. 93– 94).
he priest then recommends several “treatments” for her “venom’d bites” 
(l. 101) but focuses on the generally discredited practice of dunking: to “set 
the shatter’d thoughts arights; / hey send you to the ocean’s shore. / And 
plunge the patient o’er and o’er” (ll. 102– 4). While this image may recall the 
trials for supposed witches, the practice of dipping rabies victims in seawater 
in order to cure them dates back to the Roman Cornelius Celsus. Writing in 
the mid- seventeenth century, the Dutch physician Herman van der Heyden 
describes the logic of dunking:
[I]t is therefore still the Common use to throw such as are bitten by a 
Mad Dog, into the Sea, as well Men, as Beasts; or else into some River; 
and to do the same again for several times. By which repetition of the 
said practise, they suppose that the Venom will be the more easily sup-
pressed, and the Party bitten will also be so much accustomed to the 
Water, that at length he will not be in any fear of it at all: Which Practise 
(say they further) having always continued, even to this very day, would 
never have been so held up, unless the speedy, and often repeated prac-
tise of the same had sometimes been found to doe some good.81
Dunking constituted a kind of coercive aversion therapy. hrough it, the 
patient’s phobic reaction to water— a rabies symptom— was countered 
through repeated exposure. But even ifty years before Gay’s poem, this “cure” 
was contested, so that the priest’s advice to the woman bitten by her lapdog 
signiies a credulous, even superstitious, gullibility at a time when physi-
cians, such as Desault, concurred with Van der Heyden that water cannot 
counteract rabies, and that, indeed, dunking infected humans may actually 
corrupt the water. Writing about the rabies epidemic of 1730– 31, Desault 
categorically denies the efectiveness of this ancient “cure”: “Bathing in the 
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Sea, consecrated in a manner by the unanimous Consent of all Nations, and 
supported by publick Conidence as a Preservative, has been found fruitless, 
and many unhappy persons, who the Day after they had been bit went to 
dip in the Sea, which the Nearness of the Place made easy to them, have 
experienced the Uselessness of it, and died mad before the fortieth Day.”82 
Gay’s poem, published during this epidemic, consciously and satirically, as-
sociates the quack cure recommended by the priest with the superstitions of 
the Catholic Church.
he centerpiece of Gay’s satire is an extended and prurient account of 
the young lady, a diseased Diana at her bath, being hauled to the seashore, 
stripped, and dunked:
What virgin had not done as I did?
My modest hand, by Nature guided,
Debarr’d at once from human eyes
he seat where female honour lies,
And tho thrice dipt from top to toe,
I still secur’d the post below,
And guarded it with grasp so fast,
Not one drop thro’ my ingers past;
hus owe I to my bashful care
hat all the rage is settled there.
(ll. 110– 18)
Gay, superimposing two versions of an antifeminist voyeurism, burlesques 
the idea of the shy virgin whose “modest hand” tries to cover her genitals 
from a crowd of onlookers by transforming the nude into a rabid young 
woman whose “zealous fury” compels her to seek sexual satisfaction.83 Even 
the “cure” for her sin— dunking— turns into an erotic and perhaps autoerot-
ic encounter: she guards her genitals “with grasp so fast” that “not one drop 
through [her] ingers past.” he dunking treatment succeeds in iring the 
imagination of the onlookers and in focusing her “rage” in her genitals, the 
only part of her body to remain dry.
he idea of the woman protecting her much- visited vagina from the 
luids intended to liberate her allows Gay to broaden his satire by suggest-
ing that all men— the statesmen, the fop, and the wit— are similarly “bit” 
or mad, and similarly defend themselves against the cure by covering their 
most corruptible parts. “Plunge in a courtier,” the speaker says, and he would
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Direct his hands to stop his ears.
And now truth seems a grating noise,
He loves the sland’rer’s whispering voice;
He hangs on latt’ry with delight;
And thinks all fulsome praise is right.
(133– 38)
his criticism of what Mosca calls “court- dog trickes” links Gay’s poem to 
traditional satires of social parasitism and underscores the performative 
nature of fragile sexual and social identities. Yet, in “he Mad Dog” as in 
Rochester’s “Ramble,” what enables this satiric critique of corruption is the 
only real role available to women: the bitch in heat. Gay’s dog- bite victim 
makes explicit the connection between rabies and female sexual desire and 
becomes an unusually overt example of the usually igurative tendency to 
conlate women and dogs. Like Corinna, Gay’s young woman experiences 
her “disease” not as canine furiosis but as furor uterinus— as sexual hyperac-
tivity, as desire that cannot be quenched. he woman’s mouth and genitalia 
become virtually indistinguishable. Indeed, the genital “rage” driving her to 
men parallels a desire to confess that shores up a related economy of plea-
sure and prurience in which judges, priests, and readers beneit from her 
sexual transgression.
he judges (waked by wanton thought)
Dive to the bottom of her fault,
hey leer, they simper at her shame,
And make her call all things by name.
(ll. 33– 36)
In “calling all things by name,” the woman stars in a voyeuristic heteronor-
mative and masculinist fantasy. he simpering and leering male igures of 
legal and ecclesiastical authority “plunge” and “dive” to “the bottom of her 
fault” in a tautological exercise: they witness the sexual corruption they 
both seek and provoke. In the inal lines of the poem, Gay generalizes from 
the behavior of this woman to the sex as a whole. Because “All women,” he 
concludes, “dread a wat’ry death,” they too will shut their lips when faced 
with dunking (l. 140). he surreal and obscure image with which the poem 
ends conlates the cure for rabies, the Catholic confessional, sexual titilla-
tion, and gossip:
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And though you duck them ne’er so long,
Not one salt drop e’er wets their tongue:
’Tis hence they scandal have at will,
And that this member ne’er lies still.
(ll. 141– 44)
To the extent that women preserve their ability to act as the subjects and 
authors of “scandal,” Gay seems to suggest, they are agents in perpetuating a 
cycle of masculine rivalry and mimetic desire, proof of which is his wagging 
“member.”
Libertine poetry, when read against the context of zoonotic illness, 
exposes the status of dogs as disease vectors that could release, in still- 
mysterious ways, the furious into the fashionable, unbridled desire into 
genteel society. Free- roaming dogs and their female counterparts, bitches, 
herald the return of atavistic qualities, primarily violence and madness. Even 
as it celebrates shared biological impulses between humans and canines, lib-
ertine writing tends to highlight the venereal qualities of dogs and thus the 
relationship between sex and violence, and between sex and madness. hese 
satires showcase how rivalries, passion, and mimetic desire drive canid and 
human behavior in ways that reinforce the sentiment, traceable to Plautus, 
that lupus est homo homini or “Man is a wolf to [his fellow] man.” If dogs 
are to become civilized companions, they must therefore (like the rake) be 
plucked from the pack like lapdogs. But females dogs, bitches, remain what 
Serres calls “the universal hostess,” the “smooth space, the wax tablet, on 
which everything can be written”— a “matrix,” as he says, “for thinking” (216). 
Given the gendered parasitical logic underwriting much Restoration litera-
ture, it is telling that what many people regard as the irst English novel is 
therefore set outside the city. It contains no women and only a singular dog, 
rehabilitated, stripped of both canine companions and consorts, already do-
mesticated as his master’s best friend. Robinson Crusoe feeds his singular 
and loyal companion, and the dog guards the crops that ensure Crusoe’s 
prosperity. In such an idealized and companionate relationship, rivalry and 
parasitism seem to disappear. But as we shall see in the next chapter, while it 
is possible to lee from the city and its women, the parasite returns in difer-




What Happened to the Rats?
Hoarding, Hunger, and Storage  
on Crusoe’s Island
Glory be to the verminous divine son of God.
— Michel Serres
In 2011, the Nature Conservancy began a two- phase project to eradicate 
nonnative animals that had been introduced in the seventeenth century 
to the Galapagos Islands and have been breeding ever since. After remov-
ing goats, cats, pigs, and burros, conservationists turned their attention to 
rats, whose population density had reportedly reached about one rat for 
every square foot on Pinzón, the main island.1 In what one newspaper de-
scribes as the “biggest raticide in the history of South America,” Ecuador 
began dumping twenty- two tons of poison, designed to kill eighteen million 
rats, eliminating (if all goes according to plan) the resident rat population 
by 2020. he ancestors of these doomed Galapagos rats, it is generally ac-
cepted, traveled from Europe and colonial South America on trading vessels 
and pirate ships, and there is strong evidence that, even in the early modern 
period, colonizing rats already were a signiicant problem. While there was 
considerable ambiguity, as we saw in the irst chapter, about how rats were 
implicated in disease, their ability to destroy harvested grain and devastate 
food systems— especially aboard ships and on islands— was never in doubt. 
Indeed, European trading ventures and colonial aspirations depended, to 
a great extent, on (at least) battling vermin to a standstill. Not surpris-
ingly, then, seventeenth- and eighteenth- century accounts dramatize these 
struggles, often restaging the metaphysical ravages of traditional plague lit-
erature, in a seemingly more secular key, as a series of biopolitical manage-
ment crises. Robinson Crusoe similarly deploys vermin in this manner. Defoe 
144 imperfect creatures
transforms them from the ubiquitous threats that slither and crawl through 
seventeenth- century plague writing to di cult but controllable populations, 
human and nonhuman; rats, birds, wolves, and hostile indigenes become 
subject to many of the same disciplinary technologies: traps, toxicants, re-
pellers, barriers, and exclusion.
In the early- modern voyage narratives on which Defoe drew for Robin-
son Crusoe, rats run rampant.2 Garcilaso de la Vega, as I noted in chapter 1, 
describes “the incredible multitudes of Rats and Mice” brought to Peru by 
the Spaniards.3 In a similar vein, Samuel Clarke recounts the history of a 
“great Plague” of rats that ravaged the irst English plantation in Bermuda.4 
In William Dampier’s accounts of his circumnavigations in the 1690s and 
early 1700s, rodents pose a dire threat to shipboard provisions. Leaving Cape 
Corrientes for the East Indies, Dampier describes the crew’s fear at having 
their meager provisions ravaged by shipboard rats: “we had not 60 days Pro-
vision, at a little more than half a pint of Maiz a day for each man, and no 
other Provision except 3 Meals of salted Jew- ish; and we had a great many 
Rats aboard, which we could not hinder from eating part of our Maiz.”5 
Dampier’s fellow buccaneer, Woodes Rogers, who preyed on Spanish ship-
ping along the coasts of Peru and Chile in 1708– 9, found that even when he 
stole grain, it was quickly “much damag’d by the [shipboard] Rats.”6 After 
Rogers rescued the Scots sailor Alexander Selkirk, marooned for three years 
on the island of Juan Fernandez of the Chilean coast, he described Selkirk’s 
living conditions. Selkirk was
much pester’d with Cats and Rats, that had bred in great numbers from 
some of each Species which had got ashore from Ships that put in there 
to wood and water. he Rats gnaw’d his Feet and Clothes while asleep, 
which oblig’d him to cherish the Cats with his Goats- lesh; by which 
many of them became so tame, that they would lie about him in hun-
dreds, and soon deliver’d him from the Rats.7
Before Selkirk semidomesticates the cats as a kind of feline Swiss Guard, 
rats— reproducing, like the cats, “in great numbers”— threaten to eat him 
alive. Richard Steele retells Selkirk’s story but, in describing the rodent in-
festation, obscures the shipboard origins of both cats and rats: “His Habita-
tion was extremely pester’d with Rats, which gnaw’d his Cloaths and Feet 
when sleeping. To defend himself against them, he fed and tamed Numbers 
of young Kitlings, who lay about his Bed, and preserved him from the En-
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emy.”8 Particularly for Steele, a patriotic Englishman rather than a bucca-
neer, rats igure as “the Enemy” and mark the dark, even verminous side of 
an emerging global economy. Transported to islands, vermin disrupt native 
ecologies and become integral, if often threatening, components of a new 
biopolitical order.
he colonial fantasy of Crusoe’s island prosperity depends on the era-
sure of the threat posed by vermin: the rats that plagued Selkirk, marred 
Rogers’ pirated grain, and swarm, even three hundred years later, through 
the indigenous ecology of the Galapagos. Defoe mentions rats only three 
times in Robinson Crusoe, all of them in relation to a single bag of grain. 
Scouring his shipwrecked vessel for provisions, he inds “a little Remainder 
of European Corn which had been laid by for some Fowls which we brought 
to Sea with us, but the Fowls were kill’d; there had been some Barly and 
Wheat together, but, to my great Disappointment, I found afterwards that 
the Rats had eaten or spoil’d it all.”9 he bag of grain is chicken- feed; the 
shipboard fowl, intended as fresh food for sailors on transoceanic vessels, 
have perished in the shipwreck, have already been eaten, or perhaps have 
been killed by rats. It is only “afterwards,” that Crusoe discovers the bag of 
barley and wheat, then salvages the bag of corn that, he supposed, “was all 
devour’d with the Rats” (114). Seeing “nothing in the Bag but Husks and 
Dust,” he shakes it out (114). A month later, miraculously, as he emphasiz-
es, Crusoe sees “some few Stalks of something green, shooting out of the 
Ground” (114). he providential preservation of grain against the threat of 
hungry rats leads to a meditation on the nature of this agricultural miracle:
for it was really the Work of Providence as to me, that should order or 
appoint, that 10 or 12 Grains of Corn should remain unspoil’d (when 
the Rats had destroy’d all the rest,) as if it had been dropt from Heaven; 
as also that I should throw it out in that Particular Place, where it be-
ing in the Shade of a high Rock, it sprang up immediately; whereas, if 
I had thrown it anywhere else at that time, it had been burnt up and 
destroy’d. (115)
Because grain seeds quickly succumb to moisture, whether rain or rodent 
urine, Crusoe attributes the fact that a few seeds remained “unspoil’d” to 
divine intervention. hat the “Work of Providence” secures a suitable eco-
logical niche for the seeds, protected from the efects of the tropical sun, 
reairms the values and assumptions of a colonial food system.10 Strangely, 
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however, the rats that helped themselves to the poultry feed seem simply 
to have disappeared when the ship washed aground. Unlike Selkirk, then, 
Crusoe is not “pester’d with” rats.
he near- empty bag of grain reminds us that Crusoe depends on a 
food system— men grow grain, grain feeds fowl, fowl feed men— extremely 
vulnerable to rodents, before and after the shipwreck. But that the rats are 
present only in their absence— in the traces of food they leave behind— 
leaves unanswered the question posed in my chapter title: what happened 
to the rats? Other animals prosper on Crusoe’s island, as they did on Juan 
Fernandez. Crusoe is surrounded by goats and cats, but unlike Selkirk, 
has no rats gnawing on his toes or, later, once he begins harvesting grain, 
eating his food supplies. his absence of rodents contrasts strikingly to 
other passages in his work, where Defoe cites historical accounts of rat 
infestations. In A Tour thro’ the Whole Island of Great Britain, he char-
acterizes the Island of Rona in the Hebrides, as having been “destroyed” 
forty years earlier by “irst, a Swarm of Rats, none knows how, [that] came 
into the Island, and eat up all their Corn. In the next Place, some Seamen 
landed, and robbed them of what Provisions they had left. By this means 
they all died.”11 Indeed, given the 200 year history of rat infestations in Eu-
ropean colonies, the seemingly deliberate erasure of rats on Crusoe’s island 
is noteworthy, if not cognitively jarring. Even if one wanted to credit Defoe 
with inessing the rat problem by populating Crusoe’s island with cats, 
the math is unconvincing. Cats produce two litters per year, with three to 
ive surviving kittens per litter. At the end of Crusoe’s irst year on the is-
land, the cat population has grown to between ifty and one hundred cats. 
Rats, in contrast, are incestuous and interbreed; they produce litters of 
between ten and twelve ofspring; the gestation period lasts only twenty- 
two days; females can come back into heat an hour after birth; and (unlike 
cats) they stay in heat all year round. At the end of six months, then, two 
shipboard rats and their ofspring could have produced 77,960 rodents, 
overrunning the island and wreaking ecological havoc— turning Crusoe’s 
one- man colony into an eighteenth- century Galapagos. his diference 
in these reproductive rates is why Alexander Selkirk— while “preserved 
from the Enemy,” as Steele writes, by half- feral cats— was miserable, and 
why, unlike Crusoe, he was starving and impoverished when rescued.12 
he agricultural economy of Crusoe’s island depends, in other words, not 
simply on the providential presence of European corn but on the absence 
of the rats that plagued Selkirk and the millions of others across the early 
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modern world, all struggling to protect their grain supplies against rodent 
infestation.
his point is crucial to understanding the ways that vermin igure in 
early eighteenth- century literature and its depictions of what we now would 
call ecology. As with Crusoe’s near- empty bag of grain, vermin (real and 
imagined) are entangled in ecosystemic relationships, ecologies variously 
characterized as evidence of humankind’s fallen nature— think back to 
Godfrey Goodman’s he Fall of Man, or the Corruption of Nature— or as 
proof of God’s benevolent design.13 Robinson Crusoe does something a little 
diferent. Defoe “exorcises” the “pestiferous” rats (as the 1651 anathema terms 
them) and populates Crusoe’s island with more perfect, more domesticable 
creatures: goats, a dog, cats, parrots, and human indigenes. Ultimately, the 
absence of rats reinforces John Bender’s view of the novel as “apparitional.” 
In producing a “coherent linguistic version of the real that never has been, is, 
or will be,” Bender argues, the novel creates “a virtual reality possessed of the 
organic wholeness that the contingency of the lived empirical world cannot 
possess.”14 To put Bender’s idea in ecological terms, the island’s imagined 
environment is not an open, dynamic ecosystem but a closed, zoomorphic 
world in which Crusoe hunts, gathers, farms, and stores under metaphysi-
cally secured conditions.
Within this context, the near- empty bag of rat, chicken, and human 
food serves a double function: while its mostly consumed contents point in 
the direction of a food system partly dependent on grain, the bag itself ges-
tures toward a crucial, if seemingly pedestrian, aspect of that food system: 
the problem of storage. Although tool use on Crusoe’s island has received 
considerable attention, in the age before refrigeration proper food storage 
was often all that stood between a food- suicient present and a harvestless 
future. Storage technology required the ability to imagine that future, to 
construct a calculus of future needs, and to protect against future short-
ages through managerial expertise. Because we live in a post- refrigeration 
culture, it is easy to “read over” the bag of corn in Robinson Crusoe; ideologi-
cally, we are trained not to perceive the threat of porous boundaries against 
vermin, moisture, and heat. he chewed- through bag of grain, though, for 
many eighteenth- century readers, underscores the vulnerability of food sup-
plies. To reimagine that vulnerability, this chapter focuses on food insecurity 
in Defoe and how his ratless colony grows, through hoarding and proper 
storage, into an idealized system in which he defends his supplies from the 
vermin that threaten it.
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Provisioning and Hoarding on Crusoe’s Island
Crusoe’s island has no large predators. he goats and cats multiply without 
hindrance, and, despite his persistent fears, Crusoe inds himself alone at 
the top of the food chain. In relecting on Providence and the “long series 
of miracles” that cast him on the island, he recognizes that while he “ha[s] 
no society,” he, quite fortunately, encounters “no ravenous Beast, no furious 
Wolves or Tygers to threaten my Life, no venomous Creatures or poison-
ous, which I might feed on to my Hurt, no Savages to murther and devour 
me” (155). Given the absence of predators and “poisonous” creatures on the 
island, he can divide his eforts between animal husbandry and vermin con-
trol. he goats igure as a staple of his diet for twenty- eight years, but much 
of the novel’s drama derives from Crusoe’s culling the cats and fending of 
the birds that attack his grain.
One of the two female cats he rescued from the ship, having run away, re-
turns with three kittens, engenders a population explosion; the cats multiply 
and annoy him until he “was forc’d to kill them like Vermine or wild Beasts” 
(133).15 he fact that he exterminates them “like” vermin suggests how arbi-
trary boundaries are between diferent species of animals. Whereas Selkirk 
“cherish[ed]” his cats with goat meat to protect him from omnivorous rats, 
Crusoe’s cats quickly lose their shipboard use- value— controlling rodent in-
festations that threaten grain supplies— once Crusoe brings them ashore.16 
Without rats to control, the cats themselves become a type of “Vermine” 
that stand in sharp contrast to the unnamed (and solitary) dog. Rather than 
pestering him, the dog, says Crusoe, “was a trusty Servant to me many Years; 
I wanted nothing that he could fetch me, nor any Company that he could 
make up to me, I only wanted to have him talk to me, but that would not 
do” (105). If the dog, in efect, is Friday’s predecessor as a companion and 
servant, the proliferating cats exist outside of this kind of companionate in-
terspecies relationship: they cannot hunt for Crusoe, as the dog does; they 
cannot fetch what he wants; and they do not provide him with domesticated 
“Company.” Extraneous to the ratless island’s economy, the cats may ofer 
a form of resistance to Crusoe’s “ideological superiority,” as Rajani Sudan 
has argued, posing a “continual threat to the integrity” of his rule over the 
island.17 In terms of his food supply, however, they are primarily a nuisance.
A more direct threat to the hero’s sense of well-being comes from the 
birds indigenous to the island, which compel Crusoe to draw on familiar 
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strategies of vermin control to protect his grain. Page after page in Robinson 
Crusoe deals with his eforts to turn the few seeds he salvaged from the ship 
into a sustainable crop that he can mill to produce a gustatory reminder of 
England— white bread. While growing barley and rice, Crusoe charts the 
advent and duration of the two rainy seasons each year, and he conducts ad 
hoc experiments to determine the best times to plant his grain crop (at the 
beginning of each of the rainy seasons).18 hese eforts make him, at least 
in his own mind, “Master of [his] Business”; he knows “exactly when the 
proper Season was to sow; and that I might expect two Seed Times, and two 
Harvests every Year” (135). Part of this mastery turns on his ability to keep 
devastating animals away from his delicate crop. Crusoe deploys the dog 
to protect the ledging shoots from goats and hares— “he would stand and 
bark all Night long” (143)— but the invading birds pose a greater menace, 
just as they did in England. Indeed, Crusoe’s response to the birds recalls 
the kinds of policies against vermin still being enacted in his homeland. As 
Keith homas notes, vermin hunts mandated under the 1533 Acts of Parlia-
ment continued into the eighteenth century; in the late seventeenth century, 
the widespread use of guns replaced the use of nets and traps.19 Crusoe’s 
initial tactic of vermin control is to use his gun. Yet when he shoots at the 
birds in the trees, “there rose up a little Cloud of Fowls, which I had not 
seen at all, from among the Corn it self ” (143). Alarmed, and with his crop 
already partly despoiled, Crusoe turns to a kind of a Foucauldian exercise, 
criminalizing the birds determined to invade his property. He deals with 
the dead birds “as we serve notorious hieves in England”: their bodies are 
“Hang’d . . . in Chains for a Terror to others” (143). his stratagem works so 
well that the birds “forsook all that Part of the Island, and I could never see 
a Bird near the Place as long as my Scare- Crows hung there” (143). Crusoe’s 
juridico- political language underscores the extent to which the island’s birds 
are imagined as a criminal threat to property rather than regarded as part 
of a complex ecological order. Not surprisingly, then, his solution is as much 
political as it is environmental.
While Crusoe’s fear of wolves and cannibals understandably has attract-
ed the lion’s share of critical attention, it is worth considering in more detail 
what is at stake in his eforts to drive away the birds. Ostensibly, Crusoe 
takes such deadly measures because the birds “in a few Days . . . would de-
vour all my Hopes, that I should be starv’d, and never be able to raise a Crop 
at all” (143). he image of (future) starvation harks back to Crusoe’s initial 
fears when he was shipwrecked, and it serves as one of the hero’s charac-
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teristic moments of writerly amnesia, seemingly contradicting what he had 
written a few pages earlier: “I had no Want of Food, and of that which was 
very good too; especially . . . Goats, Pidgeons, and Turtle or Tortoise; which, 
added to my Grapes, Leaden- hall Market could not have furnish’d a Table 
better” (138). Indeed, Crusoe’s feasts of goat, pigeon, turtle, and grapes sur-
pass what a Londoner of the middling sort might have considered a hearty 
meal. he corn crop, however, becomes precious for two reasons. First, it 
allows Crusoe to replicate more closely a kind of emblematic English meal 
of meat and bread— an ideological marker of his domestication of the is-
land. Second, the grain (unlike meat and fruit) allows Crusoe to safeguard 
his food supply from contingencies and weather patterns; animal lesh and 
seasonal fruits ofer a good deal of food security, but the grain can be stored 
for long periods of time. he corn crop therefore becomes a practical as well 
as talismanic safeguard against the hero’s isolation and the uncertain future 
he faces.
Provisioning supplies to guard against real and imaginary food threats is 
an adaptive strategy common to human and nonhuman animals alike. Ani-
mal ethologists use the term “food hoarding” to describe the characteristic 
behaviors of secreting and storing food for future use.20 As Stephen Vander 
Wall writes, “Food- hoarding animals have the capacity to control the avail-
ability of food in space and time. . . . By permitting animals a measure of con-
trol over their food supply, food hoarding has become an important element 
in adaptive strategies for circumventing problems of food limitation.”21 In the 
novel, Crusoe’s hoarding signiies both the acknowledgement of food insecu-
rity and the exercise of what seventeenth- century commentators would have 
regarded as an act of corporeal imagination. he root of provision is provi-
dere, Latin for “foresee”; as its etymology suggests, provisioning turns on acts 
of imagination, of vision.22 In English, “provision” can serve as a verb (the act 
of supplying beforehand) or as a noun (that which is supplied). Outside the 
Cartesian tradition, various animals were described as capable of anticipating 
future needs and responding appropriately through acts of embodied imagi-
nation. Bacon invokes this faculty in Sylva Sylvarum to explain how bees can 
ind their way back to a hive located two or three miles away, and both hom-
as Willis and John Locke make analogous arguments for other creatures. 
While Willis identiies imagination in “less perfect” beings as instinctive, he 
argues that a corporeal imagination— closely related to memory— operates 
in higher mammals: it drives a “hungry Horse” from “place to place, till he has 
found our imagined Pasture, and indeed enjoys that good the Image of which 
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was painted on his brain.”23 For his part, Locke acknowledges that in terms of 
memory— “the faculty of laying up and retaining the ideas that are brought 
into the mind”— other “Animals seem to have to a great degree [of that capac-
ity] as well as man.”24 Put simply, (human) “provisioning” is (animal) “hoard-
ing” resituated from an ecological to an economic discourse.
he close relationships among provisioning, hoarding, food insecurity, 
and imagination perhaps help explain why in Defoe’s iction, from Robinson 
Crusoe on, the accumulation of food against future contingencies seems, at 
once, prudent, nearly compulsive, and almost totemic, a strategic warding 
of of psychological distress and channeling deep- seated fears into seemingly 
productive activities. 25 In popular language, North Americans use the word 
“hoarding” to describe the pack- rat behaviors of humans who refuse to take 
for granted an (ostensibly) always- available supply of food, who store up 
excessive supplies against an imagined future dearth. Whether or not one is 
a hoarder is determined, in part, by whether or not others agree on whether 
one’s provisioning is timely and measured. At stake in the behavior is never 
a simple economic principle of accumulation, stripped from any context, but 
a mixed set of social, psychological, and biological strategies of adaptation 
to an unpredictable environment. Many of Defoe’s works, before and after 
Robinson Crusoe, contain extended accounts of elaborately designed and ex-
ecuted strategies of food storage, and these may attest to diferences between 
our food system and his. In Due Preparations for the Plague, for example, 
Defoe describes the survival of a family in Marseilles during the devastating 
plague of 1665 when two- thirds of the city’s population succumbed to infec-
tion. he head of the family, a merchant, furnished himself “with Stores of 
all sorts of Provisions,” including “three housand Pound Weight of Biscuit 
Bread such as is Bak’d for Ships going to Sea, and had it put up in Hogs-
heads, as if going to be shipp’d of.”26 In addition to bread, wine, and herbs, 
the magazine also included the “Flesh” of “three Fat Bullocks,” “Pickl’d and 
Barrel’d up, as if done for a Ship going on a long voyage; likewise six barrels 
of Pork for the same pretended Occasion” (68– 69). he merchant and his 
family survive by treating their predicament as though they were pressed 
to endure the isolation and dietary self- suiciency of an extended sea voy-
age. hey eat what sailors in the early eighteenth- century ate— hardtack and 
pickled meat, both provisions that have incredibly long shelf- lives. Defoe 
presents the merchant’s preparations as an emblem of both his foresight and 
his moral virtue.
he strategies that allow the Marseilles family to survive the plague are a 
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staple of Defoe’s iction in which diferent degrees of food insecurity are part 
of the human condition. In Robinson Crusoe, the hero describes his chief 
employment as curing his raisins, then planting barley and rice, his goal be-
ing to have a “good Quantity” of bread “for Store, and to secure a constant 
Supply” (144). After a while, he devotes himself almost exclusively to bread 
making, employing all his “Study” and “Hours of Working” in creating the 
fences, instruments, and utensils required for bread making and seed stor-
age, by which Crusoe imagines he can control an always uncertain future.27 
Crusoe’s compulsive food- hoarding and the merchant’s plague preparations 
reappear in diferent guises elsewhere in Defoe’s work, often in relation to 
severe climatic conditions. In Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe, Cru-
soe describes long- term planning as a necessary strategy to cope with the 
Siberian winter: “Our Food was chiely the Flesh of Deer dry’d and cured in 
the Season; good Bread enough, but bak’d as Biskets; dry’d Fish of several 
Sorts. . . . All the Stores of Provision for the Winter are laid up in the Sum-
mer, and well cur’d” (208). Salting and drying meat become a mark of pru-
dence and, almost invariably in Defoe, an occasion for economic moralizing. 
In his inal novel, A New Voyage Round the World, Defoe’s sailors spend 
thirteen days on Juan Fernandez— Selkirk’s island— to supply the ship for a 
cruising (or really privateering) voyage along the coasts of Chile before sail-
ing south and east around Cape Horn and into the Atlantic. During their 
stay on the island, they “kill’d three hundred and seventy goats”; and the 
unnamed narrator tells us, “our Men who were on Board [the ships] were 
very merrily’d employ’d,” and “did very little but roast and stew, and broil and 
fry from Morning to Night.”28 During the voyage proper, sailors kill cows, 
goats, deer, seals, and penguins, then salt the meat in order to season and 
preserve it. hese preparations turn necessary fare into, as the narrator says 
of salted penguin, “a very wholesome Diet” (226). Food production for the 
voyage requires what Defoe calls “an exceeding Supply” (142) of all kinds 
of provisions, provisions that serve as insurance against the hardships that 
befell ships on transoceanic voyages. At sea and on land, such provisioning 
is a measure of moral probity and economic utility extending far beyond 
Crusoe’s island.
“Reason” is the name Defoe gives to the economic logic behind his high- 
level food- hoarding activities, and he takes great pains to distinguish his 
responses to food insecurity from the presumably instinctual behavior of 
other species. While both humans and animals, as we have seen, can defer 
pleasure for the sake of a perceived future safety, Defoe declares that without 
 What Happened to the Rats? 153
the supplementary capacity of reason, humans would perish in a postlapsar-
ian world of scarcity and Hobbesian aggression. “MAN,” he writes in Essays 
upon Several Projects, “is the worst of all God’s Creatures to shift for himself ”:
no other Animal is ever starv’d to death; Nature, without, has provided 
them both with Food and Cloaths; and Nature within, has plac’d an In-
stinct that never fails to direct them to proper means for a supply; but 
Man must either Work or Starve, Slave or Dye; he has indeed Reason 
given to direct him, and few who follow the dictates of that Reason come 
to such unhappy Exigencies.29
While Defoe presses this presumed contrast between humans and other 
animals into the service of an argument about the importance of savings and 
pensions, it also describes the situation in which Crusoe inds himself: even 
with the beneit of an environmentally hospitable and rodent- free island, 
Crusoe must “Work or Starve.” While he may share hoarding behaviors with 
rats, the complexity of Crusoe’s food- hoarding behaviors is, according to the 
logic of the novel, animated by the dictates of God- given reason and evi-
dence, as Willis might put it, of a rational, rather than merely sensitive, soul.
he role of technology in distinguishing human reason from animalistic 
instinct is underscored in Mere Nature Delineated; or, a Body Without a Soul. 
Unlike other predators, Defoe writes, a human has no teeth or claws to “tear 
and devour.” 30 Instead, says Defoe, God, “to supply all these by the Author-
ity of his Person,” provides man with a techno- physiological advantage: “an 
Awe of him is placed upon the Beasts and he has Hands given him, irst to 
make, and then to make Use of, Weapons, both to rule [animals] for his 
Safety, and to destroy them for his Food.” In such instances, Defoe sounds 
very much like Willis, for whom human diference is deined almost exclu-
sively in terms of some presumably intrinsic Crusoean ingenuity: “Brutes 
know not Rights or Laws of Political Society,” Willis asserts, “they make no 
Fires or Houses, nor ind out any Mechanical Arts, they put not on Clothes, 
nor dress their food, yea unless taught by Imitation.”31 Defoe’s version of 
this argument in Mere Nature Delineated is that human exceptionalism 
rests in tool use, without which, he insists, humans “will either be torn with 
wild Beasts (even Dogs would devour [them]) or [they] would be frozen to 
Death with Cold, or drench’d to Death with Water and Rain” (7). Indeed, 
the morphology of the human body— its lack of the sharp teeth and claws 
of predators— demonstrates that humans are superior to other creatures; 
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human anatomy “denies them the Honour of being Beasts in Form,” he con-
tinues, “and in the ordinary Functions of sensitive Life, whatever they will be 
in practice” (12). From this perspective, Crusoe’s gun and knife, in particular, 
are crucial to his eforts to establish and maintain his species identity as well 
as his sense of a civilized selfhood. Echoing a sentiment in Mere Nature De-
lineated, Crusoe insists on the importance of the knife in distinguishing him 
from “savages” and “beasts”: “I should have liv’d, if I had not perish’d, like a 
meer Savage. hat if I had kill’d a Goat, or a Fowl, by any Contrivance, I had 
no way to lea or open them, or part the Flesh from the Skin and the Bowels, 
or to cut it up; but must gnaw it with my Teeth, and pull it with my Claws, 
like a Beast” (53). In this imagined scene, cutting, as Derek Hughes claims, 
“divides man from the beast.”32
And yet, this presumed diference— like that between “hoarding” and 
“provisioning”— is notoriously unstable. From a broader perspective, De-
foe’s human is more properly deined, in Michel Serres’s phrase, as “the 
master of mediations,” using traps, nets, guns, spears, horses, dogs, and 
“Scare- crows” to assert dominance over other species.33 Being “Master of ev-
ery Mechanick Art” also means transforming the food supply so that what 
one eats no longer resembles the food of beasts. Defoe argues in A General 
History of Trade that animals are “not to be Devoured, as one Wild Beast 
Devour[s] and Prey[s] upon another, but to be Kill’d, separated from the 
Filth, Blood, Hide, and Uneatable Parts, and then Prepar’d, Drest, and made 
Palatable.”34According to Defoe, the “meer Savage” and the “Beast” are inca-
pable of separating the edible “lesh” from the inedible “skin” and “bowels” 
of their prey. Whereas they take their food as they ind it— bleeding and 
raw— civilized “man,” in Defoe’s writing, eats animal lesh only after it has 
been cooked or “dressed.”35 Cutting, then, occupies a place along a spectrum 
of other transformations: ish are dried and salted; cows are pickled; and 
goats, deer, and even penguins, are salted and preserved. At times, Defoe 
turns these dietary practices into an admonition. In Due Preparations, Defoe 
insists civilized humans must avoid eating meat that is “almost Raw,” a pre-
dilection he associates with “Tartars,” cannibals, and dogs (44). He tries to 
shame his fellow Britons about their less than civilized tastes:
[I]f we were but to be seen by the People of any other Country how we 
Eat, especially our Wild Fowl, the Flesh scarce warm thro’, and all the 
undigested Impurities of the Entrails and Inside of them serving for our 
sauce. I say, when Strangers see us feeding thus, they must be allowed 
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to take us, as they do, to be, if not Canibals, yet a sort of people that 
have a canine Appetite; and it was the modestest hing I could expect 
of them, when in Foreign Countries I have heard them describe our way 
of Feeding in England, and tell us that we Devour our meat, but do not 
Eat it; viz. Devour it as the Beasts of Prey do their Meat with the Blood 
running between their Teeth. (44- 45)
Such passages about feeding practices have a double function in Defoe’s 
works: they scold his countrymen and women for their brutish, “canine” 
appetites and they try to reinforce distinctions between the “raw” and the 
“cooked,” between “savage” and “civilized” behavior. Ethnic distinctions— 
Englishmen versus cannibals— are entangled in the logic of species difer-
entiation.36
Much of Robinson Crusoe, correspondingly, is concerned with a range 
of domestic duties: planting, harvesting, drying, curing, weaving, roasting, 
and baking (157). So central is provisioning to Defoe’s psycho- economics 
that Crusoe builds up supplies despite the God- given sustenance that the 
island provides: “I had great Cause for hankfulness, that I was not driven 
to any Extremities for Food; but rather Plenty, even to Dainties” (138). Hav-
ing secured his grain against goats, hares, and birds, Crusoe is able to pro-
duce “forty Bushels of Barley and Rice” at each harvest, “much more than I 
could consume in a Year.” Yet this surplus is treated as an unmitigated good, 
a sign of his prosperity and security. Forecasting the likely return for his 
labor, Crusoe decides “to sow just the same Quantity every Year, that I sow’d 
the last, in Hopes that such a Quantity would fully provide me with Bread, 
&c.” (148). he “&c.” is suggestive; if we take Crusoe at his word, he is har-
vesting each year “much more” than he eats, and his supplies, therefore, are 
increasing annually. His grain stores become emblematic of the rationalized 
status of food hoarding on the island; overproduction is not only a mark of 
prudence but of providential favor, particularly in the years before Friday’s 
appearance.
For us, Crusoe’s planting, provisioning, and hoarding may verge on a 
compulsive set of behaviors; J. M. Coetzee’s redaction of the hero in Foe 
(1986) focuses on the less- productive but just as obsessive terrace building. 
But these practices allow Crusoe to solve— at least ictionally—a critical 
problem in early eighteenth- century England. he provisioning of grain 
was, in the words of one historian, “among the most serious of problems 
faced by local and state government in preindustrial England.”37 Because a 
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bad harvest or di cult winter could cause prices to double within a mat-
ter of months, grain storage was a hotly contested political issue that of-
ten pitted grain merchants against the poor, artisans living in towns, and 
those, in general, who did not grow their own food.38 Grain prices and bad 
weather were problems intermittently throughout the seventeenth century. 
As Defoe’s contemporary, Charles Davenant, wrote, “in England, in a plen-
tiful years, there is not above ive months stock of grain at the time of the 
succeeding harvest, and not above four months in an indiferent year, which 
is but a slender provision against any evil accident.”39 Compounding this 
problem of “slender provision” was wastage: an estimated twenty to thirty 
percent of grain supplies, even during a good year, were lost to smutting 
and rodents.40 On Crusoe’s island, however, provisioning against an “evil ac-
cident” seems to lessen the prospect of disaster each year because the hero’s 
supplies show net increases that ensure his prosperous, if isolated, future.
While Crusoe’s penchant for storing more than he can consume car-
ries Reason to ecological and economic extremes, it exhibits the paradoxical 
logic of food- hoarding underwriting mercantile capitalism: through excess, 
moderation. Even as Crusoe continues to grow his food reserves, he admits 
his “thoughts run many times upon the Prospect of Land, which [he] had 
seen from the other Side of the Island” (148–49). he surplus Crusoe builds 
year after year attests to the animal foresight that Defoe depicts as uniquely 
human. In this regard, provisioning constitutes the precondition, means, 
and ends under which “the human” fully, if tautologically, emerges. hrough 
hoarding, Crusoe arrives at a humanity denied to vermin, predators, and the 
savages who invade his island.
“Hunger Knows No Friend”
Robinson Crusoe’s adventures do not end when he leaves the island. Several 
months after Defoe published the Strange Surprizing Adventures, the sequel, 
he Farther Adventures of Robinson Crusoe (1719) appeared. hrough the 
end of the nineteenth century, the Farther Adventures was reprinted regu-
larly with the irst volume and had a signiicant publication history in its 
own right.41 After seven years in England, Crusoe and his nephew board a 
merchant ship bound for the East Indies, with the intention to stop at his 
“Colony” of the coast of northern South America on the way and resupply 
it with skilled tradesmen and provisions.42 En route, they encounter an Eng-
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lish ship, driven from Barbados “a few Days before she was ready to sail, by a 
terrible Hurricane” (21), so before it was fully stafed and provisioned. With 
its masts severely damaged and its captain and irst mate on shore, the ship’s 
skeletal crew has no way to navigate. By the time Crusoe inds them, the 
crew and their passengers have had no “Bread and Flesh” for at least eleven 
days. Hearing this tale from the second mate and six sailors who make their 
way to his vessel, Crusoe resolves to visit the stricken ship and see the “Scene 
of Misery” for himself. here he encounters a tableau out of seventeenth- 
century famine literature. he three passengers, a “Youth and his Mother 
and a Maid- Servant,” having been left for dead in their cabin, are in a “Con-
dition that their Misery is very hard to describe” (22). Nonetheless, Crusoe’s 
relation goes on at some length and furnishes his readers with a gruesome 
object lesson in what happens when provisions are destroyed.
he “poor Mother,” a woman of sense and “good Breeding,” sits on the 
loor, her back to the wall and her “Head sunk in between her shoulders, 
like a Corpse, tho’ not quite dead” (24). She revives briely when she is giv-
en some broth, but only to indicate by “Signs” that they should minister to 
her starving child instead. Her son, who “was preserv’d at the Price of his 
most afectionate Mother’s Life,” lies in a bed with a piece of old glove in his 
mouth, “having eaten up the rest of it” (24). he starving maid sprawls on 
the deck beside her mistress “like one in the last Agonies of Death” (25); ter-
riied by the prospect of her demise, the maid is nevertheless “brokenhearted 
for her Mistress, who she saw dying two or three Days before, and who she 
lov’d most tenderly” (25). Such graphic images of starvation, as we have seen 
in plague literature, were often deployed theologically to remind humans 
of their intrinsic corruption and the prospect of eternal sufering.43 Here, 
in contrast, the passengers and crew on the foundering ship are victims of 
misfortune rather than perpetrators of excess or evil. In fact, emphasizing 
the contingent, even arbitrary, nature of their sufering, Crusoe describes the 
victims as the most “innocent” creatures on the ship: a “poor Mother” will-
ing to die for her son, a “well- bred Modest and sensible Youth,” and a “poor 
Maid” (24, 25).
Even before Crusoe returns to the island, then, this horriic scene empha-
sizes the fundamental truth of shipboard travel and even everyday life: that 
food supplies are always contingent, subject to spoilage, bad luck, bad weath-
er, and vermin. And because the maid and mother are “innocents,” Defoe 
reintroduces, in a diferent context, the moral function of proper provision-
ing: to preserve the fragile boundary between savage and civilized behavior. 
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Under the conditions that Crusoe inds on the stricken ship, the characters’ 
humanity, rather than their faith, is put to the question. he mother dem-
onstrates her willingness to preserve her son by her own deprivation, but for 
Defoe, such self- sacriice cannot be taken for granted. Indeed, much later in 
the narrative, the maid provides an extended account of her struggles with 
starvation and her powerful impulse towards self- preservation. Right before 
he leaves the island for good in the middle of Farther Adventures, Crusoe 
interrupts his narrative to allow Susan, the maid, to tell “one Story more” 
about her ordeal (115). Deprived of broth, bread, or even an old glove, Susan 
relates in horrifying speciicity the sufering that culminates in an impulse 
to eat human lesh and drink human blood. During ive days without food, 
she descended through “very great Hunger,” through “the extremity of Fam-
ine,” and to a grim cycle of aliction: “sick, sleepy, eagerly hungry, Pain in the 
Stomach, then ravenous again, then sick again, then lunatick, then crying, 
then ravenous again” (117). Describing herself as “twice raging mad as any 
Creature in Bedlam,” she falls down, striking her nose against a bed; some of 
her blood is captured in a nearby basin. he next day, in a it of “violent Hun-
ger,” she almost turns cannibal: “I got up ravenous and, in a most dreadful 
Condition. Had my Mistress been dead, as much as I loved her, I am certain, 
I should have eaten a Piece of her Flesh, with as much Relish, and as uncon-
cerned, as ever I did the Flesh of any Creature appointed for Food; and once 
or twice I was going to bite my own Arm” (117). Instead, however, of declin-
ing into the “savagery,” Susan catches sight of the basin with her blood in it: 
“I ran to it, and swallow’d it with such Haste, and such a greedy Appetite, 
as if I had wonder’d no Body had taken it before, and afraid it should be 
taken from me now” (117). Although soon the thought of drinking her blood 
“ill’d [her] with Horror,” she admits that “it check’d the Fit of Hunger, and 
I drank a Draught of fair Water, and was compos’d and refresh’d for some 
Hours after it” (117).
Although Willis and others argued that blood (and especially blood 
of the “more perfect creatures”) was a valuable source of nutrition, Susan’s 
compulsion to drink her own blood both preserves her life and marks her 
descent into bestial behavior.44 One moral of her gruesome story seems to 
be that the exogamous, highly mediated eating practices that character-
ize civilized behavior are themselves partially dependent on food secu-
rity having been ensured. Defoe repeatedly stages, in diferent and often 
empathetic ways, dramatic scenes of near- starvation, the extreme and 
diicult choices they provoke, and how “ravenous” eating must be modu-
 What Happened to the Rats? 159
lated through what he sometimes calls “self- command.” In this case, the 
starving sailors are described as “ravenous”: the men “rather devour’d than 
eat [the food]; they were so exceedingly hungry, that they were in a kind 
ravenous, and had no Command of themselves; and two of them eat with 
so much Greediness, that they were in Danger of their Lives the next 
Morning” (22). But the mother, her son, Susan, and the starving crew also 
illustrate a lesson about the nature of compassion. he “Sight of these 
Peoples Distress,” Crusoe writes, “was very moving to me, and brought to 
Mind what I had a terrible Prospect of at my irst coming on Shore in the 
Island, where I had neither the least Mouthful of Food, or any Prospect 
of procuring any; besides the hourly Apprehension I had of being made 
the Food of other Creatures” (23). Now, however, his own ship properly 
provisioned, Crusoe characterizes the foundering boat as a “Subject for 
our Humanity to work upon”; it ofers an opportunity for him to exhibit 
his fellow- feeling and generosity, sharing with the passengers a substan-
tial portion of his well- stocked magazine without expectation of proit or 
reward (21).45
Indeed, food insecurity, whether through bad luck or bad judgment, 
undermines one’s ability to sympathize or empathize with the sufering of 
others. Several times during the voyage back to his island, Crusoe absolves 
the famished sailors of blame for having abandoned the three passengers to 
starvation or at least tries to justify their actions by emphasizing their equiv-
alent “Distress”: “he Seamen being reduced to such an extreme Necessity 
themselves had no Compassion, we may be sure, for the poor Passengers” 
(22). A few paragraphs later, he reports the Mate’s confession that the crew 
had “wholly neglected” the passengers only because “their own Extremities 
[were] so great” (23). his qualiied absolution establishes a causal relation-
ship between a lack of compassion and a lack of food. Crusoe again rein-
forces the point when, at the end of the scene, the seventeen- year- old son 
begs to be taken aboard Crusoe’s ship, claiming that the “cruel Fellows had 
murther’d his Mother” (25). Crusoe agrees with him, but mitigates any sense 
of moral culpability on the part of these “cruel Fellows”:
And indeed so they had [murdered the mother], that is to say, passively; 
for they might ha’ spar’d a small Sustenance to the poor helpless Widow, 
that might have preserv’d her Life, tho it had been but just to keep her 
alive. But Hunger knows no Friend, no Relation, no Justice, no Right, 
and therefore is remorseless, and capable of no Compassion. (25)
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In one respect, Crusoe’s generalization about the nature of hunger is contra-
dicted by what he inds on board the ship: the mother, after all, had sacriiced 
her own life to preserve her son’s. But his grim observation— “Hunger knows 
no Friend”— also underscores, in dramatic fashion, his view that there is 
often a gap opened by the demands of the corporeal soul for food and the 
desires of the incorporeal one to embrace humane and civil virtues: kinship, 
justice, and compassion. One’s “humanity” is determined by the choices one 
makes within a world sometimes, if not usually, characterized by the break-
down of sociopolitical, technological, and cultural relations that themselves 
depend on the cultivation, proper storage, and distribution of food.
Predators, Bees, and Plantation Politics
For Defoe, as for his contemporary Bernard Mandeville, all creatures are 
driven by appetite, although the force and quality of that drive is species 
speciic. he “iercest Appetite that Nature has given [animals] is Hunger,” 
Mandeville asserts. “Nature” has endowed “Beasts of Prey” with a “much 
keener Appetite” than herbivores— a ierce desire (akin to sex) leading them 
to “crave, trace, and discover” “good Food,” along with an instinct “that teach-
es them to shun, conceal themselves, and run away from those that hunt af-
ter them.”46 Competing needs for food and safety mean that predators often 
go about with “empty Bellies”— with an appetite that “becomes a constant 
fuel to their Anger” (cv). Mandeville’s ravenous predators, driven by their 
“piercing” hunger and forced to “fatigue, harass and expose [themselves] to 
Danger” (civ) for every bite, have much in common with the “beasts of prey” 
appearing throughout the Crusoe trilogy. At the end of Robinson Crusoe, 
Friday wrestles a bear in the Pyrenees, after which he and Crusoe drive of 
a pack of wolves. In both episodes, Defoe emphasizes the predators’ hun-
ger: although men are rarely the “proper Prey” of bears, their behavior is 
unpredictable when driven by hunger (275); the wolves come down from 
snow- covered mountains into bordering forests and towns when their emp-
ty stomachs require them to hunt for prey. Being “excessively hungry and 
raging on that account,” “furious” wolves, incited by the smell of the horses, 
have become “sensless of Danger” and are only with di culty killed or driven 
of by volleys of gunire. Crusoe, in contrast, says, “I was never so sensible 
of Danger in my Life”: “seeing above three hundred Devils come roaring and 
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open- mouth’d to devour us, and having nothing to shelter us, or retreat to, 
I gave myself over for lost” (282). After escaping the wolves, he vows never 
to return to those mountains, claiming that he had rather “go a thousand 
Leagues by Sea, though I was sure to meet with a Storm once a Week” (282). 
What Crusoe describes in the Pyrenees is a weather- sensitive system popu-
lated by opportunistic carnivores sometimes driven by uncontrollable ap-
petites. he violence of encounters between hot- blooded creatures (human 
or otherwise) is precisely what his colony, with its nascent infrastructure of 
agriculture and storage, is intended to prevent.
In Farther Adventures, Defoe recasts the dynamics of hunger, predation, 
and vermin control under the ideological shadow of a colonialist enterprise.47 
At the end of the irst volume of the trilogy, Crusoe had left behind on the 
island seventeen Spaniards, ive Englishmen, Friday’s father, six slaves, some 
women, and a few irearms. In his absence, this ledgling colony is forced to 
deal with the arrival of two hundred and ifty Indians. Defoe’s lengthy de-
scription of this encounter (as it is described to him) emphasizes the ways 
in which these “invaders” threaten fragile food systems and supplies. In the 
irst two counterattacks, the colonists kill or wound about 180, then burn the 
canoes, fearing that the survivors (much like shipboard rats) would return 
with “multitudes” to “desolate the Island, and starve” the Europeans (69). 
Even after their victories, the colonists remain confronted by seventy or so 
fearful, desperate, and hungry men roaming the island, “like wild Beasts,” 
damaging crops and property (70): they “trod all the Corn under- foot; tore 
up the Vines and Grapes, being just then almost ripe, and did to our Men 
inestimable Damage” (70). he colonists, with “their Provision . . . destroy’d, 
and their Harvest spoile’d,” ind themselves in “very bad Circumstances,” 
with no idea “what to do, or which Way to turn themselves” (71). Draw-
ing an explicit parallel between the scavenging Indians and the vermin that 
threatened him and his irst grain crops more than thirty years earlier, Cru-
soe recasts the plight of the colonists in terms of both infestation and preda-
tion: “I look’d upon their Case to have been worse, at this Time, than mine 
was at any Time, after I irst discover’d the Grains of Barley and Rice, and 
got into the Manner of planting and raising my Corn, and my tame Cattle; 
for now they had, as I may say, a hundred Wolves upon the Island, which 
would devour every hing they could come at, yet could hardly be come 
at themselves” (71). Signiicantly, although Crusoe’s language recalls his en-
counters with wolves, carnivorous predators, at the end of Strange Surpriz-
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ing Adventures, the strategies the hero subsequently describes are designed 
less to exterminate the indigenes en masse than to reduce their potentially 
lupine- like violence to a problem of pest containment.
Linking the Indians to vermin, Crusoe’s struggling colonists recast ag-
ricultural and ecological threats— in this case, crop destruction— as a mili-
tary problem with a two- step solution: violence to terrorize and starve the 
surviving Indians, and subsequent managerial control to produce docile 
dependents. Having “daily hunt[ed] and harass[ed]” the Indians, killing as 
many as “they could come at, till they had reduced their Number” (71), the 
colonists drive the survivors to the island’s “hollow Places” where they live 
hungry and miserable: “they reduced them to the utmost Misery for want 
of Food, and many were afterwards found dead in the Woods, without any 
Hurt, but merely starv’d to Death” (71). he second- generation colonists 
treat the Indians much as Crusoe treated the goats and cats during his irst 
stay on the island, subjecting them through controlled starvation and tacti-
cal reward. hus, with their lives and food supplies no longer threatened, 
the colonists, moved by pity, ofer the remaining Indians a part of the island 
to inhabit, corn to plant, and some bread to keep them alive until they can 
harvest their irst crop. In return, the Indians are forced to “keep in their 
own Bounds” and “not come beyond it to injure or prejudice others” (72). 
Coerced into becoming primitive agriculturists, supplied with bread, rice 
cakes, three live goats, and later knives and other tools, the thirty- seven 
remaining “Wretches,” “conin’d to a Neck of Land, surrounded with high 
Rocks behind them” (172) lived as “the most subjected innocent Creatures 
that were ever heard of ” (73). Crusoe banished the rats, culled the cats, 
drove of the crows, and tamed the goats in the irst volume; employing 
similar strategies in the second, the colonists humble and make “tractable” 
potentially verminous humans, eventually teaching them, as he says, “how 
to plant and live upon their daily Labour” (172)— that is, how to accept 
integration into the plantation economy.48
Crusoe’s insistence that the formerly verminous Indians have achieved, 
through farming, a kind of innocence is in keeping with seventeenth- century 
agricultural treatises that characteristically invoked an entire bestiary to 
describe the signiicance, naturalness, and moral superiority of farmers’ la-
bors. Abraham Cowley, in his inluential essay, “On Agriculture,” declares 
that farmers “live upon an estate given them by their mother . . . like sheep 
and kine,” in contrast to “others” (presumably city dwellers and civil servants) 
who live on resources “cheated from their brethren . . . like wolves and foxes, 
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by the acquisitions of rapine.”49 Cowley’s imagery anticipates the logic of 
Crusoe’s colony, where the major structuring diference between producers 
and consumers is igured in animal terms; indeed, Cowley’s distinction be-
tween “useful” and “pernicious” members of the human- animal kingdom op-
erated as a familiar— almost clichéd— basis for seventeenth- century writers 
to imagine an eicient and self- regulating agricultural economy. he theo-
logian and mathematician Isaac Barrow linked predators and vermin in his 
posthumously published work, Of Industry, declaring that “a noble heart will 
disdain to subsist like a drone upon the hony gathered by others labour; 
like a vermine to iltch its food out of the publick granary; or like a shark to 
prey on the lesser fry; but will, one way or other earn his subsistence; for he 
that doth not earn, can hardly own his bread.”50 For Barrow, drones, vermin, 
and sharks are alike in their apparently willful refusal to “earn” their “bread’ 
by working willingly for a communal good as well as for personal beneit; 
Defoe simply provides a primer for how, on a global scale, human vermin can 
be transformed in ways that make possible the colonial ideal of “innocent” 
and beneicial labor.51
And here one inally encounters bees. Whereas the teeming, thronging, 
and swarming movements of hungry crows, cannibals, and wolves threat-
en Crusoe’s well- being, bees and their spatially organized hives helped to 
deine, for him as for others, a cultural ideal of provisioning, prosperity, 
and political order. Impressed by the design and construction of the now- 
paciied Indians’ highly eicient basket houses, the colonists, before Crusoe 
returns to the island, “got the wild Savages to come and do the like for them” 
(73). Crusoe reports on his arrival that the “two English Mens Colonies . . . 
look’d, at a Distance, as if they liv’d all like Bees in a Hive” (73). his simile 
draws upon the long tradition of georgic literature, going back to Hesiod, in 
which bees were cast as Nature’s artiicers, capable of producing their own 
government. As Danielle Allen has argued, “in all periods, the bees’ hive was 
used to exemplify perfect political order, whether that was taken to be mo-
narchic (Virgil), communitarian (Christian writers), or egalitarian (some 
French revolutionaries).”52 Pliny, Aristotle, and Virgil had sung the praises 
of the bees for their sense of government in subordinating individual desire 
to the common good. heir “love of lowers, and glory in creating honey,” as 
Virgil put it, is the foundation for the hive’s prosperity: although individual 
bees have short lives, “the species remains immortal, and the fortune of the 
hive/ is good for many years, and grandfathers’ grandfathers are counted.”53 
In Henry V, the war- mongering Canterbury articulates the political lessons 
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that bees embody. hey are deined by their “Obedience” as “Creatures that 
by a rule in nature teach/ he act of order to a peopled kingdom.”54
In anthropomorphizing bees as magistrates, merchants, masons, sol-
diers, citizens, and porters, Canterbury describes a hierarchical order that 
descends from a supposedly male monarch to “the lazy yawning drone” 
(I.ii.203). “Order,” writes Allen, “consists precisely of functional diferentia-
tion” determined in relation to the all- important task of the hive: to pro-
duce and store suicient food for the winter (88). Later in the seventeenth 
century, the Cambridge Neoplatonist Henry More singles out bees (along 
with elephants) to further his argument that there is “no Evil but Good in 
the Animal Life” because each species exhibits in its nature the wisdom of a 
Divine creator: peacocks exhibit a love of praise, storks natural afection for 
their ofspring, and domesticated dogs a principle of altruism. he “Political 
order and government in the Commonwealth of Bees,” More continues,
is not only noted by great naturalists  .  .  . but vulgarly known to every 
Countreyman that has Hives in his garden; where he may observe, how 
some one Bee by his humming, as by the sound of a Trumpet, awakes 
the rest to their work; how itly the whole Company distribute the sev-
eral tasks of Melliication amongst themselves; how severe punishers 
they are of Drones, ejecting them out of their Hives; how loyal they are 
to their King or Captain, moving as he moves, and sustaining him with 
their own bodies when he is weary with lying.55
For More, like Shakespeare, the “Commonwealth of Bees” depends on both 
the “loyalty” of worker bees to their “King or Captain,” but also on the shared 
project of “Melliication,” or producing the honey that sustains the colony.56 
Bees are a model of social order and government, then, precisely because 
they are highly eicient hoarders, mobilizing to sustain a polity deined in 
terms of the production, storage, and defense of a vulnerable food supply.57 
As Virgil puts it, “hey alone  .  .  . in summer, remembering the winter to 
come, / Undergo labour, storing their gains for all.”58 For More and his con-
temporaries, humans can learn from bees, these masters of corporeal imagi-
nation and foresight, that cooperative food production and storage are the 
primary means of self- and species- preservation.
Crusoe’s commitment to the Georgic tradition is embodied in his admir-
ing and lengthy description of the colony’s architecture, which resembles 
a human apiary: catching sight of the Englishmen’s houses, he remarks “at 
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a Distance,” it looked “as if they liv’d all like Bees in a Hive.”59 he form of 
the colonists’ housing mirrors its primary function— to protect and preserve 
their fragile food stores. he Indians made both the houses and fences, “rad-
dling or working” the dried plants “up like Basket- work all the way round, 
which was a very extraordinary Piece of Ingenuity” (73). he “Basket- work” 
of native materials underscores the bee- like self- suiciency of these enclo-
sures, and while the human apiary “look’d very odd,” Crusoe remarks, the 
basket- work houses constituted “an exceeding good Fence, as well against 
Heat, as against all Sorts of Vermine” (73). Together the houses demon-
strate that the colonists have escaped their former statuses as vermin, preda-
tors, or scavengers and have transitioned, collectively, into a working polis, a 
human instantiation of More’s “Commonwealth of Bees.”
Similarly, the house inhabited by Will Atkins— who, we are told, has 
become “a very industrious necessary and sober fellow” (73)— stands as the 
architectural apotheosis of the agro- colonial ideal. Defoe provides far more 
detail about this “Great Bee Hive” than does about the cave- like habitation 
in which he dwelled for over twenty years:
[he house] was 120 Paces round in the out- side, as I measur’d by my 
Steps; the Walls were as close work’d as a Basket in Pannels, or Squares 
of 32 in Number, and very strong, standing about seven Foot high; in 
the middle was another, not above 22 Paces round, but built stronger, 
being Eight- square in its Form, and in the eight Corners stood eight 
very strong Posts, round the top of which he laid strong Pieces pinn’d to-
gether with wooden Pins, from which he rais’d a Piramid for the Roof of 
eight Rafters, very handsome I assure you, and join’d together very well, 
tho’ he had no Nails, and only a few Iron Spikes. . . . after he had pitch’d 
the Roof of his inner- most Tent, he work’d it up between the Rafters 
with Basket- work, so irm, and thatch’d that over again so ingeniously 
with Rice- Straw, and over that a large Leaf of a Tree, which cover’d the 
Top, that his house was as dry as if it had been til’d or slated. Indeed he 
own’d that the Savages made the Basket- work for him.
he outer Circuit was cover’d, as a Lean too, all round this inner Ap-
partment, and long Rafters lay from the two and thirty Angles to the top 
Posts of the inner House, being about 20 Foot Distant, so that there was 
Space like a Walk within the outer Wicker- Wall, and without the inner, 
near 20 Foot wide.
he inner Place he partition’d of with the same Wicker- work, but 
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much fairer, and divided it into six Appartments, so that he had six 
Rooms on a Floor; and out of every one of these there was a Door, irst 
into the Entry or Coming into the Main- tent, and another Door into 
the Space or Walk that was round it; so that Walk was also divided into 
six equal Parts, which serv’d not only for Retreat, but to store up any 
Necessaries which the Family had Occasion for. hese six Spaces not 
taking up the whole Circumference, what other Appartments the outer 
Circle had, were thus order’d: As soon as you were in at the Door of the 
outer Circle, you had a short Passage straight before you to the Door of 
the inner House, but on either Side was a wicker Partition, and a Door 
in it, by which you went, irst, into a large Room or Store- house, 20 Foot 
wide, and about 30 Foot long, and thro’ that into another not quite so 
long; so that in the outer Circle was ten handsome Rooms, six of which 
were only to be come at thro’ the Apartments of the inner Tent, and 
serv’d as Closets or retiring Rooms to the respective Chambers of the 
inner Circle, and four large Warehouses or Barns, or what you please to 
call them, which went in thro’ one another, two on either Hand of the 
Passage, that led thro’ the outer Door to the inner Tent.
Such a piece of Basket- Work, I believe, was never seen in the World, 
nor a House or Tent, so neatly contriv’d, much less, so built. In this great 
Beehive liv’d the three Families. (73– 75)
Although a beehive is composed of a series of regular hexagons and Will 
Atkins’ house is an octagon subdivided into large and small apartments, 
both structures adhere to a strict geometric architecture. Hives protect bees 
and their food supplies from heat and moisture, while channeling movement 
into and from the hive and the outside world. In his account of the beehive 
later in the eighteenth century, Oliver Goldsmith anthropomorphizes apid 
architecture and the putative architects: “hese lodgings have spaces, like 
streets, between them, large enough to give the bees a free passage in and 
out; and yet narrow enough to preserve the necessary heat. he mouth of 
every cell is defended by a border, which makes the door a little less than the 
inside of the cell, which serves to strengthen the whole.”60 Images such as 
this one naturalize an extended analogy between the biopolitics of bees and 
humans. he multifunctional and hypereicient internal structure of the 
hive becomes a kind of disciplinary mechanism: according to Goldsmith, the 
“cells serve for diferent purposes: for laying up their young; for their wax, 
which in winter becomes a part of their food; and for their honey, which 
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makes their principal subsistence” (71). With its living quarters, storerooms, 
antechambers, and passageways, Atkins’ “Great Beehive” exhibits a similar 
kind of multifaceted order that, in its eicient procurement and storing of 
provisions, embodies and reinscribes the principles of an ordered state.61
he precondition of the apid state is hunger: its solution, industry; its 
outcome, morality. In his commentary on Aesop’s Fables, John Trusler claims 
“the hive is a signiicant emblem of industry, it being the store- house, where 
the bees lay up their provision for the winter.” Trusler then turns “industry,” 
intensive labor, into a kind of trans- species ideal. “Industry,” he continues, “is 
the straight line to retirement, for the diligent man maketh rich.”62 In he 
Grumbling Hive, Mandeville’s argument about industry is more complex, 
but he begins by describing it as a response to “Hunger”: “a dreadful Plague 
no doubt / Yet who digests or thrives without?” In his poem, “Insects” who 
“lived like Men” demonstrate how private vices lead to public good. Al-
though Mandeville’s poem is sometimes read satirically, within the context 
of early modern bestiaries, any comparison between men and bees signaled 
an attempt to deine humans and their political relations in ways outside of, 
or tangential to, a Hobbesian zoography, dominated by predators and prey. 
If, the logic goes, all animals are driven by hunger and compete with each for 
food, and if hot- blooded animals (like dogs, wolves, and humans) are espe-
cially destructive in this regard, humans might do well to take a lesson from 
bees who, in their ability to convert natural resources, nonviolently, into food 
that sustains rather than destroys the hive, are not so much anti- vermin as 
non- vermin. By virtue of functional diferentiation as workers, drones, and 
queens directed towards the shared goal of thoughtful provision, bees dem-
onstrate how to arrive at communal plenty: through excess of industry, bees 
arrive at moderation.
Atkins’s beehive house, then, is proof, presumably, of progress, of how 
far the colonists have come since Crusoe’s irst eforts, decades earlier, to lay 
up a store of raisins to “furnish” himself “for the wet Season” (131), only to 
ind that they they had either rotted (“spoil’d”) or had otherwise been made 
inedible by “wild Creatures thereabouts” (131). he colonists’ mimicry of bees 
demonstrates their (admittedly shaky) claim to having escaped the less- 
desirable society of parasites and predators described in cringeworthy detail 
by Jonson, Rochester, and Shadwell. he plantation’s “Barns” and “Ware-
houses” are ofered as a sign that the Europeans’ eforts are directed by a 
God who, from the beginning, has guided Crusoe into exhibiting his divine 
reason (125). As I have suggested, however, the materials and workmanship 
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of Atkins’s “Great Hive” are not really— or not solely— artifacts of Euro-
pean techno- superiority. Instead, the Europeans constructed their colony 
by appropriating the labor of men formerly described as “a hundred Wolves 
upon the Island.” he “Great Hive,” in other words, is built on a great vio-
lence. Mandeville deines “society” as “a Body Politick, in which Man either 
subdued by Superior Force or by Persuasion drawn from his Savage State 
is become a Disciplin’d Creature, that can ind his own Ends in Labour-
ing for others, and where under one Head or other Form of Government 
each Member is render’d Subservient to the Whole and all of them by 
cunning Management are made to Act as one” (ccxiv). From this perspec-
tive, Crusoe’s multicultural island exhibits a kind of Mandevillian logic: 
both the Indians and the formerly “wild” colonists, like Will Atkins, have 
been “Disciplin’d” through a “Superior Force” or “Persuasion”— including 
near- starvation— to work together with supposedly hive- like eiciency. 
Solutions to the characteristic problems that confronted island colonies— 
deforestation, soil exhaustion, disease, dependency on foreign goods and 
supplies— can be managed, Defoe suggests, only through moral reforma-
tion and the careful appropriation of indigenous materials, know- how, and 
technologies.63 It appears from his works that some may be starved to pro-
cure food for the many, and that food security constitutes one of the most 
important goals of the modern state.
Colony Collapse and the Death of Drones
Midway through Farther Adventures, Crusoe decides to leave the island 
for good and, now in his sixties, embark on a career as a merchant in Asia. 
Robert Markley calls attention to the vehemence of Crusoe’s language in 
abandoning the colony: “I have now done with my Island, and all Manner of 
Discourse about it; and whoever reads the rest of my Memorandum’s would 
do well to turn his houghts entirely from it” (125).64 In Crusoe’s absence, 
the beehive settlement seems to undergo a kind of colony collapse that is 
only partially explained in the novel.65 “he last Letters I had from any of 
[the colonists],” Crusoe writes, “was by my Partners means; who afterwards 
sent another Sloop to the Place, and who sent me Word, tho’ I had not the 
Letter till ive Years after it was written; that they went on but poorly, were 
Male- content with their long Stay there: that Will. Atkins was dead; that 
ive of the Spaniards were come away, and that tho’ they had not been much 
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molested by the Savages, yet they had had some Skirmishes with them; and 
that they begg’d of him to write to me, to think of the Promise I had made 
to fetch them away, that they might see their own Country again before 
they dy’d” (126). Without its “Patron” the leaderless colony, especially after 
Atkins’s death, reverts to entropic disorder. he “People under no Discipline 
or Government but my own” (126), posits Crusoe, might have “done well 
enough,” but without his “cunning Management,” as Mandeville calls it, the 
colony becomes a failing backwater. Because it operated as a fantasy of col-
lective zoopolitical structure rather than as a colony per se, Crusoe’s island 
had never been attached to a state. Crusoe admits that he “never so much 
as pretended to plant in the Name of any Government or Nation, or to 
acknowledge any Prince, or to call [his] People Subjects to any one Nation 
more than another; nay, [he] never so much as gave the Place a Name” (125). 
Now, as the nameless colony collapses, the beehive metaphor crumples, too, 
reappearing in the context of stasis and idleness. “he whole World is in 
Motion,” says an English merchant who persuades Crusoe to outit a trading 
expedition to China, “rouling round and round; all the Creatures of God, 
heavenly Bodies and earthly are busy and diligent, Why should we be idle? 
here are no Drones in the World but Men, Why should we be of that 
Number?” (144).
For the merchant, drones are associated with a sedentary, land- based 
existence, the kind of life Crusoe compulsively seeks to escape in order to re-
turn to the sea. his analogy is worth exploring in more detail. At least since 
Virgil, as Allen argues, “the laboring bee is the picture of perfection, superior 
to the imperfect and lazy drone” (94). Imagined as females until the late 
16th century— until the “king” bee was recognized as a queen— the “stay- at- 
home drones,” neither gathering nectar nor building hives, were perceived 
as emblems of waste and luxury, as drains on the hive’s food supplies.66 he 
discovery that drones were male “came with a lood of anxieties,” Allen con-
tinues, “about the relative value of male and female work” (96) along with, I 
would add, more animated discussion about the well- known phenomenon 
of drone sacriice. Writing in 1637, Richard Remnant explains in Discourse 
or Histories of Bees how female bees kill the drones “for necessity”: “for the 
males are exceedingly great eaters and wasters of the winter provision, there-
fore the females kill them, and had rather be without their sweet companie, 
than starve in their winter.”67 More than 100 years after Remnant, in he 
Deserted Village, Goldsmith describes this selective extermination as a “cruel 
policy,” but one that attests to Nature’s refusal of luxury: “he drone bees . . . 
170 imperfect creatures
are marked for slaughter. hese, which had hitherto led a life of indolence 
and pleasure, whose only employment was in impregnating the queen, and 
rioting upon the labours of the hive, without aiding in the general toil, now 
share the fate of most voluptuaries, and fall a sacriice to the general resent-
ment of society.”68 When Crusoe’s merchant exhorts him to leave the hive— 
there are no “Drones in the World but Men”— he appeals to a similar moral 
and economic logic: as a male, he can either stay at home, like the drone, and 
be idle, or can join the ranks of the worker bee, “rouling round and round,” 
“busy and diligent.”
While Crusoe’s “Great Hive” houses no drones— indeed, no queen, and 
very few females— the analogy nevertheless strikes me as being ontologically 
constitutive. If the Enlightenment state is built on the beehive, that state, 
like the beehive, contains within it and promotes a sacriicial economy. he 
famed eiciency of the hive, its legendary industry, depends (according to 
seventeenth- and eighteenth- century naturalists) on the systematic exter-
mination of hungry members whose use- value has been expended. In this 
sense, the industrious beehive generates its own vermin, those who provoke 
“resentment” for their “rioting” on food for which they have not worked. Re-
garded as part of a sacriicial economy, then, the powerful bee analogy con-
tinues the impulse to extermination that we have seen in previous chapters 
populated by leas, witches, rats, Jews, dogs, and other “imperfect creatures.” 
Such “imperfection” may be variously associated, as we have seen, with a 
perceived lack of sexual development, with sexual or gender ambiguity, with 
simple because cold- blooded neuroanatomy, with rapid reproduction, and 
with an excess of appetite. Hungry, horny, efeminate, and luxurious drones 
fulill several of these criteria. he important point is that drones, like these 
other vermin, are necessary to the “well- ordered” human hive, threatening 
but decidedly constitutive agents within its religious, sexual, medical, eco-
nomical, and moral systems.
What Defoe’s rats, wolves, cannibals, and drones make explicit— and 
what Imperfect Creatures has, I hope, conveyed— is how much those second- 
order systems depend on something many Anglo- European scholars take 
for granted: food. Mosca’s observation on a corrupt Venice in Ben Jonson’s 
Volpone holds true, it turns out, not only for Rochester’s London but for 
Crusoe’s island: “All the world is little else, in nature, / But Parasites, or Sub-
parasites.”69 Crusoe, often taken as an embodiment of modern economic val-
ues, appears iconically in the eighteenth century in illustrations that show 
him, as Richard Nash puts it, “swallowed up in his goatskins.”70 hese skins 
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derive from the same goats that serve as his food, clothing, and, if Alexander 
Selkirk is any indication, perhaps his sometimes consorts. (Selkirk may have 
“cherished” his cats to ward of rats, but he had sex with the island’s female 
goats, notching their ears as a sign that they had been “had.”) In some sense, 
Crusoe’s parasitic relationship to Nature mirrors our own. We too live “in 
the animal we eat,” or, as Serres puts it, “We live within tents of skin like 
the gods within their tabernacles.”71 Defoe’s hero struggles mightily to avoid 
descending to the level of scavenging or ravenous beasts, but his adventures 
are haunted by the half- realized knowledge that the lines between species, 
like those between “perfect” and “imperfect” creatures, are porous, and eas-
ily exposed. hat rats, the primary material threat to his food supply, were 
banished in advance demonstrates the extent to which Defoe’s metaphysical 
guarantees of species identity and providential fortune are themselves, as 
Serres suggests, always idealizations, ones that deny the force and historicity 
of nature. Complex ecologies function in and through the very parasites that 
an edenic nature must ignore. As English literature’s most famous “vermin-
ous son of God,” Robinson Crusoe signiies both the struggle and the failure 
to escape the entangled feeding practices of the more- than- human world.
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Afterword
We Have Never Been Perfect
“If there is one thing a literary education is good for it is to ill  
you with a sense of doom.”
— Sam Savage, Firmin: Adventures of a  
Metropolitan Low Life
Reading beneath the grain encourages us to consider how engrained English 
literary history is in food systems, in how and what to eat. Feeding practices 
cut across and unite medical, moral, economic, and political histories in ways 
that demand multidisciplinary work.1 Animal studies, food studies, environ-
mental studies, and agricultural studies are all points of emphasis in a much 
larger network of biopolitical relations. he “question of the animal,” then, 
can be abstracted neither from matters of environmental stress nor from the 
role of speciic animals, including humans, within equally speciic food sys-
tems. We survive (or not) with other creatures in living ecologies on which 
we exert considerable pressure; as Serres puts it, we are “not separated, but 
plunged, immersed in the Biogea, in cousin company.”2 In Biogea, Serres’ goal 
is to “think like that company, in it, by it, with it, for it” (107). Imperfect Crea-
tures shares his sentiment if not his method; I have sought throughout this 
study to treat insects, rodents, and occasional vermin as subjects of a shared 
world. Vermin, I have argued, provide a point of entry to this living ecology, 
not because they are constitutively diferent from other animals but because 
they make explicit what we all have in common. In Serres’ words, because 
our behavior “resembles that of other insects, other rodents or poisonous 
plants,” neither scientiically nor morally can “we . . . claim to be subjects in 
the midst of a world of objects” (107).
Indeed, one might argue, the reinforcement and obstinate staying power 
of the subject/object, human/animal distinction in early modern culture, 
symptomized in Descartes, is partially a byproduct of periodic food inse-
curity and correspondent feeding practices. By the seventeenth century, as 
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we have seen, humans lived, struggled, and died within a complex system of 
dietary habits and moral choices about which protein pools, in diferent cir-
cumstances, were deemed suitable, or unsuitable, for human consumption. 
Rapidly- reproducing creatures— frogs, mice, locusts, lice, snails, lobsters, 
and other “imperfect” beings— are treated by English writers as disgusting 
animals, it for consumption only during dearth or famine. In natural phi-
losophy, correspondingly, Willis reines and naturalizes this dietary practice 
in neuroanatomical arguments that the corporeal soul, which lies “hid in the 
Blood, or Vital Liquer,” is distributed unequally across the animal kingdom.3 
He places living creatures into three classes according to “he Various Con-
stitution of the Vital Humour”: those without blood (insects, certain ishes, 
oysters, lobsters, and crab); those with “less perfect” or frigid blood (earth-
worms, some ishes, frogs, serpents, and lizards); and those with “more per-
fect” or hot blood (fowls and four- footed beasts) (7). From his perspective, 
to eat meat, or animal lesh, is to partake of food in its most nutritive be-
cause most complex or “perfect” form.
Eighteenth- century attacks on the eating of lesh similarly replicate the 
neo- Aristotelian division between perfect and imperfect animals but chal-
lenge the values inherent in these categories. Bernard Mandeville’s 1732 
statement against eating lesh, for example, often taken as a touchstone 
for “modern” vegetarianism, follows Willis in organizing edible animals 
into “more” and “less perfect” beings, but replaces the former’s emphasis on 
“nutritive value” with “afective value.” Writing after Willis, Richard Lower, 
Edward Tyson, and other comparative anatomists, Mandeville argues the 
anatomical similarities between “such perfect Animals as Sheep and Oxen” 
imply analogous emotional structures— an innate, automatic sympathy.4 
he “Heart, the Brain and Nerves difer so little from ours,” he writes, 
sounding much like Willis in his account of the brute or sensitive soul, that 
“. . . the Separation of the Spirits from the Blood, the Organs of Sense, and 
consequently Feeling itself, are the same as they are in Human Creatures” 
(173). In contrast to Willis, however, Mandeville assumes such structural 
and emotional equivalencies make the “more perfect” not ideal but unit for 
human consumption: “I can’t imagine,” he continues, “how a Man not hard-
ened in Blood and Massacre, is able to see a violent Death, and the Pangs 
of it, without concern” (174). For him, a seemingly natural reluctance to kill 
perfect creatures, or to eat familiar ones, is proof of biological kinship from 
which the aversion emanates. Not only are most people averse to the idea of 
being a butcher, they are reluctant to “taste of any Creatures they have daily 
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seen and been acquainted with, whilst they were alive” (174). Both reactions, 
he claims, suggest “a consciousness of Guilt” (174).
What makes Mandeville’s argument for vegetarianism possible is not 
simply a discourse of sensibility or compassion but a prior recognition of 
biological kinship. Mandeville deploys a rhetorical shorthand, sidestepping 
the kind of neuroanatomical language that Willis had used in the 1660s, 
but preserving its logic. In his mind, sea creatures exist, for most people, 
beyond the afective realm that perfect creatures share. “Reason excites our 
Compassion but faintly,” he argues, “and therefore I would not wonder how 
Men should so little commiserate such imperfect Creatures as Cray ish, 
Oysters, Cockles, and indeed all Fish in general: As they are mute, and their 
inward Formation, as well as outward Figure, vastly diferent from ours, 
they express themselves unintelligibly to us, and therefore ’tis not strange 
that their Grief should not afect our Understanding, which it cannot reach” 
(174). Because nothing “stirs us to Pity so efectually, as when the Symptoms 
of Misery strike immediately upon our Senses,” some people, at least, are 
“mov’d” at the “Noise” of a “live Lobster upon the Spit”; despite being unin-
telligible to reason, lobsters and other arthropods have sensitive souls and 
therefore are not banished irrevocably from community and moral vision 
(174). Mandeville’s argument for compassionate consumption, then, repli-
cates the tendency of seventeenth- century natural philosophy to reject abso-
lute diferences between humans and animals. Instead, diference gives way 
to a continuum of perfection, to a series of distinctions imagined in terms of 
capacities and practices— not only “reason,” abstractly considered, but “com-
passion,” “benevolism,” “imagination,” and “mechanical art.”
In his insistence that feeding practices are, or should be, tethered to one’s 
capacity for fellow feeling, Mandeville promotes what, in his Care of the Self, 
Foucault calls a discourse of epimeleia, ancient regimens of self- discipline 
practiced in the name of “life.”5 Foucault attends to such modes of ethical 
self- fashioning primarily as a means of thinking about the individual organi-
zation of pleasure, whether health or sex, but refusing to ofer a blueprint for 
society. In contrast, Mandeville’s question to the epicurean— “what animal 
have you spared to satisfy the caprices of a languid appetite?”— implies that 
humans, by virtue of their species being, have an obligation to reject promis-
cuous consumption. In efect, Mandeville’s argument is a purifying gesture 
typical of modernity; coming after Gassendi, Willis, Tyson, and others had 
challenged, if not swept away, human- animal diference, Mandeville restores 
the place of humans at the upper end of the scale by insisting on their innate 
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moral sensibility. “As in all Animals that are not too imperfect to discover 
Pride,” he writes, “we ind, that the inest and such as are the most beauti-
ful and valuable of their kind, have general the greatest Share of it; so in 
Man, the most perfect of Animals, [pride] is so inseparable from his very Es-
sence . . . that without it the Compound he is made of would want one of the 
chiefest ingredients” (18). Although not peculiar to the human “Compound,” 
the experience of pride in humans is sign and symptom of their status as 
the “most perfect of Animals,” which in this case means the ones most sub-
ject to their complex biology: they should reason more rigorously, feel more 
strongly, and empathize more deeply. Humans are biological hybrids whose 
species identity depends on their ability to articulate distinctions between 
themselves and other perfect creatures. hat may seem to be a surprising 
stance from the writer who promoted a satiric identiication with insects in 
Fable of the Bees. But Mandeville’s vegetarian ethos depends simultaneously 
on an identiication with other creatures, who share our corporeal soul, and 
a disidentiication from them because, being less perfect, they are not perfect 
enough.
Given his fascination with parasites and other vermin, Serres sometimes 
looks like a contemporary Mandeville; working both within and against the 
Enlightenment continuum of perfection, his writing, like Mandeville’s, rests 
uncomfortably on the knife- edge between science and satire. Like Roches-
ter, Pope, and Shadwell, Serres could be said to deploy rats, insects, and 
other less perfect creatures primarily as a means of satirical delation, as in 
Rochester’s sneer against the “mite” who thinks “he’s an image of the Ini-
nite.” “We have made the louse in our image,” Serres writes in he Parasite, 
“Let us see ourselves in his” (7). From this perspective, his task is largely 
deconstructive, its goal to make explicit and invert the value of the terms 
that anchor the Great Chain of Being. From the beginning, Serres insists, 
humans are “immersed” in the bios and occupy no God- given superiority 
within it; we are “on the same level as the other living things,” he insists, 
“neither more or less than ants, seaweed or rats” (107). Indeed, Biogea de-
scribes humans as one of many “invasive species”: “our hunting, gathering, 
cultivations, breedings, cities, industries and transportations,” writes Serres, 
“continually disrupt vital local balances by favoring . . . the disembarkation 
of other species, just as invasive as we are” (107). In this posthumanist ver-
sion of plague literature, Serres encourages us to acknowledge our status as 
the plagues from which other animals lee; like frogs, locusts, rats, lice, and 
other “imperfect” creatures, we overrun the Biogea, we spoil food systems, 
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and we spread diseases whose origins are only less slightly mysterious than 
they were in the seventeenth century. “Sailors, rats, leas microbes” move in 
great populations; they “lood the world” and encounter, on the way, other 
similarly “uncontrollable” species with whom they engage in “ierce competi-
tion” (106). At best, humans battle against other species in a constant, near- 
Hobbesian state of interspecies war.
he futility of such competition, however, seems to be the point of a 
story Serres, or his character Monsieur Arhan, a lighthouse keeper, tells 
midway through Biogea about a “ghost ship” of rats who, having triumphed 
over the crews’ “attempt to reason” with them, and having “feasted on the 
organs and bones of all the sailors,” were left the ship’s “sole masters” (97). 
When the rats no longer had any food supplies to gnaw on— “hawser, bar-
rel, dried cod, biscuits, or sailors”— they turned on one another like, Arhan 
says, “cursed shipwrecked people” (98). Eventually, the ship washes up on an 
Italian island, where “tens of thousands of animals, fasting since forever and 
a day” disembark and “galloped at the heels” of the lighthouse keeper “to de-
vour him, peacoat included” (99). Arhan’s colleague makes it to the lantern 
room but realizes the “entire islet” is now covered with swarming rats. He 
hears “the enormous rumbling of the rodents attempting to climb the tower, 
covering almost all of it”:
Was the door of the lantern going to hold? Howling and sticky, a mass 
was pushing against it, and behind that fragile panel, my colleague pant-
ing. hat, madam, is the entire story: all of a sudden, without warning, 
alone against an army. You think you’re calm, cleaning your things with a 
nanny- goat skin, and, suddenly, the downpour of rats. . . . Who’d believe 
it? (100)
Eventually, humans entice the rats away by loading a ship with rotting meat 
and then, once the rats are on board, setting the ship on ire.
For Serres, the eventually incinerated rodents are not antagonists in a 
tale of human progress. Instead, as in he Parasite, homologies between their 
feeding practices and our own underscore the need for humans to realize that 
ierce and destructive competition for food “in this island” he calls the Biogea 
will never stop. His tale about rat- inhabited ships both recalls the struggles on 
Crusoe’s island and empties Crusoe’s wars against birds, goats, and Indians of 
their theological power. While no less allegorical than Robinson Crusoe, Biogea 
has the polemical and empirical advantage of treating the world as an open 
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system from which rats (human or otherwise) cannot and should not be ex-
cluded a priori. In contrast to the Garden of Eden, the Biogea was not created 
for the sons of God; indeed, its history thwarts even our claims to thanatologi-
cal superiority: “In spite of our boasting,” Serres writes, “even directed towards 
our most vile acts of violence, despite our sublime talents as murderers, we’re 
not as good as the rats and the leas, nor the bacteria and viruses” (105). his 
wry argument makes a crucial point: the politics of purity tend towards mutual 
and collective destruction. Crusoe attempts to “secure” his island and supplies 
through extermination and containment, prayer and conjuring— much in the 
same way that the Lord Mayor, Alderman, and people of London in Journal of 
the Plague Year sought to secure themselves from contamination: in addition 
to killing the “forty thousand Dogs” and “ive times as many Cats,” all “possible 
Endeavors were us’d . . . to destroy the Mice and Rats, especially the latter; by 
laying Rats Bane and other Poisons for them, and a prodigious multitude of 
them were also destroy’d.”6 Such eforts, whether applied to humans or non-
humans, are doomed in advance, claims Serres, because they imply a zero- sum 
game among matched participants. And when, or if, we have “destroyed every 
other living species” on this “ghost planet,” Serres asks in the person of Arhan, 
will we turn on each other, as the shipbound rats do? Will we “drink the blood 
of our cousins”? (98– 99)7 his question, the dystopian version of Mandeville’s 
challenge to the epicurean, similarly insists that moral and political relations 
cannot be species speciic.
If we are to avoid the fate of cannibal rats adrift on a dead planet, accord-
ing to Serres, we must negotiate what he calls “a mutual aid beneit pact” (171) 
that difers markedly from the violent, onto- theologic practices of Crusoe. 
In a powerfully constitutive metaphor, Serres argues that a precondition for 
such negotiation is “listening” to the languages, the signals, the sounds of the 
presumed objects against which (or whom) we deine ourselves. While the 
Biogea includes the entire physical world, such sound “bursts forth better” 
from the “maws” of animals than from “loods, storms, and volcanoes” (109). 
Serres’ parasite, then, his “noise,” his “third man,” turns out to be neither 
“man” nor “human” at all, but a collection of locks, broods, colonies, swarms, 
packs, plagues, nests, and companies.8 Vermin occupy a foundational place 
in Serres’ ecozoography, not only because they share with humans invasive, 
infesting, infecting behaviors but also because they are physically, cognitive-
ly, morally, and theologically excluded from our idealized, still theologically 
inlected worlds.
Following Serres’ lead, Imperfect Creatures has turned away from the pairs 
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of perfect creatures ambling of of Noah’s Ark and has listened, instead, to 
the noises of those excluded ones who intrude on our material and imagined 
ields and gardens, giving them shape. he vermin who cavort through Ben 
Jonson’s Volpone, the locusts massing as armies in Abraham Cowley’s poem, 
and the dogs rambling in St. James’s Park encourage us to remain open to 
ontical and ontological skirmishes in seventeenth- and eighteenth- century 
literature, to examine Latour’s nature/culture before “nature” has been dis-
articulated, dressed, plated, and brought to the table. In this context, Serres’ 
spiritual predecessor, Mandeville, reminds us that, if we have never been 
perfect, we have never stopped looking for humane and responsible ways to 
live in the world we share with swarms, packs, prides, herds, and locks. If 
we have never been perfect, we have also never been entirely identical with 
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